ANDREAS STEINBICHLER/AP

Tibetan rioters wreck a car at Bakhor Square in Lhasa on March 14.

April is the cruellest month, breeding
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing
Memory and desire, stirring
Dull roots with spring rain.

– T.S. Eliot, ‘The Burial of the Dead’ in The Waste Land, 1922.

MARCH is the cruellest month for Tibetans in China if you were to go by the serf-owners’ uprising that broke out on March 10, 1959 and the troubles that surfaced sporadically after that, in 1987 and 1989 – or what happened in Lhasa, capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), on March 14, 2008 and subsequently in some Tibetan autonomous areas in Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan provinces.

I. DEIFYING THE RIOTS: THROUGH A TWISTED LENS

If you go by Western media reports, the propaganda of the theocratic ‘Tibetan government-in-exile’ in Dharamsala and the votaries of the ‘Free Tibet’ cause, or by the fulminations of Nancy Pelosi and the Hollywood glitterati, Tibet is in the throes of a mass democratic uprising against Han Chinese communist rule. Some of the more fanciful news stories, images, and opinion pieces on the ‘democratic’ potential of this uprising have been put out by leading international news agencies, Western newspapers, and television networks. Unsurprisingly, these demonstrably false, manipulated reports have drawn condemnation and sharp criticism from tens of thousands of Chinese ‘netizens.’

The Pavlovian media campaign has been conducted alongside an international political campaign led by the Bush administration and joined by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, various other western political leaders, and American and European legislators. “Washington,” notes F. William Engdahl, an economist who has written extensively on geopolitical, economic, and energy subjects, “has obviously decided on an ultra-high risk geopolitical game with Beijing’s by fanning the flames of violence in Tibet just at this sensitive time in their relations and on the run-up to the Beijing Olympics” (http://www.china.org.cn/china/Lhasa_Unrest/2008-04/14/content_14947945.htm). Engdahl sees the current Tibetan operations as getting “the green light” in October 2007 when President George Bush agreed to meet the Dalai Lama for the first time publicly in Washington and also witness the award of the Congressional Gold Medal to the Dalai Lama. Fortunately, the Indian government has distanced itself from these U.S.-led actions and taken a correct, constructive stand on the question of Tibet and its recent troubles.

The websites of several Western television organisations and newspapers, including The Washington Post, BBC News, Fox News, and CNN, have not been above fielding photographs such as those of baton-wielding Nepalese policemen clashing with Tibetan agitators in Kathmandu, with the captions claiming the baton-wielders were Chinese policemen; an ambulance bearing a Red Cross symbol, with the caption claiming “there is a heavy military presence in Lhasa”; Indian police dragging a man away, with the caption saying “Chinese troops parading handcuffed Tibetan prisoners in trucks”; and seemingly menacing Chinese military trucks, with the part showing rioters hurling rocks at the trucks cropped out (for the details, including images, see (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-03/22/content_6557738.htm.)

But this is not all. Following an allegation made by the Dalai Lama on March 29 that Chinese People’s Armed Policemen dressed up as Tibetan monks and rioted in Lhasa on March 14, 2008, a sensational photograph began to circulate on the Internet. It showed several People’s Armed Police servicemen wearing summer uniforms and holding in their hands folded robes of Tibetan monks. The problem for the credibility of the image was this. By the end of December 2007, there were some 210 million Chinese Internet users (32 per cent of whom were young men and women in the age group 18-24; 72 per cent of whom used search engines; and 66 per cent of whom were accustomed to posting or uploading content on the Internet): the data source for these numbers is the 21st Statistical Survey Report on Internet Development in China published online by CNNIC, the China Internet Network Information Centre (the full survey report can be read in English at http://www.cnnic.cn/en/index/0O/02/index.htm).

Some of these netizens did some rapid appraisal and research and found inconsistencies in what the captions claimed in relation to the images. The first problem was the summer uniforms worn by the policemen in the picture, something out of the question for March 14 in the Lhasa cold. The second problem was the absence of shoulder badges, worn by all PAP servicemen since 2005. Further online discovery gave the lie to what the photograph was supposed to be: it had been originally uploaded on a website linked to the Dalai Lama’s ‘government-in-exile,’ with the caption reading: “This photo was apparently taken when monks refused to act in a movie, so soldiers were ordered to put on the robes” (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-04/04/content_6592836.htm) and (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/06/content_7928140.htm).

A notable feature of recent Western media coverage of Tibet is the way journalism feeds off the disinformation campaign unleashed by the Dalai Lama’s headquarters and the votaries of Tibetan ‘independence,’ without any attempt at independent reporting. One favoured method, under the guise of responsible news reporting, is to rationalise publication of the most exaggerated and fanciful accounts by pleading lack of onsite access. BBC did this on its website on April 4, 2008 with reference to the riot in Garze in Sichuan Province by offering the caveat that “foreign media organisations cannot report freely from Tibetan areas, so it is difficult to confirm facts from the area” (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7330827.stm). This is news-speak for ‘anything goes’ for journalists on the other side of the ideological-political fence; they are freed from all rules of responsible and transparent sourcing and verification prescribed by codes of good journalistic practice and innumerable books on journalistic ethics.

In particular, such stratagems have enabled various Western newspapers, news websites, news agencies, and television stations to deify the riots and disturbances by Tibetan discontents, including monks, under the banner of ‘human rights’ and ‘freedom.’ They equate Chinese official accounts of the toll taken by the recent Tibetan riots with vaguely sourced claims made by ‘Tibetan exile groups.’ This observation applies especially to the death toll, which is necessarily a function of body counts in any law-abiding society. In various subtle and not-so-subtle ways, readers are invited to give credence to claims by unnamed Tibetan exile sources that up to a hundred, if not hundreds of, people died in the March-April 2008 riots; and that Chinese security forces cracked down on or brutalised unarmed protesters or ‘opened fire on crowds of civilians, killing’ whatever number the ‘Tibetan exile groups’ are pleased to put out on the incident (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7330827.stm).

The mainstream Western news media have also failed to report on, and analyse the significance of, the crucial fact that police investigation has revealed that the “confirmed list of [40] individuals killed” released by the Dalai Lama’s ‘government-in-exile’ on March 26 (http://www.tibet.net/en/flash/2008/0308/26A0308.html) was wholly fabricated. The investigation has found that five people on the list of dead are alive or never existed; and that the other 35, whose birthplaces or residences have been given as ‘Lhasa, Tibet,’ ‘Aba, Sichuan Province,’ and so on, were impossible to locate. A supposedly dead monk, Lobsang Tsepel of Sera Monastery, and a supposedly dead nun, Lobsang Doma, have been found to be very much alive; and a ‘dead’ monk, Ngawang Thekchen of Taklung Drak Monastery, has been found to be non-existent (http://www.china.org.cn/2008-04/07/content_14403280.htm). The Dalai Lama establishment’s fabricated list of 40 Tibetan ‘martyrs’ is strikingly reminiscent of the list of 59 Hindu ‘martyrs’ put out by India’s ultra-rightist organisation, Vishwa Hindu Parishad, in 1991; journalistic field investigation exposed the falsity of the VHP’s communally venomous body count hoax (‘When the “dead” came back,’ Frontline, May 24, 1991, pages 12-16).

