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AMERICAN scholarship on Iran is persistent, at times enlightening, at others misleading. Ray Takeyh's purpose is specific: to decipher the "hidden" Iran so that the true challenge posed by the Islamic republic can be addressed. The Iranian-American scholar on West Asia opines that the unseen emanates from "a contradiction deeply embedded in the governing structure" of the country and results in "a degree of inconsistency and wild oscillation between pragmatism and dogma".
Any such endeavour must necessarily be comprehensive. It is to Takeyh's credit that he has done it in a compact, eminently readable book. There is, however, an unstated major premise common to many studies on Iran. The country is seen to be an "enigma", a "puzzle", is "hidden"; the task then is to decipher, unravel, make public - a shade beyond the logic of cold analysis. This attitudinal tinge is premised on a desire to interact beyond the normal. Lord Curzon was right when he observed, a century earlier, that policy on Persia was characterised by exaggeration, whether out of interest or apathy.
Two threads are discernable in the history of Iran in the 19th and 20th centuries: a quest for freedom from oppression and a generally unpleasant story of interaction with the Western countries. The two often intersected; the Islamic Revolution of 1979 was one such occasion and the shock waves emanating from it are being felt to this day.
Takeyh's chapter on Ayatollah Khomeini and his legacy is somewhat superficial. He makes the common mistake of calling the political system a theocracy; the focus in Islamic thought, however, is on "nomos" rather than "theo" and Khomeini stipulated "continuous Ijtihad" (independent legal judgement) by a qualified jurist or group of jurists and thereby sanctioned innovation and change rather than rigid adherence to dogma and a pristine model.
The resulting system was a mix of Islamic-legalist, secular and democratic elements in which a balance of forces was maintained by the Imam himself who, as Mehdi Moslem showed in his 2002 study of factional politics in Iran, even "helped to fuel the competitive nature of Iranian politics by allowing diverse interpretations of his decrees and views".
His departure from the scene thus allowed different groups of his followers to interpret his legacy and still claim legitimate adherence to the Imam's line. Hence the somewhat inclusive term "factions", rather than the exclusive expression "parties" connoting individuality of separate political groups.
As a result, "the intriguing aspect of Iran that tends to puzzle Western observers is that these political factions never completely lose their influence despite their electoral performance. The fact remains that they all represent important political constituencies and have a presence in the complicated web of the informal and formal institutions that govern the Islamic republic" (page 32). Another aspect is the "robust and lively debate" that leaves the country "hopelessly and irrevocably divided against itself".
Takeyh touches upon only some aspects of the ideological and political debate in the post-1989 period and prescribes a corrective: "For Iran to reclaim its democratic spirit it must deconstruct Khomeini's political order and dismantle his innovative but ultimately pernicious legacy" (page 56).
In doing so, he misses the central point of the 1995-2005 reform debate. The latter is to be viewed in the historical perspective of the Revolution itself, in which the conflict between reformists and hardliners becomes a feature of the extended revolutionary power struggle. In this context, Mohammad Khatami's programme for rule of law and reform was presented by the "children of the revolution" as part of constitutional politics, deemed essential for popular support and the fulfilment of the agenda of the Revolution. They may well have recalled Khomeini's advice in his Last Testament: "We owe the victory of the Islamic Revolution to the support of the people... . Bereft of their support, you will be done away with and tyrants such as there were during the monarchy will occupy your offices."
From the viewpoint of the Western world, the 1979 Revolution disturbed the strategic balance in the region; it also disrupted the Twin Pillar arrangement for security in the Persian Gulf. Consequently, Iran came to be perceived as a strategic threat; by the same logic, and with greater justification, Western policies were viewed as an existentialist threat to Iran in its strategic loneliness.
In the regional and global perspective, therefore, and from the morrow of the Revolution, Iran's foreign policy became a matter of concern; it remains so to this day.
