POLITICS

A shock in Rajasthan

T.K. RAJALAKSHMI
in Jaipur

The Congress(I)'s defeat in the State comes as a surprise, considering the apparent absence of an anti-incumbency sentiment and the fairly clean image of Chief Minister Ashok Gehlot.

DESPITE the majority of pre-poll surveys forecasting a comfortable victory for the Congress(I) in Rajasthan where any anti-incumbency sentiment was hardly discernible, the BJP which had been reduced to 33 seats in the 11th State Assembly sprang a surprise on the Congress(I) by winning 120 seats. The Congress(I)'s failure lay in not assessing the resentment among the electorate.

Vasundhara Raje Scindia holding the party symbol after she was elected BJP Legislature Party leader at a meeting in Jaipur on December 6.

The BJP under the leadership of State party president Vasundhara Raje Scindia cashed in on this anger. But wherever the electorate saw a third option, it chose to exercise its mandate in that direction. It would therefore be incorrect to say that there was a strong wave in favour of the BJP. At least in 10 seats each, candidates of the two major parties forfeited their deposits.

Despite the outgoing Chief Minister Ashok Gehlot's relatively good image, there was a wave in favour of change, which went undetected. Had the Congress(I) forged principled alliances with parties such as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), the Left or even the Lok Jan Shakti party, it could have avoided some of the losses. In the multi-cornered contest that was witnessed in the State, the BJP happened to be the only available option for the electorate in most of the constituencies. However, some of the sitting BJP MLAs, including party heavyweights such as former Deputy Chief Minister Hari Shankar Bhabhra, former State party president Lalit Kishore Chaturvedi and former Minister Manak Chand Surana, lost. The party does not consider these as real losses as the former two had lost in 1998 as well. The defeat of Surana, the sitting legislator from Lunkaransar in Bikaner district, was attributed to the division of BJP votes by the Samajik Nyaya Manch. BJP candidates also lost out to non-Congress(I) parties by heavy margins.

The BJP's real victory came in the 57 reserved constituencies. Of the 33 constituencies reserved for the Scheduled Castes, the BJP won in 26, the Congress(I) in five and other parties in the remaining two. In 1998, the Congress(I) had bagged 31 of these seats. Similarly, in the 24 seats reserved for the Scheduled Tribes, BJP candidates won 15, the Congress(I) five, and other parties two. In 1998, the Congress(I) had won 19 of these seats. These gains for the BJP in southern Rajasthan can be attributed to several factors, but the main ones are the organisational deficiency of the Congress(I) and a specific kind of ideological campaign that the BJP and its fraternal organisations kept up over the last 10 years. This kind of campaign was more visible in the tribal-dominated areas adjoining Gujarat.

There is a view that Congress(I) workers did not work in a coordinated manner and there was sabotage from within. But overall, the defeat was because the Congress(I) succumbed to complacency brought in by reports of a positive mandate. It even re-nominated the majority of its sitting legislators in order to quell dissidence. The anti-incumbency factor weighed heavily against them. The BJP escaped this experience, as it did not have many sitting MLAs. Senior Congress(I) leaders, expressing disbelief over the debacle, said that Congressmen's complacency was evident in the campaigns as they were confident that the good "image" of Ashok Gehlot would see them through. The party had hoped to make electoral gains among the urban voters as the beautification of cities and roads and the building of flyovers were considered a strong point in favour of the Congress(I). But even the voters of Jaipur City let it down because the party failed to consolidate the urban goodwill.

BJP supporters celebrate the victory in Jaipur on December 4.

One significant factor that contributed to the fall of the Congress(I) was unemployment. Around 30 lakh new voters were registered this year. Nearly 40 per cent of the electorate comprised youth and it was this section that made a huge difference in the results. The dissatisfaction of government employees, which is being touted as one major reason for the Congress(I)'s loss, may not be the main factor at all. Nor was it really because the Jats turned away from the Congress(I). While it is true that the Jat Mahasabha did announce its intention to support the BJP, the defeat of those very BJP-supported Jat Mahasabha candidates has to be explained. Both the Congress(I) and the BJP played the caste card until the very last moment.

