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THE political resurgence of Japan, increasingly evident for some time now, received a big boost in May. With the economy, post-imperial Japan's trump card so far, also showing signs of revival after years of slump or plain stagnation, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe found himself in a comfort zone for the first time after he succeeded the charismatic Junichiro Koizumi last year.
However, it is not roses all the way for Abe at this stage. And, the two major Bills piloted by him and endorsed in May by the Diet (parliament) have some controversial features.
The first of these measures clears the way for a referendum, in due course and at a time of Abe's choice, on constitutional revisions. No less importantly, the other law gives him a free hand to stabilise the military presence of the United States in Japan to meet the two countries' new and shared security goals at this time.
In this context, the possibility of a plebiscite on the abrogation of the constitutional principle of pacifism is widely expected. This directive principle of state policy, imposed on Japan by the US during the MacArthur era after the Second World War, denies Tokyo the sovereign right to be a "normal" military power and to wage war as deemed fit.
It is well known, of course, why the US, which played the lead role in vanquishing Japan in the War, imposed pacifism on that country. Yet, pacifism has been put to Japan's advantage by its own leaders since Shigeru Yoshida. Post-imperial Japan's military alliance with the US, recently updated to meet their shared perceptions of the geopolitical realities of the 21st century, has in fact freed Tokyo, for several decades now, from the burdens of a "normal defence budget". Japan has succeeded in becoming an economic superpower at a pace that might not have been possible if it had to spend on "normal" defence budgets.
Another critical aspect of this military alliance is Japan's access to the US nuclear umbrella or, more precisely, Washington's willingness to defend the Japanese people under the terms of its own nuclear security doctrine as a global power. The US, not Japan, has the doctrinal and operational control over this nuclear umbrella. Nonetheless, it suits Japan to derive a nuclear security dividend without having to pay for it in economic, as different from political, terms.
The bottom line in Washington's strategy, under this military alliance, has always been the global supremacy of the US. Japan's security interests have invariably figured as an integral part of US game plans for sustained global supremacy.
These nuances of a foes-turned-allies romanticism largely account for the Abe administration's move to amend the pacifist feature of the Japanese Constitution. Japan's stated reasons are very polite, though. As a "normal" military power, Japan will be better able to defend itself, like any other country, and also play a combat role as a US partner instead of being largely a moral force that can at best extend non-lethal logistical support.
Often mentioned as part of this reasoning is the limited role that Japan has had to play under the US-led "coalition of the willing" in Iraq at this stage. Japan deployed its troops on a humanitarian and reconstruction mission in Iraq. These personnel were later withdrawn under pressure from the Japanese people, a large number of whom expressed opposition to any departure from pacifism for whatever reason. As a result, Japan, for now, continues to extend non-lethal forms of air-lift support to US-led forces in the Iraq theatre.
Another factor that the Abe administration has cited is the perceived need for a constitutional mandate so that Japan can deploy combat-ready troops under the auspices of the United Nations for peace-keeping operations around the world. This role is a logical sequel to constitutional pacifism. So runs the complex reasoning for regaining a sovereign attribute that other countries take for granted.
For Abe, the challenge is not so much the credibility of such reasoning as the timing of the move itself.
On the credibility issue, he still has to win the minds and hearts of a majority of the population, which is not willing to forfeit, in a hurry, the advantages of pacifism. As for the timing, Abe has not yet indicated his preference. The mandatory moratorium on a quick referendum gives him some political space to fine-tune his strategy. Nevertheless, neighbours like China, which is widely seen to be preparing itself for a superpower role, and South Korea remain sceptical about what a post-pacifism Japan might actually want to do to them.
The timing aspect has another dimension as well. Major powers across the globe, especially those in the crowded Greater East Asia arena, are currently jockeying for niche roles. Encouraged by the post-Cold War ambience, these powers have taken to the diplomatic path of engagement, regardless of their misgivings about one another. Beijing has taken abundant care to insist that "peaceful rise" is China's only state policy on the international stage. In this context, the US, now a wounded superpower, is willing to bide its time in this region to try and recover before addressing the issues arising out of China's rapid ascendance. Unlike the US, major regional powers like India and Russia do not make much difference to the triangular equation among the US, China and Japan at the moment.
It is in this context that Tokyo finds itself with a public relations challenge on the regional scene. It needs to sort out a critical issue that can be summed up thus: Is it savvy diplomacy to talk of a farewell to pacifism when China projects itself as a power that would not swerve from the path of a "peaceful rise"?
Tokyo does, of course, know that China, too, has to contend with its critics in the region, which is not populated by just Japan-sceptics. On balance, however, Japan has to come to terms with itself and its neighbourhood before it can bid farewell to pacifism.
In the Diet, opposition to the Bill on referendum was based, in part, on a reasoning that the practice of ascertaining the will of the people should not be restricted to constitutional matters alone. This somewhat esoteric argument did not, however, gloss over the more fundamental opposition to the very idea that Japan should reinvent itself as a "normal" military power. In sum, what stood out during the parliamentary debate was the determination of the Abe administration to think out of the box and create a "new Japan" that can set its own security agenda.
The US shadow over Japan, not seen as such by Abe and others with similar ideas, is not gone, though. The passage of the referendum Bill was followed by the Diet's endorsement of a special-measures enactment on the "realignment" of the existing US troops and military facilities in Japan, including Okinawa in particular.
The "realignment", a diplomatic euphemism for a slight reduction of the American forces and a quantum leap in their capabilities, forms the nucleus of the recent updated accord on the security aspects of the US-Japan military alliance. Within Japan, the "realignment" has been widely opposed. Resurgent Japanese nationalism apart, the opposition is also traceable to popular anger over "social and environmental problems" that the prolonged American presence is perceived to have created. Not surprisingly, few Japanese municipal governments are willing to host the US troops and their facilities.
The latest law, therefore, provides for a system of subsidies to encourage local bodies to host the US military men and machines. At the national level, the proposal received the Diet's political assent. But the local authorities have furiously rejected the notion that they can be silenced through subsidies.
By May-end, it was not clear whether the subsidies, euphemistically called "incentives", would do the trick that political persuasion by at least two successive Japanese governments has failed to do. Official Tokyo is now giving itself 10 years to enforce the new law, although the US is keen to accelerate the "realignment" process.
Washington wants to protect its military flanks in Greater East Asia and put Japan through its paces for a cooperative role in ensuring that China does not become a US-peer. Of enormous concern to the US is Beijing's recent success in carrying out an anti-satellite (ASAT) test, which involved a ballistic-missile strike against China's earth-orbiting object. In April, US Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael Moseley, described the ASAT test as a "strategically dislocating" event. It is in this context that the US is keen to intensify its ongoing science-and-technology collaboration with Japan to develop an anti-ballistic-missile defence system. In a sense, possible space-related cooperation of this order provides the overarching reality for the terrestrial "realignment" of US forces in Japan.
Foreign diplomats and observers tend to see the evolving Japanese strategic opinion in this wider context. Many Japanese want their country to move decisively away from the shadow of the US in the military domain. Any such denouement will validate resurgent Japanese nationalism. At the same time, they would like Japan to collaborate with the US on major futuristic aspects of military preparedness. This might enable Tokyo to play the role of a US-peer in the science-and-technology domain and send to China a signal about Japanese self-assurance in critical areas of survival.
However, the Abe administration wants to measure its steps, one at a time, so that Japan can stay the course in Greater East Asia, where North Korea, a country of "concern" to Tokyo, is increasingly seen as an "unpredictable" player.
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