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SHAMSHAD AHMAD was the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan at an important period in India-Pakistan relations, from 1997 to February 2000. He retired as Ambassador to the United Nations. Together with India's Foreign Secretary Salman Haidar, he was co-author of the historic Joint Statement they issued in Islamabad on June 23,1997. It marked a defining moment in the relations between the two countries by putting their "composite dialogue" into a structured format that endures to this day.
His interview to this writer at his home in Lahore on March 24, 2007, sheds much light on the fate of that accord, on the genesis of the Lahore summit and a failed attempt at a direct India-Pakistan accord on Kargil without American mediation.
At a time when Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leaders A.B. Vajpayee and L.K. Advani are trying frenetically to thwart the peace process by shooting off letters of dire warning to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the role Vajpaye played when in Opposition, and in office, assumes great relevance.
Shamshad Ahmad spoke in a constructive spirit, emphasising the need for direct negotiations without American interference. His comments were balanced. However, any new light on an episode, be it from archival disclosure or an interview, is best appreciated in the light of the record already published. The interview falls into three parts - on the accord of 1997, Kargil diplomacy and the present course of the India-Pakistan dialogue.
Shamshad Ahmad spoke clearly and frankly, without a note or notice of the questions that the writer wished to ask him, during a brief halt in Lahore on the way back from Islamabad to New Delhi. Few questions were needed. He gave a coherent exposition.
But, first, the background. Prime Minister I.K. Gujral agreed with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on May 12, 1997, at the time of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in Male, to set up a Working Group on Kashmir and other issues. Gujral said that day: "We have mandated the Foreign Secretaries to meet by the end of June to work out and identify the areas where Joint Working Groups can be set up and proceed with it." Nawaz Sharif made an identically worded statement. A senior Indian journalist of editorial rank, a card-carrying hawk on Pakistan, told this writer that a Working Group on Kashmir had been agreed between the two.
The idea was to have a regular "mechanism" for dialogue. Until then, meetings of Foreign Secretaries were held off and on. The first round of such talks was held in Islamabad between July 17 and 20, 1990. At the sixth round held in New Delhi during August 16-19, 1992, an agreement was reached on a schedule of meetings on Siachen, Sir Creek and Wular Lake Project confidence-building measures (CBMs). The seventh round in Islamabad in January 1994 ended in failure. Benazir Bhutto always rode the high horse when in power.
Pakistan's desire to have a "mechanism" was understandable. India had shirked negotiations on Kashmir. The Jawaharlal Nehru-Ayub Khan Joint Statement on November 29, 1962, "to resolve the outstanding differences between the two countries on Kashmir" was followed the next day by Nehru's rejection of "anything that involved upsetting the present arrangements", only to be followed by a clarification on the day after that there was no "precondition" or "restriction" on the talks. Similarly on May 6, 1967, India said: "We are, without any preconditions on either side, ready to discuss all questions between India and Pakistan, including the Kashmir question." Four days later, Indira Gandhi said: "There is nothing to negotiate on Kashmir."
Pakistan formally invoked the Shimla Pact on July 14, 1992, to ask for "negotiations on the settlement of Jammu and Kashmir in terms of Article 6 of the Shimla Agreement". Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao's reply, on August 24, expressed readiness to discuss "all matters of mutual concern including issues related to (sic) Jammu and Kashmir". On November 24, 1993, both sides agreed that "all aspects of Jammu and Kashmir will be discussed".
Pakistan obviously expected that the very existence of a Working Group would ensure continuous discussion with a view to arriving at a settlement. But Vajpayee, who had Gujral's ear, exclaimed: "Working Groups kya work karengey?" (What work will the Working Groups do?) A highly placed Pakistani source said that after Male a document was delivered which reflected second thoughts in New Delhi. The Joint Statement of June 23, 1997, was a fair compromise.