CHOGO/XINHUA

Many buildings, including schools, hospitals and residences, were set on fire by rioters on March 14. Here, firefighters train water cannons on a building in Lhasa.

This kind of journalism turns on its head C.P. Scott’s celebrated maxim, “Comment is free, but facts are sacred.” But even the opinions have been riddled with contradictions. In an editorial, ‘China Terrorises Tibet,’ published four days after the Lhasa riot, The New York Times was quick to judgment. It charged Beijing with a “crackdown on Tibet” and described the response to the savagery unleashed by the rioters as a “clash” between Chinese security forces and “hundreds of Buddhist monks and other ethnic Tibetans” (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/18/opinion/18tue3.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=China+Terrorizes+Tibet&st=nyt&oref=slogin ). Subsequently, this newspaper was obliged to publish news items that acknowledged, in minimalist fashion, the lynching of Han Chinese by the rioters. In its editorial, ‘A spluttering flame,’ published on April 5, 2008 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/apr/05/olympicgames2008.china), The Guardian went a step further, even after the nature of the Lhasa riots became clear to the whole world. This editorial criticised Britain for being “in close embrace with a government cracking down on human rights.” Citing “exiled Tibetan sources” as claiming that the death toll was 140 (against the official figure of 18 civilians), it surmised, “the final death toll could well be much higher.” The liberal British newspaper charged China with “preparing for the [Olympic] Games by re-establishing control” and accused Chinese security forces of “behaving in a manner not unlike Burma’s junta.”

The reality is that the riots that broke out in Lhasa on March 14, 2008 and claimed a death toll of 18 innocent civilians and a police officer and an injury toll of 382, including 241 police officers, were the handiwork of violent, thuggish, ransacking mobs. They included 300 militant monks from the Drepung Monastery, who marched in tandem with a foiled ‘March to Tibet’ by groups of monks across the border in India. The rioters committed murder, arson, and other acts of savagery against innocent civilians. The atrocities included dousing one man with petrol and setting him alight, beating a patrol policeman and carving out a fist-size piece of his flesh, and torching a school with 800 terrorised pupils cowering inside. The rioters set fire to seven schools, five hospitals, and 120 homes. They destroyed or looted 908 shops. The damage caused to public and private property was estimated at 244 million yuan ($35 million). Tourism, which is vital to the Tibetan economy, was set back seriously, with a sharp decline in the number of tourists and consequently hotel occupancy, and a blow to the catering business.

Visual images and independent eyewitness accounts attest to this ugly reality, which compelled even the Dalai Lama to put out threats to resign. There was violence also in Tibetan ethnic areas in the adjacent provinces of Gansu and Sichuan, which, according to official estimates, took an injury toll of more than 700.

By way of analysis, Western pundits have linked these incidents to the March 10 anniversary of the failed 1959 Tibetan uprising; non-progress in the talks between the Dalai Lama’s emissaries and Beijing; China’s ‘human rights record’; the Beijing Olympic Games, which will of course be held as scheduled from August 8 to 24 (notwithstanding some attempts to disrupt the ceremonial relay of the Olympic Flame or torch from Olympia in Greece to the Olympic venue in Beijing); and what not.

Recent Western media accounts express unease and sadness over the swift containment of the Tibetan troubles, the ‘large-scale,’ if belated and politically slow, response by Beijing, and the ‘brutal ease’ with which the protests have been ‘smothered.’ The surrender, by March 19, of more than a hundred people who admitted involvement in the Lhasa riots, and the formal arrest, by April 9, of 403, including 13 of the 93 ‘most wanted’ (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-04/09/content_6603589.htm), were either ignored or reported in mournful tones.

The swift trial, conviction, and sentencing of 30 rioters by the Intermediate People’s Court of Lhasa will no doubt trigger fresh ‘human rights’ complaints, especially since the Dalai Lama, with total disregard for the rule of law, called for the release of all criminal suspects arrested for their role in the March 14 riots. Three were sentenced to life imprisonment and the rest given jail terms ranging from three to 15 years. The three given life sentences are a driver in a Lhasa real estate company who set vehicles on fire, threw stones at police stations and fire engines, and attacked firemen; a monk who led 10 people in destroying a government office, setting alight 11 shops, stealing valuables, and attacking policemen; and a businessman who was involved in arson and destruction of vehicles and shops (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-05/02/content_6657245.htm). The fact that the April 21-25 trials strictly followed the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China is unlikely to weigh for much with western ‘human rights’ champions.

The announcement by a spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Public Security that weapons, including 178 guns, vast quantities of ammunition, 359 swords, 3,504 kg of dynamite, 19,350 detonators, and two hand grenades, had been recovered from the rooms of lamas in Tibetan temples introduces a new dimension altogether. According to a Ministry statement, the authorities, who have the ring-leaders in custody, are investigating a conspiracy, approved by “senior officials of the Dalai clique,” to develop out of the March 14 riots an armed “Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement” and to use the favourable opportunity before the Olympics to stage “sabotage activities in the Tibetan-inhabited areas in China”(http://www.china.org.cn/china/Lhasa_Unrest/2008-04/02/content_14074314.htm). Such Chinese official revelations tend to be treated with scepticism, if not derision, by the Western media.

JIM BOURG/REUTERS

The Dalai Lama with U.S. President George W. Bush in Washington on October 17, 2007, when the former was presented with the U.S. Congressional Gold Medal.

Apart from going after the rioters, as the rule of law requires, the authorities sent a law education work group to the Drepung Monastery (whose monks were involved in the riots) and work groups to some other monasteries to help maintain the rule of law, public order, and social stability and indeed to calm things down (http://www.china.org.cn/china/Lhasa_Unrest/2008-04/12/content_14938804.htm). In another context, say Pakistan under Pervez Musharraf, such a response from the state would have been characterised as exemplary restraint.

As the evidence on the nature of the riots has piled up, the realisation has dawned that it was too much to expect any legitimate government of a major country to turn the other cheek to such savagery and such a breakdown of public order. Secondly, there has been a massive reaction from the Chinese people in support of their government and in opposition to those who have turned the truth about the Lhasa riots on its head and those who have supported the Dalai Lama’s cause. This mobilisation involving tens of millions of people has major political and economic implications.

