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DEMOCRACY has sometimes been defined, rather cynically, as "government of the politicians, by the politicians, and for the politicians".
In the South-East Asian state of Thailand, which is still in search of an `authentic' brand of democracy, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has, within a year of his stunning re-election to the top post, brought this definition into sharp focus. The growing refrain by his critics amounts to a broad charge that he has transformed Thai democracy into a government of his singular political self.
By mid-February, even as Thaksin celebrated his fifth successive year as Prime Minister, his opponents, especially those outside the realm of political parties, stepped up their campaign demanding his resignation and fresh general elections. The irony was that he had in fact led his Thai Rak Thai party to a landslide victory in the general elections of February 6, 2005 (Frontline, March 11, 2005).
Since becoming Prime Minister in 2001, on the basis of his triumph in the first general elections held under the 1997 "people's Constitution", Thaksin has in a sense revelled in riding out crises and controversies. If, in his own reckoning, a combative style may have taken him very far, the new crisis has certainly served to show up the chinks in his political armour.
The crux of the crisis, as at the time of writing, was his willingness to drag King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the deeply revered constitutional monarch, into political controversies. Even for Thaksin, long used to questioning the authority of non-elected but statutory functionaries, the effort to cite the King as the final arbiter would have been quite novel. However, Thaksin found the political heat so intense that he insisted in a radio address that he would quit only if the King were to tender such counsel.
According to independent observers who monitored the broadcast, Thaksin maintained that he would bow out, if only the King were so much as to "whisper" such advice. A public opinion poll on this sensitive aspect indicated a strong disapproval of such political tactics. However, the same opinion poll showed 60 per cent public support for Thaksin.
Why did the Prime Minister go the extra mile to seek political legitimacy by arguing implicitly that the King had not indeed called for any change at the helm of government? The simple but profound reason was that Thaksin found himself battling to shore up his pro-poor image in the context of the suspicions that his family might have siphoned off $2 billion through the sale to a foreign buyer of Shin Corp., the giant telecommunications firm that he himself had founded as a businessman. At the centre of the related controversy was the investigation into the charge that his family might have wrongfully benefited - by cleverly circumventing the mandatory payment of capital gains tax.
Outwardly, the issue should not have caused Thaksin such great agony. However, the allegations apparently had the effect of denting his carefully nurtured image as an authentic friend of the poor. In a sense, this image and his reputation as a leader of action (regardless of the controversies over some of his proactive roles) had sustained him through crises since his advent as Prime Minister.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, an expert on the country's politics, has taken the line that some recent controversies have "highlighted the role of the King as the check-and-balance force in the face of Thaksin's monopoly of political space".
It was in this climate of opinion that the early-February challenge to Thaksin's authority came, led by Sondhi Limthongkul, a prominent media personality. The challenge was based on charges that Thaksin was prone to corruption, cronyism and even "disloyalty to the King".
Now, a long-running theme in Thai politics, laced by 16 Constitutions since the abolition of absolute monarchy in 1932, is that the country, when not faced with authoritarianism of the military or `praetorian' kind, is "condemned" to one brand or other of "elite democracy".
Thaksin lost no time to dismiss Sondhi's campaign as that of a nonentity. With the poser "who is he (Sondhi)?", Thaksin sought to portray himself as a leader who, by not being a prisoner of "elite democracy", could reach out to the people. He was seeking to go beyond, if not entirely erase, his own reputation as a business-magnate-turned-politician.
Even as thousands flocked to the protest rallies at a plaza near the Parliament building in Bangkok, organised on successive Saturdays in early February as part of Sondhi's campaign, Thaksin said he was willing to "solicit ideas from the nation" and "not any interest group".
Significantly, as the Opposition in Parliament, badly battered in the 2005 general elections, played second fiddle (that too, discreetly,) to the "people's campaign", Thaksin made clear his willingness to hold a national referendum on the question of constitutional changes to make the political system more receptive to the people's voices and needs.
While several considerations accounted for Thaksin's calculations, one of the episodes in focus was the manner in which he rejected Sondhi's suggestion for a live televised debate with him on national issues.
One bright spot in Thaksin's political balance-sheet is his rapid-response action in the wake of the tsunami disaster of December 2004. His empathising with the survivors and relatives of the victims, besides his reconstruction efforts in the style of a "Chief Executive Officer of the state", did help him win the votes of the doubters in the 2005 general elections.
The negative side of the ledger is dominated by the alleged and "documented" excesses in his administration's drive against drug traffickers on one side and Muslim "insurgents" as also terrorists in the southern provinces of the mainly Buddhist kingdom on the other.
As a leader with a business background, Thaksin did push for economic diplomacy, with trade pacts as the key, in foreign policy. On political aspects of foreign policy, his decision to remain a steadfast ally of the United States is reinforced by Thailand's latest move to join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
Arguably, the U.S.-led PSI, despite being designed to curb trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and their sub-systems and delivery mechanisms, can monitor, and also act as a brake on, China's naval prowess.
This aspect does not seem to have been addressed by Bangkok, despite its good ties with Beijing. Bangkok's more immediate foreign policy preoccupation is to ensure that the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) does not evince interest in the "human rights situation" in Thailand's southern provinces. As a result of this concern for national sovereignty, Thaksin's earlier activism over democracy-related issues in Myanmar, a fellow-ASEAN member, is now on the decline.
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