It listed eight issues: peace and security, including CBMs; Jammu and Kashmir; Siachen; Wular Barrage Project; Sir Creek; "terrorism and drug trafficking" - not "cross-border terrorism"; economic and commercial cooperation; and the promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields. The parties agreed "to set up a mechanism, including Working Groups at appropriate levels, to address all these issues in an integrated manner". The first two would be dealt with at the level of Foreign Secretaries who would "also co-ordinate and monitor the progress of work of all the Working Groups".
If words mean anything, this was an explicit commitment to set up Working Groups. What followed made that even more explicit. There was a "preliminary exchange of views on the composition of the Working Groups and their methodology. It was decided to continue the consideration of this matter through diplomatic channels." Establishment of the groups was agreed upon, the talks would centre on their "composition... and their methodology".
Salman Haidar retired only a week later. His successor K. Raghunath did not conceal his distaste for the groups even in Islamabad. But they could not have been scuttled unless Gujral had so desired. Scuttled they were from July 1, 1997. The "success" of the summit with Nawaz Sharif in New York in September 1997 proved illusory. In Dhaka on January 14-15, 1998, Gujral proposed to Nawaz Sharif discussion on all the eight subjects in one round. All, to avoid parleys on Kashmir specifically.
How much do we know of that phase? Vajpayee became Prime Minister in March 1998. He revealed on May 24, 1998, that the Dhaka offer was worked out by Gujral in consultation with him. Vajpayee is at the same game now. But Manmohan Singh is of a stronger moral fibre than Gujral.
K.P. Nayar's report in The Telegraph of July 22, 2001, revealed Gujral in his true colours. "One of the myths about Indian diplomacy is that there are hardliners and softliners on Pakistan. In the Indian `Establishment', you cannot deal with Pakistan and be what peaceniks would call a `softliner'. When he was Prime Minister, I.K. Gujral, who was miffed at criticism that he was soft on Pakistan, told this correspondent: `Do you think I will give away anything to Pakistan? I am as much of a nationalist as anyone else.' He stressed that his `Gujral doctrine' did not cover Pakistan." Gujral was against any substantive talks on Kashmir. The statement of 1997 and the Agra Declaration of July 2001 did not "settle" Kashmir, they only envisaged talks on it. Gujral told TV at the time of Agra that Kashmir should not be discussed, not surprisingly.
But the Doctrine, of which none speaks now except Gujral, was itself a huge hoax. It is not widely known that on March 31, 1990, India presented to Nepal a draft agreement. Though not officially published, its text was published in Nepal in 1992 and in India in 1994 by Avtar Singh Bhasin in a compilation of documents on Nepal's relations with India and China.
Having served at the Ministry of External Affairs for 30 years, his comments merit respect: "Events moved fast [thereafter] and the emergence of a new democratic order in Nepal deservedly dealt the draft a death blow. The Indian draft smacked of neo-colonialism, to use a haggard cliché, as it sought to bind Nepal in an unequal relationship more tightly than even the 1950 treaty had envisaged. Apart from affirming the 1950 treaty, the draft sought to recreate a defence arrangement of a binding nature and sought to obtain for India a monopoly control on Nepal's natural resources thus closing all options for Nepal once and for all. If the 1950 treaty, after more than four decades, still haunts the Indo-Nepalese relations, the draft, if accepted by a beleaguered regime, would have been a constant source of friction."
A week later, a mass upsurge restored democracy in Nepal, which Gujral welcomed in a statement to Parliament on April 9. Why did he present the draft to an autocratic regime on March 31 when it was facing a popular revolt?
K.P. Nayar made another disclosure. The Joint Secretary at the Pakistan desk in the Ministry of External Affairs then was Vivek Katju. He told Nayar: "I am a Kashmiri, Kashmiris have suffered more than anyone else at the hands of Pakistan. I (sic) can never compromise with Pakistan" (The Telegraph, July 22, 2001). Vivek, of course, is no Kashmiri but a Uttar Pradesh man of distant Kashmiri origin, like Nehru and K.N. Katju. The report was published just after the collapse of the summit at Agra in July 2001, where Vivek Katju was present as, indeed, he was in Islamabad in June 1997. The man's ego ("I can never compromise with Pakistan") was matched by a passion to wreck accord with Pakistan.