So there has been a strategic shift in the demand made on China: it must ‘initiate’ a substantive dialogue with the Dalai Lama to find a ‘just’ and ‘sustainable’ political solution in Tibet. But this is precisely what the Chinese government has done for three decades. Even within days of the riots, it affirmed its consistent stand by announcing that it would resume “contact and consultation” with the Dalai Lama’s representatives. The framework of the political solution – regional autonomy within one China with its socialist market economy and political system led by the Communist Party – is there for all to see.

A fact little-known outside China is its ethnic regional autonomy system. This is constitutionally entrenched and is clearly beneficial to the country’s 55 ethnic minorities. China’s Han population may comprise 91.59 per cent of the total (according to the 2000 National Population Census) but the 155 ethnic autonomous areas, including five autonomous regions, 30 autonomous prefectures, and 120 autonomous counties, cover 75 per cent of the country’s ethnic minority population and 64 per cent of its territory. Tibet, which in 2006 had 0.21 per cent of China’s 1.31 billion people but one-eighth of its territory, has enjoyed regional autonomy since 1965.

So what was the provocation for the violence in Lhasa and some Tibetan ethnic areas outside TAR? What is the cause for which these pro-Dalai Lama agitators are fighting? It cannot be economic because the economy of the Tibet Autonomous Region, as virtually everyone who has been there recognises, is on a roll. Nobody in their right mind has accused the Chinese government – with its sights set firmly on economic development, political stability, and a ‘harmonious society’ and just ahead of the August Beijing Olympics – of any new set of suppressive measures, political, economic, social, or cultural, against the 2.6 million ethnic Tibetans who constitute more than 92 per cent of the 2.8 million population of the Tibet Autonomous Region or against the 3.9 million Tibetans who live in other Chinese provinces and regions outside TAR. According to officially compiled data, in 2008 more than 80 per cent of the deputies elected to people’s congresses at the regional, prefectural, and city levels, and 90 per cent of those elected at the county and village levels were Tibetans or people from other ethnic minorities.

The Dalai Lama has charged China with committing “cultural genocide” but this is contradicted by the existence of 1,700 monasteries and other Tibetan Buddhist religious sites with their 46,000 monks and nuns (1.77 per cent of the Tibetan population of TAR); four mosques for 3,000 Muslims, and a Catholic church for 700 Christians; the protection and showcasing of the Potola Palace and other priceless heritage sites; the flourishing of the Tibetan language; the renaissance of traditional Tibetan medicine, which is enjoying a cult status internationally; and the strength and vitality of age-old tradition observable in the daily lives of the Tibetan people.

Some terrible things, including cultural vandalism, happened in TAR and other Tibetan ethnic areas during the ‘Cultural Revolution’ but even worse things happened elsewhere in China. In any case, very much for ideological reasons, the Dalai Lama and the ‘Free Tibet’ campaign have chosen to underestimate the damage done during the ‘Cultural Revolution,’ tending to depict the normal years as the worst period for Tibet and Tibetans.

Overall, over a period of nearly six decades following the Chinese Revolution, Tibet has developed, with some setbacks and interruptions, as an inalienable part of the People’s Republic of China. This holds true socio-economically, politically, culturally, and above all in transforming the lives of the people. There have been shortcomings and deficits of course in rising to the historic challenges of development and socio-economic transformation in TAR and in Tibetan ethnic areas in other provinces but which country does not have such shortcomings and deficits? A fair, objective, and balanced assessment makes it absolutely clear that many developing and developed nations have done far worse by their ethnic minorities than China has done by its 6.5 million citizens of Tibetan ethnic stock.

II. CHALLENGES OF DEVELOPMENT: GAZING AT THE FUTURE

One way of examining the issue of human rights, development, and welfare is from the point of view of the entitlements or capability approach to well being and the quality of life, as set out by the Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen. This is now a rich theoretical field with far-reaching policy implications (http://www.capabilityapproach.com/pubs/AlexanderJohn07.pdf). Development, in Sen’s analysis, is a process of expanding the ‘real freedom’ of people; and real freedom resides in an individual’s ‘capability to achieve valuable human functionings.’ The crucial question of the freedom of members of a society to achieve basic and more advanced human functionings depends obviously on the socio-political system, government policies, opportunities available to all the constituent sections of society, and stability and harmony in society. “Measuring real freedom,” a commentator on Sen’s work points out, “in terms of indicators such as life expectancy, literacy and educational attainments, levels of nutrition, access to health care, employment, social respect and political participation are central to assessing how individuals and societies are faring” (http://www.capabilityapproach.com/pubs/AlexanderJohn07.pdf). In his book Development as Freedom (OUP, 1999), Sen takes the analysis further by looking into the relationship between freedom and development and centre-staging freedom as constitutive of development and in being instrumental in achieving it.

XINHUA

This photograph, showing Chinese People’s Armed Police servicemen holding monks’ robes, began to circulate on the Internet following an allegation made by the Dalai Lama on March 29 that PAP servicemen dressed up as Tibetan monks and rioted in Lhasa on March 14. The problems with the credibility of the picture were many. The first is the summer uniforms worn by the policemen, something out of the question for March 14 in the Lhasa cold. The second is the absence of shoulder badges, worn by all PAP servicemen since 2005. Third, the pedicab in the picture is decorated with a blue Tibetan-style hood when, in fact, the colour of the hood of all pedicabs in the city was changed to a combination of blue, red and green in July 2007.

The primary goal of development must be to enable all members of a society to achieve basic and more advanced human functionings on a secure and stable path. Deprivation, chronic as well as contingent (as in a drought, famine, or flood), is the opposite of development and the freedom and opportunity to develop the capability to achieve valuable human functionings. The expansion of freedom in this sense should be the foundation of human rights – a field that is valuable in itself but is unfortunately used from time to time as an ideological-political weapon to injure, besmirch, and pressure perceived adversaries. Those who use human rights as such a weapon are clearly open to the charge of upholding double standards.

We can approach Tibetan developments usefully from this perspective.

Ten years from now, a visitor to Tibet is likely to find it transformed into a region of reasonable development. It is likely to have decent living standards for all its people; a robust industrial base; modern agriculture and modernising animal husbandry; a well-educated, relatively young population; a high cultural level; a strong infrastructural spine and network supporting the development of a vast region; and active linkages and contacts with the rest of the world. It is more than likely that the autonomous region will enjoy political and social stability. It is certain not just that Tibet will be a still autonomous but much better integrated part of China but also that rising China will be very much in charge of Tibet’s future. A significant part of ‘Tibet in Exile’ could be back home, participating in shaping this future. Tibet is thus poised to achieve the status of a moderately developed region by the middle of the 21st century, possibly earlier.

These predictions can be confidently made on the strength of two visits I made to the Tibet Autonomous Region over the past seven years.