Much is being made about the aggressive campaign of the BJP, its organisational superiority as well as the development plank it put forth through the elections. The party was credited for not using the Hindutva card as an election plank but instead concentrated on development issues. But this was hardly the case. Did the party not announce its intention to introduce an Anti-Conversion Bill aimed to check conversions?

Two days after the election results were out, on December 6, Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani said that focussing on development and good governance did not mean that the party had forsaken Hindutva. Vishwa Hindu Parishad leader Acharya Dharmendra told mediapersons in Jaipur that the ban imposed on Trishul Deekshas by the Gehlot government had to be reconsidered. He also emphasised that the victory of the BJP was not possible without the VHP's help. And three days after Vasundhara Raje Scindia was sworn in, Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) chief K.S. Sudarshan held a meeting of all newly elected BJP legislators in Kota apparently to discuss matters of governance. Party insiders admit that without the help of the RSS in the last phases of the campaign the party would not have been able to manage such a victory.

The new Education Minister, Ghanshyam Tiwari, told Frontline that there was no question of the party forsaking Hindutva. He said that all programmes in the manifesto would be taken up, especially the Anti-Conversion Bill. "Let me clarify that I am not against different forms of religious worship, but I am against allurement for conversions," he said.

Tiwari said that after 1998 the Congress(I) had lost all elections, including the local body elections, and hence the BJP's victory was no surprise. The pre-poll surveys foretelling a Congress(I) sweep were "managed" by private companies, he said. As for the BJP's gains in the reserved constituencies, he said they were because the electorate was fed up of being treated like a vote bank of the Congress(I). When asked specifically about the use of Hindutva in these elections, he said that everything that the party did was on the basis of an ideology. Giving credit to the role played by the VHP and the Vanvasi Kalyan Parishad, he said that all organisations of the Sangh Parivar had worked hard to ensure the party's electoral success.

PRAKASH SINGH/AFP

Former Chief Minister Ashok Gehlot.

A senior BJP functionary, Sunil Bhargava, who was in charge of the media campaign, said that there was an aggressive note to its media strategy. "When Gehlot announced that the BJP had no issues and that it was an ineffective party, we decided to work on these fronts," he said. In the last 15 days of the campaign, the party focussed its energies on certain strata of people, linking up issues with the relevant sections. All in all, it was the highly localised nature of the campaign that paid dividends. The Parivartan Yatras of the BJP president, he said, were essentially for a detailed survey of the specific problems in various areas, and meeting the public was only an apparent objective.

When asked about the role of the RSS, he said that the entire campaign was taken over by the RSS in an "unprecedented manner". It took the voters to the voting machines and converted the silent votes into a wave, said another BJP leader.

"The BJP has to be grateful to it," said Bhargava. In the last week preceding elections, door-to-door campaigns were conducted. Nearly 75 per cent of the BJP candidates were new faces and the help of the RSS came in handy.

In the reserved constituencies, especially in the districts adjoining Gujarat, Sangh Parivar outfits such as the Vanvasi Kalyan Parishad, the Bharatiya Shiksha Samiti, the Goraksha Samiti and the VHP have been active for the past 10 years. The VHP especially had been working hard against conversions in this belt, said a BJP functionary.

Ashok Gehlot told Frontline that the causes for his party's electoral defeat would have to be assessed in a holistic manner. He said that there were no undercurrents of resentment among the electorate and that wherever he went he had received positive responses. "We had to choose between meeting the demands of the government employees and tackling the drought situation. It was a choice between keeping the livestock and the people alive on the one hand and meeting the demands of the employees on the other," he said. Gehlot felt that the party would have to do a lot of introspection, especially on organisational issues.

The Lok Sabha elections will be a litmus test for the State Congress(I). In the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, the Congress(I) fared poorly. Its performance will hinge on several factors, including principled alliances. The vote share of other parties has been steadily growing. The BSP, contrary to expectation, inflicted serious damage to the Congress(I) in several Assembly constituencies. The vote shares of the two main parties has been declining over the past 10 years. The BJP, which secured 47.23 per cent of the votes in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, winning 16 of the 25 seats, secured only 39.2 per cent of the votes in the current Assembly elections. It is clear that the electorate will be making a conscious choice in the next Lok Sabha elections on the basis of performance.

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