On Kargil, Nasim Zehra, a highly respected columnist, reported that there was accord on de-escalation followed by talks but it was wrecked. The full story of diplomacy between June 1 and July 11, 1999, is yet to be told (vide the writer's articles "Kargil diplomacy" and "An aborted deal?"; Frontline, August 13 and September 10, 1999). Nasim Zehra's report appeared in The News on July 27. Zehra wrote: "It was on the afternoon of June 27 that it all appeared to have been finalised. On his way to Beijing Nawaz Sharif would fly over Indian territory. While doing so he would send a goodwill message to his Indian counterpart. In response to the Pakistani Prime Minister's message, Vajpayee would invite him to visit Delhi, to make a technical stop. Responding to Vajpayee's invitation, Nawaz Sharif would stop in Delhi on his way back from China. In Delhi the two Prime Ministers were to sign the four-point finalised agreement."
Sharif's emissary, Niaz Naik, came to New Delhi on June 26; so did Gibson Lampher, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, after talks in Islamabad. Five days earlier, The Guardian had published a report from Islamabad by a correspondent of repute, Suzanne Goldenberg: "India and Pakistan arrived at a secret deal to end the fighting in Kargil three weeks before their generals met (on July 11) to put peace in motion - a delay that cost hundreds of lives." It is significant that the Vajpayee regime's response to the disclosures was a deafening silence.
Nasim Zehra added: "Agreement was reached on four points; appropriate steps to be taken by both sides to mutually respect the LoC determined under the Shimla Agreement of 1972; immediate resumption of the composite dialogue initiated under the Lahore process; Islamabad to use its influence on the Mujahideen to request them to disengage; find an expeditious solution to the Kashmir dispute within a specified time-frame. It was also agreed that following the agreement, Pak-India dialogue would resume involving the Foreign Ministers, for immediate military de-escalation, the Directors-General Military Operations of the two countries were to hold a meeting.
"Agreement on the text was evolved during R.K. Mishra's five Pakistan trips. He would carry back and forth amendments in a draft form in which amendments were made based on input from both sides."
On June 27, around 5 p.m., the text of the proposed "goodwill message" from Sharif was faxed from Islamabad to New Delhi. Nasim Zehra wrote: "The return message was coming in later than expected. The Indians were requested to fax the message at the Prime Minister's Model Town residence. The message came at around 10 p.m. And like a bombshell, Vajpayee was not inviting Nawaz Sharif to visit Delhi. Instead he was asking him to "withdraw" the intruders from Kargil so that bilateral dialogue could be resumed. Telephone contacts with the Indians at the highest level did not help, India's principal interlocutor blamed Delhi's going back on a `done deal' first on some misunderstanding on what had been agreed but subsequently conceded that the hawks in the Indian establishment had won out. There was a sudden panic amongst those who were the principal actors of Pakistan's back-channel diplomacy. The trip to China had still to go ahead. However, a decision was taken to cut it short."
On July 19, Shamshad Ahmad publicly revealed that Vajpayee's emissary R.K. Mishra had visited Islamabad at least five times while Pakistan's Niaz Naik also kept shuttling between the two capitals (The Hindu, July 20, 1999).
The record shows that Vajpayee actively sought the United States' intervention. "India has turned to Washington for help... " an Indian daily noted (June 19). General Anthony Zinni, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command, and Gibson Lampher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, arrived in the subcontinent on June 22. On June 25, Vajpayee rushed back to New Delhi to attend a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security.
Now, read what Shamshad Ahmad had to say:
Shamshad Ahmad Saheb it is a pleasure to meet you. You were Foreign Secretary of Pakistan at a decisive moment in the history of India-Pakistan relations. You were co-author of the peace process along with your Indian counterpart Salman Haidar. What was the background to the Joint Statement on a composite dialogue that you issued in Islamabad on June 23, 1997?
