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WHEN you find an intelligence agency discussed by the media, it is invariably for exposing its misdeeds or failures. It is the `goof-up', as the popular expression goes, that receives huge publicity and intense scrutiny, much to the embarrassment of those in power and to the immense glee of those who sit in the Opposition in the legislatures. Seldom is the success of the Intelligence Bureau/Research and Analysis Wing, the MI 5/MI 6 or the Federal Bureau of Investigation/Central Intelligence Agency (the domestic and foreign intelligence agencies respectively of India, the United Kingdom and the United States) celebrated, because no intelligence outfit worth its name can ever go to town with its positive achievements, unless it resorts to inspired leakages. This is why possibly the reputation of many intelligence organisations is unsavoury, something that invites ridicule rather than praise. This is the hazard of the trade of intelligence. No operative can complain about it, because he or she knew of this predicament at the time of entry. The travails of an intelligence outfit get compounded in a country like the U.S., where unlike in India, its operations are openly discussed, either in Congress or the media. There is very little - be it an act of financial impropriety or extramarital dalliance of an intelligence officer - that is left to public imagination.
I have been recently sorry for the CIA, a fabled organisation with a history of positive achievements and gross misdemeanours. How many of us can forget Bay of Pigs, a predominantly CIA operation that bruised President Kennedy badly. The CIA has been in hot water ever since 9/11 rocked the nation. Good times seem to elude it with a vengeance. One scandal after another has come in quick succession, leaving little time either for stock taking or some window dressing that could hoodwink an external analyst. The FBI has also had its moments of acute discomfort, as in the case of one of its senior officials, Robert Hanssen, who was indicted a few years ago for spying for the Soviet Union. The failure to track down the 9/11 conspirators, especially Zacarias Moussaoui (the designated 20th hijacker), who were in the country much before September 2001, did not also exactly enhance the FBI's reputation, triggering the plea that it should be divested of domestic intelligence responsibility.
Coming back to the CIA, the agency has run into several problems in the recent past. It all started with the 9/11 Commission report, which indicted the CIA in very strong terms for its failure to pick up the threads in foreign locations. Readers may recall that it all started with meetings in apartments, mosques and the backroom of a bookstore in Hamburg (Germany), and the CIA did not have much of a clue about the goings on. Three years later, the Company (as CIA is often referred to) was caught for its inconsistent, if not downright false reporting on Iraq and its alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Following the controversy, the then CIA Director George Tenet, a man with a formidable record of accomplishment, had to put in his papers.
Tenet was succeeded by Porter Goss, who was a junior CIA officer to start with and later became Chairman of the House of Representatives' intelligence committee. Right from the word `go', Goss did not get much support from within the CIA. Actually, his action in bringing a few his cronies from the Hill led to the raising of eyebrows. The fresh arrivals were actually ridiculed as `Gosslings'. Weighed down by such lukewarm support internally, Goss was almost cut down to size in April 2005 with the appointment of John D. Negroponte as the first National Intelligence Director (NID), a new functionary, almost an intelligence Tsar, created on the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. After this loss of primacy within the intelligence community, one soon saw the emergence of a conflict between the CIA's Counterterrorist Centre and Negroponte's National Counterterrorism Centre. Ironically, the NID was created specifically to end the ongoing turf war between the 16 intelligence organisations in the country, including the FBI, with a total headcount of all agencies of more than 100,000. Several reports suggest that Goss was out of depth in his new role. He had openly complained about the backbreaking workload of a CIA Director. He was also short on facts at crucial meetings. The wily Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was known to have encouraged Goss to speak elaborately at these meetings so that the President and his key aides came to their own conclusions on Goss's competence.
Generals in many countries are known never to miss an opportunity to get the better of civilian intelligence and expose the latter's shortcomings. In India, we recently saw General V.P. Malik complaining about the inadequate inputs received from the intelligence community on Kargil. There have been inspired columns rebutting the charge. Only the Almighty knows who was at fault! However, the point is that the Army usually overrates its own intelligence vis-a-vis what is offered by agencies like the RAW or the I.B. This unseemly conflict often works to the detriment of national interests.
