COVER STORY

The northern aggression

The message from the military operations in the Wanni region is that only a political solution will result in a permanent end to the hostilities.

V.S. SAMBANDAN
in Colombo

"Wars have never hurt anybody except the people who die."

- Salvador Dali

THE separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has redrawn the military map of the northern territory of Sri Lanka by recapturing within the first two weeks of November areas that were taken by the Sri Lankan Army through various military operati ons over the past two years.

Before Operation Oyatha Alaigal III started, the military map was a matter of satisfaction for the troops. But within days, Army camps fell like nine-pins. Areas that had been captured by the Army, some of them in difficult battles, during its military c ampaigns, were retaken by the militants with remarkable ease. Oddusuddan, Nedunkeny, Olumadu and Mankulam, important military camps that the Army had established after beating back the Tigers, fell in rapid succession. Puliyankulam and Kanakarayankulam, among the strongest and best-fortified Army outposts along the Jaffna-Kandy highway, were among those that were captured. For over a year since May 1998, this road had witnessed the troops inching forward, fighting to open a main supply route to the nort hern Jaffna peninsula, which it had regained from the Tigers.

Embarking on their latest thrust along the main highway, LTTE cadres swept vast tracts of land to the east and west of the A-9 highway and took control of several strategic towns. For all practical purposes, the government's military gains, built up over the years, were lost.

The island, especially the southern region, was preparing for the presidential election when the LTTE launched its offensive. For well over a year, the Tigers had been at the receiving end.

SRIYANTHA WALPOLA
Army patrolling in a deserted Vavuniya town.

Some military observers feel that the timing of the operation had nothing to do with the presidential election. "The main and the only motive was military," said a former militant. "The LTTE wanted to make the maximum haul of war equipment. It would have anticipated a further thrust towards Mullaitivu ahead of the election. Hence the attack on Oddusuddan," he reasoned.

Military officers are of the view that the LTTE would have conceived a smaller operation but enlarged it after seeing the effectiveness of the attack. "They have got more than what they would have expected," he said.

Although the fighting capability of the Tigers is considered formidable, such a sudden loss of territory by the Army, apparently without even putting up a fight, has caused concern. While Opposition leaders have alleged that the Government's strategy of gaining more territory was the reason for the "thinly spread out" nature of the Army's presence, sections of the Government see a possible political conspiracy behind the military debacle. The Defence Ministry promptly appointed a court of inquiry compri sing senior officers of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force to investigate the reasons for the debacle. Even as this professional exercise was under way, damage-control measures were initiated.

Censorship on military news, which was in place since June 1998, was further tightened. Sections of the national media were accused of providing grossly exaggerated and misleading casualty figures. The concern was more on keeping down the reported number of soldiers killed in action.

War casualties were contained by resorting to what has been described as "tactical withdrawals". "This is now an artillery-based aggression by the Tigers. There is less of man-to-man combat and that would explain the relatively lower numbers of casualtie s," said a military official. Initial estimates placed the number of soldiers killed at 101 and those missing in action at 743 in the five-day offensive.

Military commentators were also quick on the draw. In their analysis, it was the strategy of massing military personnel in the north for a push against the Tigers that led to the debacle.

"They have been gaining territory without a fight," said an analyst, referring to the Ranaghosa operations. It was during these operations that the Tigers withdrew from Oddusuddan and other areas, helping the Army to move in with relative ease.

As the Tigers moved out without offering resistance, it was reasoned, "they were able to keep their fighting units intact." "As the Army had to hold the territory it had gained, it was bound to spread its forces thin. Moreover, the Army had not won major victories by inflicting losses on the Tigers. This meant that the LTTE could strike back with full force," a military commentator told Frontline.

The Army's fighting units in the north also came in for a restructuring in the command, the most significant step being the replacing of the Commander of the Security Forces in the Wanni, Maj. Gen. Wasantha Perera, by Maj. Gen. Neil Dias. Senior military leaders in Colombo, including Lt.Gen. Sirilal Weerasooriya, the Army Commander, and Major General Lionel Balagalle, the Chief of Staff and until recently the Commander of the Security Forces in the Wanni, reached Vavuniya to oversee the operations.

By the turn of the week, the LTTE had reached Mankulam on the Jaffna-Kandy highway. Mankulam was won by the Army last year, when the Tigers overran Kilinochchi during Oyatha Alaigal II, inflicting heavy casualties on the Army. With the retaking of Mankul am, the LTTE consolidated its presence on the Jaffna-Kandy highway and pushed its territorial gains further south.

Then came the threat to Vavuniya, the island's northern garrison town and the headquarters of the Army's Wanni operations. Through announcements, the Tigers asked the civilians to leave the town in view of an impending attack.

Although this was dismissed by the Government as part of the "psychological operations" of the Tigers, civilians started leaving the town. By November 12, practically the entire town had emptied itself, with only those who could not afford to travel or t hose who did not have identity passes to move out staying behind. A few days later, the Tigers said that the civilians could return but asked them to stay away from areas situated near the Army camps.

LIFE in the south, however, was largely unaffected by the northern casualties. Colombo continued in its normal self. There was a clear distancing from the battlefield, not only in geographical terms but also in mental terms. But for political leaders, ac ademicians, peace activists and activists of non-governmental organisations involved in relief operations, the northern casualties largely seemed to involve "somebody else's war". But a similar situation existed during last year's Kilinochchi defeat.

One interpretation is that this also has its "positive" implications in that there is "no backlash on the minorities". This, analysts observed, was in stark contrast to the 1983 situation when the killing of 13 soldiers sparked anti-Tamil riots throughou t the island.

Sunil Bastian of the International Centre of Ethnic Studies, Colombo, attributes the larger "ambivalence" of the country's population to war as a reason. "People just want to get on with their lives," he said.

Making the point that extreme Sinhala opinion is now divided, Bastian also observed that any "instability in the south as the consequence of an event in the north is always organised". As in the past, some "sections in the parties that held power were be hind it." The present southern reaction to the northern debacle, he said, made it "quite clear that now those groups do not exist in the main parties. There is no space for hardliners in these parties."

Moreover, incidents directly involving the southern people, such as those related to the insurrections by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) during the 1980s and early 1990s, had a more direct bearing on the people in the south.

SRIYANTHA WALPOLA
Security check in Colombo.

The most telling implication of the Tiger offensive, however, would be on the living conditions of Wanni residents. The displacement of the people, providing food and other essentials to them, and averting chaos will have to engage the attention of the G overnment,nt, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations. Some former Tamil militant groups, such as the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), have started s upplementing the relief efforts of the Government and aid agencies. "We are organising blood donation camps and providing other relief materials for the displaced," said Sudhan, a TELO area leader.

If Operation Unceasing Waves III brought more territory to the Tigers, it remains to be seen how they will be able to spread further. Military officials, putting the larger picture in perspective, feel that if the Tigers spread their terrain too far, the y would be faced with the same constraints as the Army faced - too much land and too little people to man it.

While recent northern military campaigns have clearly redrawn government- and rebel-held territories, they have also sent across the signal that more than military gains and losses it is in addressing the separatist conflict from the political perspectiv e that would result in the cessation of hostilities. Until then, unfortunately, the wounds of the war will fester.