I was appointed Foreign Secretary in February 1997. The newly elected leadership of the time [Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif] entrusted me with the responsibility of resuming the dialogue with India. The last Foreign Secretary-level talks were held in January 1994 [when Benazir Bhutto was Prime Minister] without any result. My brief was to resume the dialogue with India, to reduce tensions, eliminate risks of any conflict or confrontation and finally to normalise relations without any compromise on major issues. We started the process in March 1997 in New Delhi. That was the first round of talks. We had positive discussions there, and I had proposed to Salman Haidar a mechanism consisting of Working Groups on the issues to be discussed between the two countries. The initial response I got in New Delhi was not positive, but we continued discussing and tried to persuade our interlocutors and explained the rationale of our approach. Before we could reach any conclusion there were some domestic problems in Delhi as a result of which we had to suspend our talks. So, we returned to Pakistan [Gujral had replaced H.D. Deve Gowda as Prime Minister].
After that we got an opportunity in Male on May 12-14, at the SAARC Summit. Pakistan's Prime Minister Mr. Nawaz Sharif and India's Prime Minister Mr. Inder Kumar Gujral had extensive discussions on the sidelines of the summit. Both leaders discussed the various possibilities, including our proposal for Working Groups. Finally, somehow Mr. Gujral did accept the proposal for a Working Group in principle and promised that at the next round of talks the Indian side would have a positive attitude. So we came back. There was no formal agreement. There was a tacit understanding and that tacit understanding in fact did provide the basis for the Islamabad June 23, 1997, Joint Statement. I found Salman Haidar quite amenable and positive in our discussions.
But in his delegation there were a couple of other members, particularly, if I may say, Mr. K. Raghunath, for example, who was Additional Secretary at that time, and there was also a Joint Secretary, Mr. Vivek Katju. They were, both, even in their demeanour and attitude, not very, very positive. They were somewhat negative, I must say. Raghunath left our talks halfway because, he said, he had to join someone in the United States. In any case, Salman Haidar finalised the discussions and we were able to reach our historic agreement, which was the beginning of the composite dialogue, and for the first time in the history of Indo-Pak relations we were able to identify the major issues that needed to be discussed and negotiated. They included two major, key issues, which were issues of peace and security and Kashmir. That is how we started the process.
Thereafter in the second round in September in Delhi, unfortunately, I must say that the Indian side headed by Mr. Raghunath, who had by that time become Foreign Secretary, reneged on the June 23, 1997, agreement. The whole idea of Working Groups was again challenged by Mr. Raghunath and his team, which was a big setback and disappointment for me and for everybody. The deadlock was resolved five days later when Mr. Nawaz Sharif and Mr. Gujral met in New York and resolved the impasse.
Is it true, as K.K. Nayar reported, that Mr. Nawaz Sharif told Mr. Gujral, "Lafzon me mat pariye" (Don't quibble over words).
Bilkul kaha tha. Lafzon me nahi jana chahiye, is liye ke us waqt sara masla aur tha (Definitely. Because at that time the whole problem was different).
Was Gujral quibbling at that point?
Actually Gujral was quibbling at that time but since that was said right in front of the media, he was a bit nervous. Finally, both Prime Ministers agreed that we should now go back to the composite Working Groups.
What happened after that?
After that, we had the next round of meetings in October in Islamabad. It was a preliminary discussion on all the issues. The possibility of a Lahore summit emanated from those contacts. After that, in February 1999 we had the historic Lahore Summit in which three very important documents were finalised - the Lahore Declaration, the Joint Statement and the Memorandum of Understanding, which was more or less a detailed document on risk-reduction mechanism.
Was the back channel initiated then (at Lahore), or was it in New York in September?
The back channel was initiated during the Kargil crisis.
It was reported in the press that it was initiated at Lahore, comprising Niaz A. Naik and R.K. Mishra, to work on Kashmir. Niaz Naik has also said that. In fact he took out a map of Kashmir from a tourist kiosk at the Imperial Hotel in New Delhi in order to explain to Mishra the alignment of the Chenab river.
