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THE confrontation between Iraq's Sunni community and the occupying Americans entered a crucial phase when, on August 28, the Sunnis checkmated American plans to have a new constitution accepted by Iraq. After weeks of wrangling and prolonged American mediation, Sunni negotiators rejected the draft charter. Consequently, the document was signed by the majority Shia and Kurdish negotiators and was read out in Parliament, which had been convened. Parliament did not vote on the draft; it will be voted upon in a national referendum scheduled for October 15.
Iraq's majority Shia community and ethnic Kurds hold the largest number of seats in the 275-member Parliament, which was constituted after elections were held on January 30. Sunnis, who have traditionally ruled Iraq, form Iraq's largest minority community. They have hardly any representation in Parliament as they boycotted the polls. The dominance of Shias and Kurds following the American occupation and the elections symbolises a significant power shift in Iraq as it challenges the political supremacy that the Sunnis have long exercised.
The rejection of the draft charter by Sunnis is a major setback for U.S. efforts to revive the political process in Iraq and counter the armed resistance. Sunni leaders said that they rejected the document because it was written by the Americans, who were now foisting it upon the Iraqi people. "This is an American constitution and we will not accept it, no matter what," said Hussein al-Falluji, a Sunni negotiator, soon after talks on the draft charter ended. He said that the constitution contained the seeds of Iraq's bloody partition, and would "serve American interests".
Al-Falluji hoped that the Iraqi people would reject the constitution in the October vote. Pointing to the referendums in France and the Netherlands this year where the draft European Union constitution was defeated, the Sunni negotiator said: "The Iraqi people will be the third after the French and the Dutch to say `no' to a constitution."
Sunnis can defeat the draft during the referendum as they are in the majority in four out of Iraq's 18 provinces. Under the interim constitution, a two-thirds majority in three provinces can reject the document. Already Sunni leaders have been exhorting supporters to register for the referendum in large numbers in order to defeat the draft.
In case the document is defeated in the referendum, it will negate the U.S. efforts to install a political leadership in Iraq on the basis of the new constitution. The Americans had assumed that the consensus over constitutional draft would enable it to pass in August and authenticated in the October referendum and, based on the new constitution, fresh parliamentary elections would be held in December to choose a new government.
Parliamentary elections are still likely to take place either in December or early next year. However, it is now likely that instead of choosing a new government and taking the political process forward, the new parliament would end up doing exactly what the current assembly has done - drafting a new constitution from scratch and having it endorsed by all Iraqi religious and ethnic groups.
Aware of the consequences, the Americans did everything possible to get the Sunnis on board. On being unable to muster Sunni support before the August 15 deadline, the negotiators were told to iron out the differences by August 22. With an agreement still proving elusive, two more deadlines were set and passed. But by August 28, it was clear that there was no more room for compromise and the fate of the charter would have to depend on a referendum.
Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, was a central figure involved in the negotiations with the Sunnis. U.S. President George W. Bush also exerted his influence by telephoning Shia leader Abdulaziz Al-Hakim, urging him to give more concessions to the Sunnis. In addition, on August 27, the Americans released 1,000 prisoners from the notorious Abu Ghraib prison, as demanded by the Sunnis.
THE Sunnis have been vociferous in rejecting the "federal principle", which now finds a place in the preamble to the draft charter. They fear that under the garb of federalism, the Kurds and the Shias would carve out autonomous provinces for themselves. They realise that since most of Iraqi's oil is located in the Kurdish north and the Shia south, this would deprive them of oil-generated wealth.
During the talks, Sunni negotiators also stressed that the constitution should not bar members of the Baath party, led by former President Saddam Hussein, from entering government service or politics. Consequently, the draft did not ban the party; it banned only "Saddamist Baath and its symbols".
The Sunnis were also upset by the formulation in the draft constitution that did not recognise Iraq as an Arab country. The charter stated that Iraq was "part of the Islamic world and its Arab people are part of the Arab nation". Many Arab scholars found the designation unfair, as around 74 per cent of the Iraqi population is Arab. They pointed out that around 33 per cent of Morocco's population was Berber, but Morocco was still known as an Arab nation. Berbers also made up around 25 per cent of the population of Algeria, a prominent Arab country.
Many Sunnis are, therefore, of the view that there is a deliberate effort underway to de-Arabise Iraq, and it is part of a larger conspiracy to detach them artificially from the rest of the Arab world.
The differences over the constitution are likely to deepen Iraq's religious and ethnic divisions. Despite enormous pressure from the U.S., the Shias and the Kurds were inflexible on the question of federalism, the key to their privileged status in post-Saddam Iraq. Denied power for nearly four centuries, the Shias see the present situation as a historic opportunity for political assertion. The Shias and the Kurds, who see themselves as victims of the Saddam Hussein regime, are also unlikely to relent on re-accommodating prominent Baathists in government and politics.
WITH limited room for compromise at the negotiating table, the stage is set for a new round of confrontation involving the Sunnis, the Shias and the Kurds. The situation is particularly dangerous as all three communities are armed and ready for street battles. The Sunnis have already demonstrated their fighting skills through attacks on U.S. troops and on Iraqis seen as supporting the occupation. The Shias, on their part, have the Badr corps, which was trained by Iran after Shia refugees landed on Iranian soil in the 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq war. The Badr corps, which has an estimated strength of around 10,000 men, is the armed wing of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Its present leader, Abdulaziz Al-Hakim, spent many years in Iran and returned following the American occupation of Iraq. The Kurds, on their part, have the battle-hardened Peshmerga fighters who have been deployed in significant numbers in northern Iraq.
The marginalisation of Sunnis in Iraq is also finding a response in the region. The 57-nation Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), dominated by countries with majority Sunni populations, has declared that excluding any section of Iraq's population in decision-making will undermine stability and democracy.
Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal has warned that sectarian disputes could lead to the dissolution of Iraq. Arab League Secretary-General Amr Mousa has also taken exception to the recognition of the principle of federalism in the Iraqi charter. "I do not believe in this division between Shias and Sunnis and Muslims and Christians and Arabs and Kurds," he said. "I don't buy this and I find in this a true recipe for chaos and perhaps a catastrophe in Iraq and around it."
Abdul Rahman al-Attiya, Secretary-General of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), said the derecognition of Iraq as an Arab nation threatened its very existence.
Underlying the alarm that has been raised in West Asia's Sunni heartland is the fear that Shia-dominated Iran is set to expand its influence in Iraq. Iraqi Shias have deep-rooted ties with Iran, and prominent members of the current Shia leadership, including Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari, have spent several years in exile in Iran. Similarly, President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, had, at one time, fled to Iran, and has powerful friends in Teheran.
Iran's enthusiastic support for the draft charter has deepened apprehensions about the growing Shia clout, which Jordan's King Abdullah II has already described as manifesting the rise of the "Shia crescent" in the Arab world. In case the situation in Iraq spins out of control, it could drag Iraq's oil-rich Sunni neighbours into a prolonged sectarian conflict, with unpredictable repercussions for the global economy and politics in the region.
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