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THE debate over the India-United States nuclear deal stands sharply polarised. On one side are the "pro-Washington pragmatists", who see the agreement as a "historic" opportunity to secure legitimacy and acceptance for India's nuclear arsenal from the world's most nuclear-addicted nation. Confronting them are the "nuclear ultra-nationalists", who see in it an attempt to constrain India's nuclear weapons capability.
The "pragmatists" had a headstart and launched a no-holds-barred crusade. They enjoyed extraordinary media support and access to sources close to the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of External Affairs, as well as the U.S. They dismissed most criticism of the deal as inspired by an "autarkic", "overprotected" and under-performing Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). They describe the deal as the product of a "grand vision", and as India's "second tryst with destiny".
For the past month, however, the "ultra-nationalists", who see the deal as a litmus-test for "national honour", have gained the upper hand. They allege the U.S. has shifted goalposts in ways that distort the original deal and erode India's sovereign decision-making rights. One contingent in this camp is moving towards rejecting the deal wholesale.
A major reason for this pro-"ultra-nationalist" shift is an assertive intervention by DAE Secretary Anil Kakodkar (Indian Express interview, February 6 and 8), in which he accused Washington of changing "the goalpost" on identifying and separating civilian nuclear facilities from military ones, and insisting that India's fast-breeder reactor (FBR) programme be included in the civilian list (to be subjected to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections). Kakodkar's unprecedented action of going public on an ultra-sensitive issue without prior authorisation three weeks before U.S. President George W. Bush's visit reportedly earned him a mild reprimand, but emboldened the "ultra-nationalists".
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which originally vacillated over the agreement, hardened its stance and wants the deal to be reworked on an "even keel". It says that under it, "India will have to cap its capability of fissile material production... [A]t stake here are national security issues, ... independence of our nuclear programmes, the inviolability of... a minimum credible deterrent... ." The BJP's position contrasts sharply with that of the Left and the peace movement, both of which condemned India's nuclear tests and demanded a rollback. They want India to return to the disarmament agenda globally (which the United Progressive Alliance's Common Minimum Programme too promised). They have never endorsed a "minimum credible deterrent".
Many other parties are critical of the deal for "nationalistic" reasons. Some believe the deal will consolidate the U.S.-India "strategic partnership". The Congress is divided and confused. The BJP alone criticises the deal on the ground that it will "deny" India the "flexibility of maintaining a minimum credible deterrent.... "
Does India really need the deal for nuclear power development, assuming that that is necessary and desirable? How will it affect its long-term stake in global disarmament and immediate interest in a more balanced, multipolar world? Will Fast Breeder Reactors' inclusion in the civilian list cap production of fissile material for either civilian or military purposes? Should FBRs be excluded from the list both for "long-term energy security" and a "credible deterrent"? Why do many existing and former DAE scientists oppose the deal if it promotes nuclear weapons and power? Will the legitimisation of nuclear weapons enhance India's global credibility?
These complex questions cannot be answered definitively without understanding the deal's political context, as well as details of what exactly transpired between Indian and U.S. officials in July. Much depends on how the two sides interpreted terms like "responsibilities and practices" and "benefits and advantages". Nevertheless, some observations and assessments are in order.
The deal is not just about recognising India as a "responsible" nuclear-weapon state (NWS) - an oxymoron given that NWSs seek security by threatening and actually preparing to rain death upon non-combatant civilians. It is primarily about sealing a close India-U.S. strategic relationship. The two are so asymmetrical that the relationship cannot be equal. Those who criticise the deal for its lack of reciprocity are in a sense barking up the wrong tree.
The agreement will increase worldwide resentment at the U.S.' and India's double standards: they can keep their nuclear weapons, but others (like Iran) cannot even have civilian programmes. This will encourage future proliferation in Iran, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, possibly Saudi Arabia and Japan. The deal will not encourage "responsible" behaviour on India's part. By gaining access to imported nuclear technology/materials, India can dedicate its scarce domestic uranium to military uses. India's civilian programme is unlikely to meet targets. A big constraint is uranium, which is running out. There is popular resistance to new mining projects.
The DAE has landed itself in a fuel bottleneck, just as it caused a heavy-water shortage in the 1980s. The nuclear deal rescues the DAE. To "counter-balance" this civilian-military advantage, some Washington policymakers might press India to suspend unilaterally military fissile production ahead of a global Cut-off Treaty, causing India another predicament.
Kakodkar has advanced numerous reasons for excluding FBRs from the civilian list: they have "fuel linkages" with power reactors and bombs; they are indigenously developed; they have an intellectual property rights (IPR) issue related to designs; and they are still under "development" - you can't "do R&D with an inspector breathing or looking over your shoulder".
None of this is convincing. "Fuel linkages" and the mystified "end-stages" of the "fuel cycle" which connect the three components of India's planned programme - Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDUs), FBRs, and future thorium-based reactors - are not unchangeable. Such "linkages" evolved because India's civilian and military programmes were interlinked. They can and should be separated - independently of the deal - to promote full transparency and accountability in the civilian programme. In the past, FBRs could take their fuel from power reactors and use the output for military purposes. The programme was protected from public scrutiny under the Atomic Energy Act 1962. That does not have to be so.
The FBRs are not fully indigenous. The 40 MW-thermal Fast-Breeder Test Reactor is estimated to be 80 per cent indigenous. It was designed with French help. France agreed to supply highly enriched uranium, but withdrew the offer. (See G. Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, Oxford University Press, 2000.) The FBR was commissioned in 1985, but "as of 1998, it did not operate above 12 MW-thermal."
The IPR issue could easily be resolved through a confidentiality agreement with the IAEA. As for the R&D argument, FBRs are not experiments in which parameters change mid-stream. Once operational, the Prototype FBR under construction will be largely unamenable to "new ideas". The charge, voiced by DAE scientists in closed-door meetings, that IAEA inspectors are nosy and "won't let you move a chair without Vienna's clearance", is not borne out by the safeguards experience at Tarapur and Rajasthan.
Why has Kakodkar raised FBRs to a high pitch? Bluntly put, there are, logically, four reasons. One, the DAE is so unsure of its operations that it does not wish to "take chances" by limiting its list of military installations. FBRs are useful to cite because of the mystique associated with them and their hypothesised link with thorium reactors. However, the thorium reactor is only a possibility. Leave alone gateways to energy security, FBRs are not a successful technology. They have been a failure everywhere, including in France, the fast-breeder "leader".
Second, Kakodkar does not want more transparency in a department that has had very little of it in a half-century. The DAE probably sees IAEA inspections as the thin end of the wedge. It is making a big jump from a 14 MW(e) to a 500 MW reactor without proving the first to be a reliable breeder (which produces more fissile material than it consumes).
Third, Kakodkar is using FBRs to extract a better bargain on other issues. He knows it is unlikely the U.S. will accept FBRs' exclusion from the civilian list. FBRs are an open-ended plutonium source. But in exchange, he might hope to keep CIRUS in the military list although it must be used only for "peaceful purposes" under legally-binding agreements with the U.S. and Canada.
A fourth possibility: Kakodkar wants to derail the deal. This is not implausible. It is known that the DAE was dragged, kicking and screaming, into endorsing the July deal.
The real motive may well be a mix of the four reasons. The point remains that the "pro-U.S. pragmatists'" case is extremely weak. They want the deal to turn India into Washington's camp-follower. But the "ultra-nationalists" are no more convincing. The most rational approach to the deal is one that questions its fundamental purpose: to sanctify India's and the U.S.' nuclear weapons and undermine the global disarmament agenda.
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