Frontline Volume 21 - Issue 21, Oct. 09 - 22, 2004
India's National Magazine
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SRI LANKA

`Keep the military alternative intact'

Suresh Premachandran, 47, secretary-general of a faction of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF-Suresh), joined the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS) in 1975 and, subsequently, the EPRLF, when it was founded by the late Padmanabha.

Premachandran - who was a member of the first and the only elected Northeastern Provincial Council - is into his second term as Member of Parliament. He won the parliamentary elections from the Jaffna constituency representing the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), which is backed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

On the current situation:

The LTTE is definitely militarily powerful, with a de facto government in the northeast, but we cannot deny its weaknesses. The departure of Karuna and his cadre may be the point of weakness, but if the government pushes the LTTE for a battle, it [the government] may do something in the east, but will lose in the north. If the government starts an onslaught against the LTTE, it will definitely backfire.

The LTTE might be facing a similar problem. I would not say that the LTTE is totally out in the eastern province, but without Karuna there is a vacuum, which may take a couple of years to fill. So, I do not think a large-scale war or Eelam War IV is possible.

SRIYANTHA WALPOLA

On the Karuna-led split in the LTTE and contradictions within Tamil nationalism:

There is no contradiction, but it has suffered a setback on issues such as northeast merger. Since the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement the northeast has remained merged for the past 15 years. If the government or some Muslim groups want a de-merger it will be very difficult because the guarantee given by India is still there.

I hope and think that India will not allow the Sri Lankan government to de-merge the northeast because this was one of the important factors why all the militants accepted the Agreement. If Muslim factions or the Sinhala extremists exert pressure, I hope India will be with the Tamils' desire not to de-merge the northeast.

Maintaining Muslim identity will be easy within the merged province, with some form of institutional arrangement similar to that worked out in Darjeeling [in the Indian State of West Bengal].

On the issue of discrimination against the east:

Karuna touched upon a long-standing complaint. Earlier, Jaffna Tamils were well-educated; they were in more official positions and there was a view that they were dominant. But now Batticaloa Tamils are equally well-educated and are in high posts, more than Jaffna Tamils. Karuna wants to capitalise on that.

There is no case for discrimination against the eastern Tamil, but Karuna thought he could play that card. I think he totally failed.

On the present bargaining power of Tamils:

The government wants to de-stabilise the eastern province, weaken the LTTE and reduce its bargaining power. The new government could have started the talks after the April election, but it is delaying it to weaken the LTTE, which is very difficult. The LTTE's military strategy and apparatus in the northeast is still very strong. They can strike wherever they want in Sri Lanka.

Is militancy the only means to meet Tamil aspirations?

The Sinhala polity has still not realised that they have to settle the problem. It is only because of the LTTE's military power that they want to talk. Until we find a final settlement, we have to keep the military alternative intact. Otherwise, the Sinhala leaders will not understand how to sort out the problem within a democratic framework.

Despite differences of opinion with the LTTE, our main concern is that after 20 years of war, the Tamil problem has to be settled in a dignified manner. When Karuna left the organisation, my apprehension was that Tamils would lose their bargaining power. It is not out of love for the LTTE, but for the last 25 years we have been battling for our own rights. If we lose that, we cannot bargain with the government.

On the continued internecine killings:

I was once on the LTTE's hit-list. We condemn all killings. These are not isolated acts because the government, with the connivance of the Karuna faction, is doing most of the unwanted activities in Batticaloa. So there is retaliation. To stop the killings, the government will have to start the talks immediately.

On how far Tamil nationalism has moved since the early militancy:

At one stage, when the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was reached, we thought that the problem could be settled, but there were hurdles. Now, it is very complicated with many international players. I feel if India intervenes, there are more chances of a solution. That depends on India - how far it can intervene and how far it can use its good offices. The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was formulated within a unitary system. Now the President and the Opposition UNP [United National Party] agree on the need for a federal system. There must be a radical change in the Constitution.

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