The first visit, over five days in July 2000, gave me an opportunity to attempt some reality testing of Dharamsala’s main campaign themes. The opportunity for another reality check came during a weeklong visit in June 2007 to the Tibet Autonomous Region and, for comparative reference, some Tibetan autonomous areas in the neighbouring provinces of Qinghai and Yunnan. The process and effects of change were there for everyone to see and there were hundreds of visitors, from various parts of China and abroad.

Two servicemen in the photograph were found in Tibet and they told journalists that the picture was taken in 2001 when they were asked to act as figurants in a movie named ‘The Torch’.

Five factors stand out about contemporary Tibet.

The first is the rapid development of its economy, which in 2007 grew by 13.8 per cent compared with 11.4 per cent for China as a whole. The second is the readily observable fact that the arrival of material prosperity, steady population growth, rises in living standards, education and skills training, and in general the process of modernisation are transforming life, work, and mindsets, especially of the young who make up the bulk of the Tibetan population. The third factor is a hard-won improvement in the Tibet Autonomous Region’s internal and external political climate. The fourth is the dramatic leap in connectivity with the mainland that has come with the Qinghai-Tibet railway – a 1,956-km engineering marvel that now links Xining, the capital of Qinghai Province, with Lhasa. The fifth factor is a widening credibility gap – between the make-believe world of the ‘independence for Tibet’ movement and on-the-ground Tibetan realities, which are reflected in the Dalai Lama’s scaled-down political demands for an ‘autonomous’ solution within a sovereign and one China.

Starting from age-old isolation from the mainstream, a chequered history, a low economic base, and a unique plateau environment averaging higher than 4,000 metres in altitude, Tibet has been growing at an annual compound rate of 12 per cent over the past seven years. The living standards, education, and skills training of Tibetans have improved visibly. In 2007, TAR’s gross domestic product was $4.88 billion (34.2 billion yuan); and the per capita income was about $1,714 (12,000 yuan), which was double the 2002 figure (http://www.china.org.cn/china/Lhasa_Unrest/2008-03/27/content_13697341.htm).

The per capita net income of farmers and herders – the really underdeveloped sector of the region’s economy – experienced double digit annual growth over the past five years. For 2007, it was estimated to be $391 (2,788 yuan), a 14.5 per cent improvement on the 2006 figure. This compared with a national per capita income of $487 (3,587 yuan) for farmers (http://www.china.org.cn/business/news/2007-12/23/content_1236634.htm). In 2007, TAR experienced the highest growth in retail sales of all provinces and regions in China (http://www.china.org.cn/business/news/2008-03/27/content_13700652.htm).

The effects of the economic transformation are conspicuous on Lhasa roads and streets, with their fast-moving vehicular traffic and rising modern buildings and commercial complexes. They can be witnessed on Barkor Street, known locally as ‘the Saint Road,’ and in the crowded bazaar around Jokhang Temple; in the vicinity of the Dalai Lama’s long-vacant Potala Palace; in the fast-developing transportation, telecommunications, and energy infrastructure; and at another high altitude wonder, the 6.2 square kilometre Lhalu Wetland in the capital’s suburbs, which is known as Lhasa’s ‘oxygen bar.’

However, the real test is in the countryside, where four-fifths of Tibet’s 2.8 million people live. There is visible evidence of economic development in the villages we were able to visit, especially in the households of farmers who have prospered thanks to their hard work and thrift, the large number of working hands in the family, central government subsidies, and new opportunities offered by the construction boom. The positive effects are also visible in the schools, kindergartens, and medical centres dispensing Tibetan medicine. They are on view in the bustling, grain producing and industrialising Xigaze prefecture located in TAR’s mid-south.

XINHUA

This screen grab from a Western website shows Chinese police carrying away a boy, Luo Jie, during the March 14 riots in Lhasa. The caption on the website said “Insurrectionist taken away by police”.

The most dramatic change since 2000 has come with the Qinghai-Tibet railway system, which will be marking its second anniversary on July 1, 2008. The section between Golmud, a city of the Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Qinghai Province, and the Tibetan capital took five years and 33 billion yuan to build. The world’s highest railway, Nima Tsiren, a Tibetan who is vice-chairman of the regional government, exulted, “has ushered in a new millennium for Tibet. It is the realisation of a dream of two generations, of great importance to the Tibetan people. It has greatly reduced the cost of transportation. We have taken one more step towards the modernisation of Tibet and the deeper integration of the regional economy with the Chinese economy.”

During the first ten months of the operation of the Qinghai-Tibet railway, TAR saw its foreign trade rise by 75 per cent – to $322 million ($100 million of imports and $222 million of exports). The trains immediately brought an influx of tourists, more than 2.5 million domestic and foreign tourists in 2006, which represented an increase of 35 per cent over 2005. In 2007, the number rose to four million, bringing in $684 million (4.8 billion yuan) of tourism revenue. Interestingly, the structure of tourism in Tibet has changed.

Investment is likely to follow tourism and trade. Chinese officials project that by 2010 the Qinghai-Tibet railway will transport 75 per cent of the autonomous region’s inbound cargo, tremendously lower transportation costs, and double the tourist revenue. As they see it, the railway symbolises ‘the right of Tibetans to seek development,’ catch up with the rest of rising China, and open themselves more to the outside world. This is the opposite of the reactionary (‘romantic’) perception of the railway as the ultimate destabiliser of Tibet’s culture, religion, demography, and environment.

Over the next decade, the railway will be extended to three more lines in Tibet: one connecting Lhasa with Nyingchi to the east, another with Xigaze in the west, and the third linking Xigaze with Yadong on the China-India border. Beginning September 1, 2008, a five-star luxury train, ‘the most luxurious… in the world,’ will transport well-heeled tourists from Beijing to Lhasa over five days.

XINHUA

The 14-year-old boy, a native of Lhasa, told journalists later that the police had, in fact, rescued him from rioters who attacked him on a street near Ramoqe Temple.

Apprehensions about the railway’s adverse effects on the environment and wildlife have proved exaggerated, if not entirely baseless. An unprecedented 1.5 billion yuan package of environment protection measures, including systems to store garbage and wastewater and treat them in designated stations, and 33 special passageways for antelopes and other wildlife, has been put in place. Technologies of heat preservation, slope protection, and roadbed ventilation have reportedly come to the aid of the plateau’s frozen tundra. Scientists have set up a long-term monitoring system for water, air, noise, and ecology. Further, greening the 700-km Tibet section of the railway – planting 26,000 hectares of trees over the next five years – is under way.

Aside from the railway, the development of a new kind of physical infrastructure – highways, paved roads, bridges, power lines, telecommunications, irrigation channels, modern housing, and so forth – is there for all to see. The plan is to build, by 2010, ‘high-class highways’ to connect 100 per cent of Tibet’s townships and 80 per cent of its administrative villages; and to convert 80 per cent of the roads into blacktops. Expressways, however, are considered unsuitable for a region that has only 2.3 persons per square kilometres.