Yes. Actually nobody had formally designated Niaz Naik for any back channel at that time, but he was visiting Delhi frequently and he was meeting both R.K. Mishra and Admiral (retd.) K. K. Nayar. They were discussing the Chenab formula. On his return he would brief us. Admiral Nayar somehow was very much involved [in this] then in "the second track" (Neemrana process?). But the back channel in the real sense was used by the leadership in Pakistan during the Kargil crisis.
What happened then? There was talk of an aborted deal and there being a possibility of Nawaz Sharif halting in New Delhi. Was any agreement drawn up?
Yes. Actually during the month of June 1999, in Pakistan there was a feeling that we needed to find an honourable exit from the crisis because the crisis had brought a lot of instability to the region. We were of the view, especially in the Foreign Office, that any effort to find an exit from the crisis must be undertaken bilaterally instead of involving a third party. So we started using [the back channel] and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had at that time entrusted Niaz Naik to carry out this back-channel diplomacy. Naik was visiting Delhi and R.K. Mishra was visiting Islamabad. In the month of June he visited Islamabad three times. Mishra was in direct contact with Prime Minister Vajpayee. I don't think that the Ministry of External Affairs was very much involved. Likewise, on our side also, there were very few people who were involved in that exercise. We did work out, through our mutual consultations in Delhi and Islamabad, a document that would constitute a kind of an agreement at the level of the two Prime Ministers.
You mean a document was drawn up?
Yes. It was drawn up. We were planning at that time, mutually, that Nawaz Sharif would, on his way to China, send the customary greetings and good wishes to Vajpayee while overflying India and Vajpayee would flash back a response in which he would invite Nawaz Sharif to stop over in Delhi on his way back from China. Then we would have a kind of formal talks in Delhi, at the end of which that document would be signed, which we had already drawn up. We had even finalised the drafts of the messages, which were to be exchanged from the flight to China. But surprisingly, to the disappointment of everyone, at least in Pakistan, the response which Vajpayee was supposed to send - when it was faxed to us - had been changed at the last minute. That means something had happened in Delhi. Which...
What is your suspicion?
Well, I think it was, may be, domestic pressure also. Vajpayee was, after all, not a decisive person. There were a lot of pressures inside, in Delhi. Then the most important factor was the American factor, because they apparently wanted that this whole episode should be brought to an end through their intervention.
Who apprised the Americans of these India-Pakistan exchanges?
I think the Indians must have kept them abreast, kept them informed of the developments that were taking place, and from our side also they must have been informed perhaps. I think the American Ambassador had been informed by our Foreign Minister [Sartaj Aziz] when he was calling on him.
How did the Americans respond?
Well (chuckles disapprovingly). Eventually the whole thing ended up with Nawaz Sharif going to Washington.
Are you implying that the Americans were very keen to find a role?
Yes, I think so, I can tell you another thing. On June 25, 1999, Gen. Zinni, Chief of the American Central Command, came to Islamabad. I think he was instrumental in arranging Nawaz Sharif's visit. Nobody knows. At least we did not know, but somehow I have a feeling that he laid the ground for Nawaz Sharif's visit to Washington. Clinton was keen that Nawaz Sharif should come and he could play the role that would give a boost to his own image, which had been suffering for some months from the Monica Lewinsky scandal and all those. He needed a diplomatic breakthrough. This provided him with an opportunity. That is how it happened. I was in Islamabad on July 3. I had no idea. We had just come back from China. I received a call from the Prime Minister in Lahore that we were leaving that night. I was surprised. From my office I went straight to the airport.
All along I could not figure out how that visit had come about, but General Anthony Zinni was here. Gen. Zinni's visit to Islamabad was a largely decisive factor.
What do you think of the Joint Statement issued by Nawaz Sharif and Clinton in Washington?
I think that there was no other way. Once we were in Washington, something had to be worked out jointly.