What was, and is, the nature of this concern? What is the extent of its validity? Wherein lies the mischief-making potential of revolutionary Iran? Takeyh makes a bold judgement:
"Iran has journeyed from being a militant actor challenging regional norms to being a pragmatic state pursuing a policy based on national interest calculations. However, Iran's journey has been halting, incomplete and tentative. Through the 1980s, under the stern dictates of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran thrashed about the Middle East, seeking to undermine the established authority in the name of Islamic redemption. Khomeini's successors would wrestle with this legacy, as they sought to integrate the theocracy into the global society. From [Ali Akbar Hashemi] Rafsanjani to Khatami to Ahmadinejad, Iran's presidents would seek the impossible, balancing Khomeini's vision with the mandates of the international community."
The central theme of the book, and its greater portion, pertains to Iran's interaction with the United States at different points in recent history. The relevance of that history is carefully related through three events.
In the first, the US engineered the coup d'etat against Mohammad Mossaddeq in 1953. That intervention had far-reaching consequences. It obstructed the "progressive trajectory of Iranian politics", "destroyed the delicate internal balance of power, with the monarchy coexisting with assertive parliaments and prime ministers", and "created an emotional barrier for Iran's masses and have made them inherently suspicious of American motives and conduct" (pages 84 and 93).
In the second, the 444-day hostage crisis of 1979-80 generated "anger and anguish" leading to a "wall of mistrust" between the two societies.
In the third, the attempt to patch up the divide through the "Bible and cake" episode went disastrously wrong, with casualties on both sides. A safer course, in Dual Containment, was attempted in President Bill Clinton's period. That too failed, so did the course correction half heartedly attempted in 1998.
The Bush administration took office with a clear perception of its Iran policy. Changes in US policy towards Iran, wrote US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, "would require changes in Iranian behaviour". This behaviour came to be assessed in the context of the post-9/11 developments. Takeyh, therefore, examines three facets of the relationship: (a) in the context of the post-9/11 war on terror and its doctrinal implications; (b) in relation to the question of Israel; and (c) the nuclear impasse.
America's approach to the world changed with 9/11. "By October 2002, the administration went so far as to enunciate a new national security doctrine that flamboyantly pledged the pre-emptive use of force as a tool of counterproliferation and regime change as a means of ensuring disarmament. Beyond such provocative assertions, it became increasingly clear that the character of the regime - as opposed to its actual conduct - would determine the degree of American antagonism" (page 125).
In this context the meaningful cooperation extended by Iran in the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the subsequent Bonn Agreement, was ignored. Takeyh does not mention the Iranian proposal of April-May 2003 (summarily rejected by Washington) suggesting a "grand bargain" on the overall relationship.
The foreign policy performance is assessed in three circles of immediate relevance in terms of national security: the Persian Gulf, the Arab East and Eurasia. On the first, credit is given to Khatami under whose auspices "Iran's Gulf policy underwent a fundamental shift, with national interest objectives its defining factor" (page 69). In the rest of West Asia, Israel and Iran have loomed large in each other's rhetoric and strategic perceptions.
The background to the relationship is of relevance. In the period before the Revolution, the two countries viewed each other as "natural allies" and established a strategic partnership of what Israel's first Prime Minister David Ben Gurion called the "peripheral states" that would contain the forces of Arab nationalism and radicalism.
Interestingly, this was also the initial impulse for Islamic Solidarity jointly conceived by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the Shah of Iran with Washington's blessings. It came to "a dramatic end" in 1979; subsequently, as Israeli scholar David Menashri put it, "the Islamic regime viewed Israel as the most evil of its enemies. Israel on its part missed no opportunity to stress the `Iranian threat' to Israel and Iran's `evil character', using the harshest possible terms to denounce the Islamic regime and its politics".
While both states portray their struggle in ideological and apocalyptic terms, the strategic factors did get articulated occasionally. Illustrative of this is a statement by Itamar Rabinovich, a former Israeli Ambassador to the US: "Decision-makers in Tel Aviv viewed the prospect of a US-Iran rapprochement as a threat, since improved relations between Washington and Teheran could come at the expense of Israel's strategic weight in the region."