The Chinese socialist system highlights the ‘fast, coordinated, and healthy development of education’ in TAR as a solid achievement of liberation and especially the post-1978 programme of reform and opening to the world. According to vice-chairman Tsiren, there are 540,000 students enrolled in the autonomous region’s educational institutions, comprising six universities, 118 high schools, seven intermediate vocational schools, and 880 elementary schools. He adds that school enrolment covers 96.5 per cent of children of the relevant age group and the programme of nine years compulsory and free education has been completed in 46 of the region’s 73 counties.

In addition, central government preferential policies have enabled about 14,000 Tibetan students to study in scores of key high schools and higher educational institutions in 20 of China’s provinces and municipalities. It has been estimated that up to January 2007, the fraternal funding of Tibetan education by these provinces and municipalities aggregated $74 million, in addition to the 2,000 teachers and educational officials they sent to Tibet. There is clearly a lesson in this for India, and especially the Hindi-speaking States.

The literacy rate among the Tibetan population in TAR is more difficult to estimate. Some Chinese education officials and literacy researchers have expressed concern over a stagnant if not worsening situation across the country between 2000 and 2005, because of factors like large-scale migration for work and the rising cost of rural education. Official sources estimated that the adult illiteracy rate in TAR was below 30 per cent at the end of 2003. It is not clear what it is in 2008 but it appears that it is not worse than the situation in India’s Hindi-speaking region.

ANDY WONG/AP

In Lhasa on March 26, the Chinese government shows visiting foreign journalists video footage of the riots.

The monasteries we visited were distinctly old world but there were plenty of signs of modernisation here too. Whether you went to the 16th century Kumbum monastery in the vicinity of Xining; or to 15th century Sera near Lhasa; or to the imposing Tashihungpo monastery, the seat of successive Panchen Lamas, in the northwestern suburbs of Xigaze city, a hub of Tibet’s modernisation; or to 17th century Songzanlin in Diqing prefecture in Yunnan, the monks wore their traditional robes and debated the sutras in the stylised and gesticulating style of Tibetan Buddhism. But they also carried mobiles, drove vehicles, collected fees for allowing photography inside the most hallowed chambers, followed satellite television, and performed for tourists. In a Tibetan autonomous area in Yunnan Province, we visited a novitiate monk of middling rank from a famous monastery in his rural home, where he is allowed to spend part of the year.

The development gap between town and country is certainly a matter for concern in Tibet – as in the rest of China – but a high level of central government subsidies and organised social sector assistance from the more developed provinces and municipalities are targeted at narrowing the gap. China, which has recently focussed on the need to narrow the development gap between its regions, has adopted a strategy of westward development to overcome the historical backwardness of this vast part of the country. A recent comprehensive study of socio-economic development in rural western China, by Professor Zheng Changde of the Southwest University of Nationalities, has come up with some surprises. The per capita income of TAR’s 2.3 million herders and farmers is actually higher than the per capita incomes of the rural population in the western Chinese provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu, Yunnan, and Guizhou. This reflects the sustained investment by the Central and regional governments in the development of agriculture and animal husbandry; the opening of the Qinghai-Tibet railway; and the development of the service industry in TAR (http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/228509.htm).

A major aspect of the propaganda campaign by the Dalai Lama, the remnants of his theocratic establishment, and his supporters abroad is the supposed contrast between China’s ‘authoritarian’ political system and the ‘democratic’ character of ‘Tibet in exile.’ This is a bit rich coming from the spiritual and temporal head of feudal serfdom, which Tibet indisputably was before 1951 – when the nascent People’s Republic liberated and took control of a region that was greedily eyed, infiltrated, and manipulated by imperialist powers, originally Britain and Czarist Russia, and subsequently Britain and the United States.

During the theocratic rule of the Dalai Lama, lands as well as most means of production were in the hands of three categories of estate-owners – government officials, nobles, and upper class Lamas – who made up merely 5 per cent of the population. The mass of the Tibetan population, serfs and slaves numbering a million in 1951, lived in extreme poverty, as appendages to estates owned by masters, lacking education, health care, personal freedom, and any kind of entitlement. They were obliged to perform unpaid labour services or ulag, corvee, and parasitical land rent.

Agriculture was largely of the slash-and-burn kind. Modern industry was virtually non-existent. Transportation was predominantly on animal or human back. Life in general was brutish and short, with diseases rampant, the population stagnant, and life expectancy at birth hovering around 36. It has been estimated that in old Tibet monks and nuns accounted for 10 per cent of the population. At the top of this oppressive feudal and theocratic system sat the institution and person of the Dalai Lama.

Pre-1951 Tibet had no schools worth speaking about. Monastic education, going back a thousand years and focussing on the Buddhist scriptures and to some extent the Tibetan language, was the leading form of education. There were some schools outside the monastic system meant for the training of lay and monk officials and for imparting a modicum of basic education – reading, writing, and arithmetic besides the recitation of Buddhist scriptures. These schools had a student body of less than 1000. Not surprisingly, the illiteracy rate was higher than 90 per cent.

From such an abysmal socio-economic base, it would be hard not to make substantial progress. With the 1959 Democratic Reform, which was brought forward by the armed uprising and the flight of the Dalai Lama, serfdom and landlordism were abolished and the socialist system was introduced in stages into Tibet. There have been twists and turns and ‘ultra-left’ attempts to force the pace of change – with the ‘Cultural Revolution’ of 1966-1976 inflicting extensive and grievous damage on life, the economy, education, religion, and cultural heritage in Tibet, as in the rest of China.

While many Tibetans regard the period 1961-1965 as a ‘golden age’ in their material lives, it is the post-1978 programme of economic reform and opening to the world and recent developments in political policy that have transformed life and work in Tibet most profoundly. Four central conferences on development issues in Tibet, sponsored by the central government in 1980, 1984, 1994, and 2001, have led to a new understanding of what needed to be done and helped put the autonomous region on a new development path. Top Chinese leaders have freely admitted that much more could have been done for the country’s ‘western development,’ and specifically for the development of TAR. Deng Xiaoping it was who inaugurated, in 1978, a new development-oriented policy approach towards the region. Hu Yaobang made an important inspection tour of Tibet in May 1980, after which Tibetan development was given higher priority; and Zhang Zemin followed up during a fact-finding visit a decade later. Hu Jintao himself worked for more than a decade as a Communist Party of China organiser in Gansu Province, which adjoins Tibet, and subsequently served as secretary of the CPC Tibet Autonomous Regional Committee.

DAVE THOMPSON/AP

In Manchester, England, on April 19, Chinese students protested outside the office of the British Broadcasting Corporation against the way China is portrayed in the media ahead of the Beijing Olympics.