The CIA suffered a blow recently with the unexplained resignation of its Director, Porter Goss, at a time when staff morale, as evidenced by the exit of many senior officers, is said to be low. The conjecture is that Goss has been shown the door by an unimpressed if not a displeased President, who is said to be disappointed at the poor leadership that Goss has given to the vital agency. It is also possible that Negroponte had played a major role in Goss's departure. Whatever it is, the exit of two CIA Directors in quick succession, obviously at the instance of the White House, does not do any credit, either to the latter or the organisation. Actually, many analysts look upon this alarming turnover rate as the major undoing of the CIA. When Tenet assumed office in 1997, he was the fifth in six years. According to a New York Times reporter, almost every one of the 18 Directors who had held office until now, was sacked or asked to leave.
Our record in India is slightly better, in the sense that most of the past Directors demitted office on retirement from government service. I know of only three instances since the 1970s where the Director, Intelligence Bureau (DIB) was eased out on very unjustified grounds. In two of these cases, the motive for the government's action was purely political. I am happy that the absurdly short terms of some Directors, because of mandatory retirement at the age of 60 has influenced the government to arrive at a two-year tenure. This makes sense, except that the tenure is at the charity of the government, and not automatic, as in the case of the CBI Director who enjoys a Supreme Court-fixed two-year term. The redeeming feature is that the appointment of successive I.B. Directors has been clinical and by seniority and track record.
CONTENTIOUS ISSUES
Two contentious issues will dominate the discussion on the CIA in the weeks to come. First is the nomination of Air Force General Michael Hayden (currently deputy to Negroponte in the NID) to succeed Goss. This has been assailed as a retrograde step that cuts at the rationale of having a civilian intelligence agency. When it was set up in 1947, the expectation was that it would avert a tragedy like Pearl Harbour and provide the one window for White House to get an overall view of military and overseas threats to the U.S., a departure from the then excessive dependence on military intelligence.
According to one school of thought, bringing in a Service officer to head the CIA now would send a wrong signal across the globe that the organisation was being led by the Pentagon, the last thing that a President in control would like to hear. Pro-Hayden voices, however, point out that this was not the first time a General was being catapulted to this position. They draw attention to two past appointments; F.D. Roosevelt's choice of William J. Donovan and Carter's Admiral Stansfeld Turner. There is also the stipulation that a Service officer, when made CIA Director, will have to agree to be decommissioned.
These are all secondary factors, if one focuses on the forthcoming confirmation hearings at the Senate Committee. By all accounts, proceedings there will be heated, if only to embarrass President Bush. More than this, Hayden is likely to be questioned severely on his former role as the Director (under both Clinton and Bush) National Security Agency (NSA), an organisation charged with running a worldwide electronic eavesdropping network. It was presumed that the NSA was carrying on its monitoring only with regard to foreign targets.
However, a New York Times report of early 2006 raised a controversy and suspicion that even domestic targets were being subjected to surveillance without legal authority from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Some Republican Senators themselves are said to be uneasy about this. During the Senate hearings, Hayden could also be asked on how he would steer the CIA clear of Pentagon control. Here, he will be on slippery ground because a strong Defence Secretary will be breathing down his neck, and there is only a thin line of division between domestic and external intelligence in these days of global terrorism that provides for sleepers in every country. Overall, Hayden will be on test, although he may eventually be confirmed.
Perhaps the greatest embarrassment to the CIA has been the FBI raid on the home of "Dusty" Foggo, CIA's Executive Director, within days of Director Goss's announcement of his resignation. Foggo has spent 25 years in the organisation. He saw many overseas postings, including the one at Frankfurt, from where he was promoted by Goss to a headquarters position equivalent to that of a Chief Operating Officer.
The FBI investigation against Foggo is part of the larger one against former Congressman Randy Cunningham, who had confessed to receiving bribes from some defence contractors. Foggo and one such contractor, Brent Wilkes (co-conspirator number 1 in the Cunningham case), are said to be friends from school days, and at least one CIA contract had gone in Wilkes' favour, for an alleged consideration in the form of paid vacations that Foggo had undertaken. This episode could again reflect on Goss' leadership and the reputation of the whole organisation.
The happenings within the CIA have a definite import for its counterparts in other parts of the globe. They highlight the fact that it is professionalism and not politics that should dictate appointments to sensitive intelligence outfits like the CIA. More than this, an agency's performance will have to be evaluated on the basis of the clinically objective assessment that it gives, even when such advice is unpopular.
An intelligence chief needs the courage to tell his political boss what the former considers to be the true position on the ground and not something that the politician would be pleased to hear. For this to happen, the chief needs to have intellectual honesty. He can, on occasions, trip up on facts, but never on integrity.
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