Revolutionary Iran complicated Israel's strategic environment by embracing the Palestinian cause; it thus played itself into the mainstream of West Asian politics. Takeyh characterises this as support to terrorism. At the same time, "the ideological imperative of resisting Israel and the practical requirement of the [Iran-Iraq] war now clashed, forcing Teheran to prioritise its hostilities. Given the imminent Iraqi danger, Iran was compelled to engage in transactions with the despised Israeli state that fundamentally violated its revolutionary doctrine".
The secret arms deals between Iran and Israel were "forged in compulsion and cynicism" on both sides and Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan "even stressed that if US-made weapons did not soon reach the Islamic Republic, Iran would collapse, leaving Israel to face a triumphant Saddam" (pages 200-201).
Two aspects of Iran's policy towards Israel are noteworthy. In the first place and despite the incendiary rhetoric, "Iran has avoided direct military confrontation with the Israeli military machine" because, as Ayatollah Khamenei put it, "The Palestinian issue is not Iran's jihad." Secondly, debate continues to rage within Iran about the cost and practicality of a policy of confrontation. This came to the fore before and during the Khatami presidency, but has noticeably regressed under Ahmadinejad.
On the nuclear question, differing viewpoints are carefully presented. "Washington and much of the international community fears that under the guise of a civilian research program Iran is gradually accumulating the technology and expertise necessary for the construction of nuclear weapons." However, and despite years of scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), conclusive evidence of Iran's progress towards the bomb is still lacking.
Takeyh points out that under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Iran does possess the right to complete the fuel cycle, and, unlike Pakistan, does not have a "crash" program, and, despite the leaks that constitute the core of Western intelligence assessments, "it is still difficult to predict with any degree of accuracy when Iran will be in a position to construct a deliverable nuclear device".
Furthermore, "although it is customary to suggest that Iran is determined to manufacture the bomb, there is a subtle debate taking place within the theocratic state on the direction of the program" (pages 139-140). The nuances of this debate are highlighted.
The concluding chapter sums up the case for a practical approach. "Despite continued revolutionary pronouncements, Iran has evolved from a revisionist state seeking to export its revolutionary template to a rational state that bases its foreign policy on pragmatic calculations. This transformation is neither complete nor absolute."
In dealing with Iran, therefore, the US requires "not just a policy shift but a paradigm change".
Talks on three tracks
The best way to proceed, suggests Takeyh, is to have direct negotiations on three separate tracks: nuclear, Iraq, and the West Asian peace process. While there should be no evident linkages between the three, the impact of progress in each would be felt in others. If economic sanctions are ended and Iran's interests in the Persian Gulf acknowledged, "the case of nuclear proponents within the clerical state would be significantly weakened".
Once Iran's "enormous influence over the future of Iraq" is accepted, common interests would dictate a coordination of policies there. If there is a constructive relationship between Washington and Teheran, the latter's "bellicosity towards Israel will lead to a potential loss of tangible benefits". The negotiating momentum would lead both to a new stage of relations that would neither be containment nor alliance; instead, it would be "a policy of selective partnership on an evolving range of issues".
Takeyh's conclusions are part of an emerging consensus in the US on a new approach to Iran. This was projected in the Baker-Hamilton Report. Stephen Kinzer put an optimistic gloss on it in The New York Review of Books: "If the US acts wisely, it might even turn Iran into the kind of partner it so desperately needs in the Middle East."
As an essay in persuasion, the book does prevail over the neocon advocacy of force. Many in Teheran would welcome it as a signal of sanity; others may look at it as conclusive evidence of the bankruptcy of the post-1979 policy and use it in the ongoing domestic debate. Some may be tempted to negotiate, others to haggle. Peace, and stability, in the region may depend on striking the right balance.
Hamid Ansari is a former Permanent
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