However, it is Mao Zedong’s portrait that you will find in a large number of ordinary Tibetan homes – because he continues to be seen as the liberator of a million serfs from the old feudal regime of landowning aristocrats and upper class monks. During my 2007 visit, I noticed that a growing number of Tibetan families also appeared to see no contradiction in displaying pictures of the 14th Dalai Lama, typically besides smaller portraits of the 10th and 11th Panchen Lamas, inside their homes. These moderate demonstrations of reverence for the Dalai Lama as a religious leader, which I did not witness during my 2000 visit to Tibet, seemed to reflect a more relaxed socio-political situation in TAR as well as in more developed Tibetan autonomous areas outside the region. But the riots and disturbances of March-April 2008 have obviously brought about a change in this situation.

III. THE FUTURE OF ‘TIBET IN EXILE’

What about the future of the ‘independence for Tibet’ movement?

The term ‘Tibet in Exile’ is used by the Dharamsala-based ‘Tibetan Government-in-Exile’ to denote up to 150,000 people of Tibetan ethnicity spread across India and several other countries who are supposed to be votaries of the Dalai Lama. This ‘Living Buddha,’ who will turn 73 on July 6, 2008, has suffered some health setbacks over the past few years. He has himself fuelled uncertainty about the future by making a profusion of statements about his own mortality. At times, he has indicated that he might choose to be the last Dalai Lama; and even proposed ‘democratic’ modalities for ending the institution. But he has also said: “If I die in exile, and if the Tibetan people wish to continue the institution of the Dalai Lama, my reincarnation will not be born under Chinese control…That reincarnation …will be outside, in the free world. This I can say with absolute certainty.” These remarks make it clear that the Dalai Lama’s approach even to rebirth is decidedly ideological-political.

Politically, Tibet presents a paradox. There is not a single country and government in the world that disputes the status of Tibet; that does not recognise it as a part of China; that is willing to accord any kind of legal recognition to the Dalai Lama’s ‘government-in-exile’ based in Dharamsala. This situation presents a contrast to the lack of an international consensus on the legal status of Kashmir. On the other hand, there is little doubt that there is a Tibet political question; that it has a problematical international dimension; that it continues to cause concern to the political leadership and people of China; and that it serves to confuse and divide public opinion abroad and, to an extent, at home.

With respect to Tibet, India, which started out in the late 1940s with a policy of ambivalence shaped by the British Raj, has come a long way. In the ‘Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China,’ issued at the end of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s official visit to China in June 2003, India firmly reiterated its ‘one China policy’ and recognised that “the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.” It added that it did not allow Tibetans “to engage in anti-China political activities in India.” The Manmohan Singh government reiterated this official Indian position in the Joint Statement issued at the end of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s state visit to India in April 2005, and again during Dr Singh’s visit to China in January 2008. In the aftermath of the March-April 2008 riots and disturbances, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee has reiterated India’s position on the status of Tibet as part of one China, and also on not allowing the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees to engage in anti-Chinese political activities in India; and the Chinese government has expressed its satisfaction over, and appreciation of, this stand.

The problematical side expresses the interplay of a host of subjective and objective factors, which I identified in a 2000 cover story for Frontline magazine as the following (http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1718/index.htm): the Dalai Lama’s religious charisma combined with the iconic international status of Tibetan Buddhism; his long-lastingness and tenacity; his alignment with Western powers and anti-Chinese interests and the ideological-political purposes he has served over half a century; his considerable wealth and global investments; the cultural and human damage done in Tibet, as in the rest of China, during the decade of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ (1966-1976); the nature of the ‘independence for Tibet’ movement, which receives financing from Western governments and NGOs; the links and synergies the Dalai Lama has established with Hollywood, the media, legislators, and other influential constituencies in the West; and, most troubling from a progressive Indian standpoint, the reality of a continuing Indian base of operations for the ‘Tibetan government-in-exile.’

ZHAO YINGQUAN/XINHUA

College students hold a banner reading "Support (Beijing) Olympics, Oppose ’Tibet Independence’, Reunify the Motherland" during a peaceful demonstration at the Nanya Square in Haikou, capital of south China’s Hainan Province, on April 20.

The long-term assessment of China’s political leadership has been that the Dalai Lama cannot be treated merely, or even primarily, as a religious leader. If he were just a pre-eminent religious leader, there would be no problem in accommodating him within the constitutional framework that guarantees religious freedom to all citizens and regional autonomy to ethnic minorities in extensive parts of a giant country. In fact, the 14th Dalai Lama is a consummate politician leading a movement that seeks to take ‘Greater Tibet’ away from the motherland – an anti-communist and separatist political figure, with external links.

The Dalai Lama’s track record certainly bears out this assessment. He started out by accepting China’s peaceful liberation of Tibet in 1951 (which can be compared, in some ways, to India’s peaceful liberation of Goa a decade later). He acquiesced in, and supported, the May 1951 ‘Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.’ The key features of this 17-article agreement were unambiguous recognition of the status of Tibet as part of one China; cooperation by the local government of Tibet with the People’s Liberation Army; continuation of the existing political system and the status, functions, and powers of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas; and a crucial and remarkably liberal provision that the local government “should carry out reforms of its own accord” and there would be “no compulsion on the part of the central authorities.”

However, after his flight to India, the Dalai Lama showed his, and his Keshag’s, secessionist colours. He declared Tibet to be ‘an independent state.’ In September 1959, acting against Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s advice, he sought unsuccessfully to get the United Nations to intervene in Tibet. In 1960, he ordered a reorganisation of the ‘Religious Garrisons of Four Rivers and Six Ranges’ in Nepal and thus became complicit in military activities against the Chinese state. His ‘Tibetan government-in-exile,’ with its ‘Draft Constitution for Future Tibet’ and its front organisations, functions in flagrant disregard of legality as well as India’s long-declared official policy of not allowing Tibetans “to engage in anti-China political activities in India.”

Over the past three decades, following a high-level political decision, the Dalai Lama has travelled extensively abroad to rally support for the internationalisation of the Tibet question and presented various ‘realistic’ proposals for its ‘satisfactory and just solution.’ These have included a Five Point Peace Plan unfurled in a September 1987 address to members of the U.S. Congress; the elaboration of these five points in the so-called Strasbourg Proposal of June 1988; the withdrawal, in March 1991, of his “personal commitment” to the ideas expressed in the Strasbourg Proposal on the basis of the allegation that the Chinese leadership had a “closed and negative” attitude to the problem; and an abrasive and propagandistic open letter written to Deng Xiaoping in September 1992. His March 10 speeches have varied in content and tone, in sync with his perception of the international situation and China’s place in the sun.