Dennis Kux writes in his book that Clinton had promised to take an active role on Kashmir but instead of sending an envoy to discuss Kashmir, Nawaz Sharif sent his brother Shahbaz Sharif to discuss his own personal predicament.
Actually, Clinton had only committed himself to taking a personal interest in Kashmir. This was the first step that was taken: let someone from Pakistan who is a man of trust with the Prime Minister represent Pakistan, and then Clinton would also depute someone so that they could then discuss.
Clinton had taken Vajpayee's O.K. to the joint statement?
Actually while they were in the meeting he called Vajpayee on the phone, spoke with him and told him that we had reached this arrangement. So he was keeping him informed. In a way I think it was also a diplomatic move.
It was thus a tripartite agreement?
Yes. He [Clinton] was trying to convey the impression to the Indians that he was trying to help them, that he was a great positive factor [in the matter].
How do you view the net result of this? Would you say that the lesson is that India and Pakistan must resolve their disputes between themselves rather than take American help?
I have always felt that. I have always strongly felt that. In fact, during that episode also that is what we were trying to do [settle bilaterally], but again, as I have said, we did not know how the Americans got involved.
In any case, after Kargil somehow the situation has become even more complex when [in 2002] India brought forth its entire armed forces along the borders, so we were virtually on the brink of another war. In 2004, the dialogue was resumed. There, I must say, the American pressure was for the resumption of the dialogue. Because post 9/11, if you look at the situation, for the U.S. it was very important that Pakistan had no other worry; in the sense that, Pakistan should completely disengage itself from the eastern border and should focus more on the western border.
Pakistan has been under consistent pressure to make peace with India.
Have the Americans been pressurising India as well?
Yes, they have, of course.
What about Operation Parakram? Was American pressure helpful?
The Americans and the G-8, all these countries played a collective role.
Once the peace process has started, would you favour a direct India-Pakistan dialogue?
I have been stressing all along, even after January 2004, that there is no substitute for dialogue and the composite dialogue is the best mechanism that could ever exist between the two countries.
You see our problem is not the dialogue or peace with India. In fact we need peace and India needs peace. The whole region needs peace, but peace has to be durable. My problem is, if I may just say this, that in Pakistan there has to be a consensus, a national consensus, a political consensus - with the involvement of all political stakeholders who can stand behind Musharraf and say "Go ahead".
Would you say the same of India?
Yes. This is what I have been writing; that in both countries they need to have a consensus with the participation of all their domestic political stakeholders.
Shamshad Ahmad Saheb, I am extremely grateful to you. Your version of events will be useful to all students of recent history. Thank you, ever so much.
Thank you, very much.
Shamshad Ahmad's account confirms the public record on Gujral, K. Raghunath and Vivek Katju as also Nasim Zehra's version of the aborted deal on Kargil. Documents were, indeed, drawn up by mutual accord.
There was, one suspects, room for miscommunication. No Indian government could possibly have accepted a time frame for a Kashmir settlement. But would India not have been the gainer if it had Nawaz Sharif on Indian soil to sign the deal? Kennedy had no hesitation in communicating with Khruschev despite the missiles in Cuba.
However, it is Shamshad Ahmad's comments on the American role that are particularly noteworthy. As the weaker country, Pakistan sought external support. In 1999 and 2001, it was India that sought U.S. intervention. A correspondent noted: "New Delhi's decision to mobilise fully for war against Pakistan was partly based on the recognition that America's global campaign against terrorism has given it a historic opportunity to force an end, once and for all, to Pakistan's support for cross-border terrorism" (The Hindu, May 23, 2002.). Home Minister L.K. Advani said on December 25, 2001: "The situation has developed in a manner as to make it possible for India, with the support of world opinion [read the U.S.] to force Pakistan to abandon terrorism as an instrument of policy."
So much for our swadeshi BJP. India and Pakistan will be able to resist U.S. pressures only if they settle their disputes between themselves directly. Shamshad Ahmad's counsel for a national consensus is wise. One hopes he will, before long, write a detailed memoir of his stewardship of Pakistan's Foreign Office.
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