In his major pronouncements, the Dalai Lama has taken the stand that Tibet has been an independent nation from ancient times; that it has been a strategic “buffer state” in the heart of Asia guaranteeing the region’s stability; that it has never “conceded” its “sovereignty” to China or any other foreign power; that China’s control over Tibet is in the nature of “occupation” by a “colonial” power; and that “the Tibetan people have never accepted the loss of national sovereignty.”

N. RAM

A view from the train on the world’s highest railway, between Qinghai and Tibet. The railway transformed the structure of tourism in Tibet.

Equally important, he has repeatedly spoken of “six million Tibetans.” He has falsely accused China of rendering Tibetans, through a state-sponsored policy of population transfer and Hanisation, into a “minority” in their own land. The plain truth, borne out by official censuses and easily verifiable by foreign observers and experts, is that Tibetans constitute more than 92 per cent of the population of the Tibet Autonomous Region. The Dalai Lama has even accused the Chinese socialist state of unleashing a “holocaust” and exterminating more than a million Tibetans.

He has put forward the demand for the reconstitution of a ‘Greater Tibet’ known as ‘Cholka-Sum’ and comprising the areas of ‘U-Tsang, Kham, and Amdo.’ This is a revival, in another form, of the infamous British attempt in the early 20th century to constitute two zones, ‘Outer Tibet’ and ‘Inner Tibet’ (the latter comprising extensive ethnic Tibetan areas in several Chinese provinces); weaken China’s sovereignty over both zones; require Chinese ‘non-interference’ in the affairs of Outer Tibet; and give the Lhasa-based Tibetan administration the right to control most monasteries and even appoint local chiefs in Inner Tibet.

He has demanded that “Chinese forces,” the People’s Liberation Army, should pull out of Greater Tibet and that “a regional peace conference should be convened to guarantee demilitarisation in Tibet.” If the 14th Dalai Lama has his way, a single ‘de-Hanised’ administrative unit, which will be formed by breaking up four Chinese provinces, will appropriate one-fourth of China’s territory – instead of the one-eighth covered by TAR.

In an appeal issued on March 28, 2008, the Dalai Lama declared that he wanted to assure the ethnic Han people who constitute the overwhelming majority of China’s population that he had “no intention to split Tibet from the country or cause a rift between the Han and Tibetan peoples.” He claimed that he had “occasionally pursued a solution to the Tibet issue on the basis of lasting and mutual benefit between the Han and Tibetan groups” and complained that “no matter how hard” he worked to “avoid separation of Tibetans from the one big family,” he was unjustly censured by “some Chinese leaders” (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2008-04/03/content_6588990.htm). But there was a mischievous new note in this appeal. The Dalai Lama expressed confidence that “a lot of important issues including those related with Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia can be resolved.” This remark has been interpreted by some Chinese commentators as expressing “a new trend in the Dalai Lama’s activities,” of uniting with other ethnic separatist forces and even terrorist organisations to split China (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2008-04/03/content_6588990.htm).

There have been other political provocations under the guise of exercising traditional religious authority. On May 14, 1995, in a pre-emptive bid, the Dalai Lama in exile in India `recognised’ the boy Gendhun Choekyi Nyima, sight unseen of course, as the 11th Panchen Lama. However, in December 1995, the Chinese central government, going by centuries-old custom and tradition that empower it to recognise and appoint both the Dalai and the Panchen Lama, approved the enthronement of Gyaltsen Norbu as the 11th Panchen Erdeni.

SOINAM NORBU/XINHUA

A class in progress at the College of Tibetan Medicine, which was established in Lhasa in 1989. It is the only institute in China teaching Tibetan medicine, which enjoys a cult status internationally.

Over the past three decades, the Chinese leadership has fashioned and finessed its strategy of dealing politically with the Dalai Lama and his followers. In December 1978 Deng Xiaoping announced, in a media interview, that “the Dalai Lama may return, but only as a Chinese citizen” and that “we have but one demand – patriotism. And we say that anyone is welcome, whether he embraces patriotism early or late.” In May 1991, Prime Minister Li Peng clarified that “we have only one fundamental principle, namely, Tibet is an inalienable part of China. On this fundamental issue, there is no room for haggling…All matters except ‘Tibetan independence’ can be discussed.”

However, after several rounds of informal talks and contacts with the Dalai Lama’s emissaries and fact-finding delegations between 1979 and 1992, and after watching his performance on the international stage, the Chinese government came to a provisional conclusion by the time it held the Third National Conference on Work in Tibet in 1994. The conclusion was that the ‘Dalai clique’ was demonstrably insincere; that it was working overtime to separate Tibet from China and destabilise the situation in TAR in concert with ‘China’s international enemies’; and that its real demands were tantamount to “independence … semi-independence … [or] independence-in-disguise.”

However, that was by no means the end of the story. In an era of China’s unprecedented economic growth, inclusive and nuanced socio-political and cultural policies, commitment to a peaceful rise and a harmonious society, when serious international political support for ‘Tibetan independence’ is non-existent, the Dalai Lama has been obliged to back-pedal on the key issues. In turn, the Chinese central government and the Communist Party of China have shown exceptional patience. This has meant that since 2002 six rounds of discussion have taken place between the representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government.

Before the sixth round of discussion took place (June 29-July 5, 2007) in Shanghai and Nanjing, Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, styling himself the “lead individual” designated by the Dalai Lama to “reach out to the Chinese leadership,” made a revealing speech at the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C. According to his remarks made on November 14, 2006, five rounds of talks deepened mutual understanding, “brought the dialogue to a new level,” and went “a long way towards establishing a climate of openness that is essential to reaching mutually agreeable decisions regarding the future of the Tibetan and the Chinese people” (http://www.tibet.net/en/diir/sino/sstd/envoystat.html#9).

PRAKASH MATHEMA/AFP

One of the Tibetans-in-exile who were detained on April 16 during a demonstration near the Chinese embassy in Kathmandu.

For a start, the Dalai Lama’s representatives declared themselves to be “encouraged by the new focus within China’s leadership” on the creation of a harmonious society and by the concept of China’s peaceful rise, whereby it will develop as a “modern socialist country that is prosperous, democratic, and culturally advanced.” They also stated that the Dalai Lama’s current approach was to “look to the future as opposed to Tibet’s history to resolve its status vis-À-vis China” because “revisiting history will not serve any useful purpose.” Further, they clarified, the crux of the Dalai Lama’s ‘Middle Way’ approach was to “recognise today’s reality that Tibet is part of the People’s Republic of China…and not raise the issue of separation from China in working on a mutually acceptable solution for Tibet.” His commitment was to “a resolution that has Tibet as a part of the People’s Republic of China, the need to unify all Tibetan people into one administrative entity, and the importance of granting genuine autonomy to the Tibetan people within the framework of the Chinese Constitution.”

But within a year, the tune changed. Addressing the European Parliament Conference on Tibet in Brussels on November 8, 2007, the Dalai Lama’s envoy, Kelsang Gyaltsen, assumed an apparently pessimistic but more belligerent tone: “After six rounds of discussion, unfortunately, I have to report to you that the overall picture of our dialogue process is rather sobering and disillusioning. Since the resumption of this dialogue in 2002 the Chinese side has been adopting a position of no recognition, no reciprocity, no commitment and no concession. Although they profess an interest in continuing the dialogue, however so far they have been pursuing a strategy of avoiding any progress, decision and commitment in the dialogue process. It has now become clear that the Chinese leadership is clearly lacking the political will to address the issue of Tibet in all earnestness.”

Kelsang Gyaltsen went on to “appeal to the international community for help,” even making the paranoid claim that “the Tibetan people – an ancient nation with its distinct and rich cultural and spiritual civilisation, language and identity – is disappearing fast from the face of the earth.” He asked “members of the international community” to play an important role “in encouraging, promoting and facilitating earnest dialogue and negotiations” between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government. As a “first priority,” he declared, it was of “vital importance to make China accountable for her repressive policies in Tibet at appropriate national and international forums and in your bilateral relations.” The Dalai Lama’s envoy wanted the Chinese leadership to be “made to realize that the issue of Tibet cannot be suppressed and silenced unless it is properly addressed and resolved.” Noting that “the emerging world power China” was “also vulnerable,” he called for “a strong and unified message with regard to the issue of Tibet” (http://www.tibet.net/en/diir/sino/sstd/envoystat.html#9).

In response to Beijing’s decision to renew “contact and consultations” notwithstanding the March 14 Lhasa riots and the violent incidents elsewhere in Tibetan ethnic areas, the Dalai Lama sent, in early May, Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari and Kelsang Gyaltsen to China for “informal talks.” According to a media release by the Dalai Lama’s secretary, during this brief visit “the envoys will take up the urgent issue of the current crisis in the Tibetan areas.” They would convey the Dalai Lama’s “deep concerns about the Chinese authorities’ handling of the situation” and “provide suggestions to bring peace to the region.” The media release added that “since the Chinese leadership has indicated, publicly as well as in briefings given to foreign governments, its position on the continuation of the dialogue, the envoys will raise the issue of moving forward on the process for a mutually satisfactory solution to the Tibetan issue” (http://www.tibet.net/en/prelease/2008/020508.html).

The Dalai Lama’s spokesman, Thubten Samphal, has clarified that this was a sort of peace mission. The “future of Tibet” would not figure in these discussions and “the larger issue could perhaps only be resolved in later talks.” He added that six rounds of talks over the larger issue had ended in the summer of 2006 on account of “a feeling that the Chinese were taking too hardline, too inflexible a stance” (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/03/china.olympicgames2008).

MINORU IWASAKI/POOL/REUTERS

President Hu Jintao: “As long as the Dalai side stops activities splitting the motherland, stops activities scheming and instigating violence, and stops activities sabotaging the Beijing Olympic Games, we are ready to continue contacts and talks with him at any time.”

This, in fact, is an acknowledgement of the big gap – which cannot be narrowed unless the Dalai Lama and his establishment radically modify their stand on two core issues.

First, the concept of ‘high-level’ or ‘maximum’ autonomy in line with the ‘one country, two systems’ principle (which Beijing holds to be applicable only to Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) is very different from what Chinese constitutional framework and the law on national regional autonomy stipulate. The law, it has been pointed out, defines national regional autonomy as the basic political system of the Communist Party of China to solve the country’s ethnic issues using Marxism-Leninism. The content of autonomy, which in the Chinese constitutional and political context essentially means self-administering opportunities and subsidies and preferential policies from the state to help the autonomous region overcome historical backwardness, can certainly be improved.

However, the kind of autonomy that the Dalai Lama demanded in November 2005 – “the Central Government should take care of defence and foreign affairs, because the Tibetans have no experience in this regard, but the Tibetans should have full responsibility for education, economic development, environmental protection, and religion” – cannot possibly be accommodated within the Chinese Constitution. Further, his demand that “a Tibetan government should be set up in Lhasa and should have an elected administrative chief and possess a bicameral legislative organ and an independent judicial system” is ruled out of court. Beijing’s 2004 white paper, ‘National Regional Autonomy in Tibet,’ is emphatic that, in contrast to Hong Kong and Macao that follow the capitalist system, Tibet does not face the possibility of introducing another social system.

Secondly, it bears reiteration that the 2.6 million Tibetans in TAR – a number that has grown steadily and is more than twice the Tibetan population in the region when the Dalai Lama went into exile – form only 40 per cent of the total population of Tibetans in China. In responding to the demand for ‘one administrative entity’ for all ethnic Tibetans, the Chinese government makes the perfectly reasonable point that TAR parallels the area under the former Tibetan regime. Acceptance of the demand for ‘Greater Tibet’ means breaking up the provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan, where there are a large number of Tibetan autonomous counties and prefectures; doing ethnic re-engineering, if not ‘cleansing’; and causing enormous destabilisation and damage to China’s state, society, political system, development, and human rights.

The talks will continue, as they should. Civility, open-mindedness, flexibility, and a positive attitude to resolving the Tibet question will certainly help, on both sides.

It is significant that in the immediate aftermath of the March 14 riots in Lhasa Prime Minister Wen Jiabao announced that although “there are ample facts and plenty of evidence that the recent riot in Lhasa was organised, premeditated, masterminded, and incited by the Dalai Lama clique,” the channels for dialogue between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama remain “open” if he can truly renounce “Tibetan independence” and recognise Tibet and Taiwan as inalienable parts of the Chinese territory. Premier Wen added the significant caveat: “We mean what we say. We need to watch what the Dalai Lama does. It is up to his actions” (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/18/content_7813012.htm).

President Hu Jintao recently defined the gap between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama thus: “Our conflict with the Dalai clique is not an ethnic problem, not a religious problem, not a human rights problem. It is a problem either to safeguard national unification or split the motherland…The barrier to contacts and talks do not lie on our side, but on the side of the Dalai Lama…As long as the Dalai side stops activities splitting the motherland, stops activities scheming and instigating violence, and stops activities sabotaging the Beijing Olympic Games, we are ready to continue contacts and talks with him at any time” (http://www.china.org.cn/china/Lhasa_Unrest/2008-04/12/content_14939522.htm).

For those who espouse ‘independence for Tibet’ – organisations like the ‘Tibetan Youth Congress,’ the ‘National Democratic Party of Tibet,’ and the ‘International Tibet Support Network’ – the future looks bleak indeed. One thing is absolutely clear: as much as the future of Goa, Sikkim, and Kashmir belongs to India, the future of the Tibet Autonomous Region and the extensive Tibetan autonomous areas that form part of four major provinces will reside – in their differentiated and distinctive ways – within one China.