COVER STORY

Return of the Generals

The takeover of a country by military leadership in the face of failures by civilian governments only leaves the country in a worse state than before. Pakistan's is a case in point.

AZIZ SIDDIQUI

IMPOSITION of military rule for the fourth time in the country's brief history is bad enough. What makes it gloomier is that the action is by all accounts, widely popular. It has not only been welcomed by a wide swathe of common citizenry, it also seems to enjoy an embarrassing measure of acclaim among the intelligentsia. Even long-time democrats and human rights activists are averse to sounding a note of dissent. "Do you want us to go back to Nawaz Sharif?" they ask testily.

That is at the core of the current dilemma. If it is not one it has to be the other. If it is not to be an extra-constitutional public-spirited benevolence, as presumed, it can only be a constitutional self-serving despotism, as experienced. The historical factors that have created this stark choice, the experiences of the past, and the fact that weighing the alternatives on the basis of the accepted norms may still be the best course for the longer term, is lost sight of in this initial euphoria.

There is, of course, no question about the gargantuan failures of the Nawaz Sharif Government. What official publicists are busy reeling out on the official media is, for once, largely true. During his 32-month stint, Nawaz Sharif not only failed to catch the popular imagination - despite his Z.A. Bhutto-like bids to win the personal support of the masses in the interior of Sindh, Punjab and North West Frontier Province (NWFP) - he also came to be regarded as a bit of a disaster by the educated elite in the cities. His intellectual limitations had become the stuff of popular jokes. Z.A. Bhutto's brilliance was barely a mitigation of his offensive waderaism. But Nawaz Sharif was bereft even of that.

People find it hard to dispute Pervez Musharraf's contention that what he rolled back was not democracy, it was a sham. Nawaz Sharif had made sure that every potential check on his freedom to do his will was effectively gotten out of the way - extra-constitutionally if necessary, and let the chips fall where they may.

B.K. BANGASH/AP
Troops on alert at the main gate of the Parliament building in Islamabad
on October 15.

Nawaz Sharif first thought up a series of constitutional amendments to fortify himself against possible challenges to his rule and to invest himself with powers few constitutional rulers ever enjoyed. The first of his amendments dispensed with the President's power to dismiss a government and dissolve Parliament in a situation he thought was one of constitutional breakdown. That power had been written into the Constitution by President Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, who had wished to retain with himself the ultimate leverage over the Prime Minister. The provision went on to cause the downfall of four elected governments and Parliaments in eight years, the first of those at Gen. Zia's own hands. This power, therefore came to be regarded as a destabilising and undemocratic weapon in the hands of a head of state meant to be only a figurehead. For that reason, its repeal by Nawaz Sharif was generally welcomed. But there was more to come.

Nawaz Sharif's next amendment bonded parliamentary parties to the will of their party leader. It required every member to vote strictly in accordance with his or her party's (which meant the party leader's) decision. Even abstention, let alone dissent, would cause the member to forfeit his or her seat. That had the effect of completely neutering the National Assembly. The Opposition, being minuscule in the House turned into a pen of sheep. There was rarely a Parliament as dull as this one.

The ultimate in constitutional despotism, however, came with Mian Nawaz Sharif's third amendment, meant as a measure to enforce Islam in the country. The original draft placed before the National Assembly gave the government (read the Prime Minister) total power to decide what was prescribed and what was prohibited in Islam, and to go ahead and enforce it regardless of what the Constitution or the courts said. He could, for instance, decide that Islam did not permit leadership by a woman or a multi-party system of government, and nothing could stop him from making that into a law. Any functionary of the state (including obviously an officer of the courts or the armed forces) who was considered tardy in the implementation of such a decree was liable to severe penalisation. An even more remarkable provision was that any future constitutional amendment considered necessary for the purpose would need only a simple majority to be passed - simple majority not even of the total membership but of just those present at the time and voting! In other words, an amendment could sail through even without the Opposition participating, and even in the face of opposition by the smaller three of the country's four provinces. Clearly, it took a sinister mind to think up the whole design.

The proposal was so plainly outrageous that a few members even of the ruling party gathered courage to demur against it in a party meeting (they came to know of the Bill only after it was presented in the National Assembly). The objectors were immediately asked to resign, which they did, whereupon they were conceded a part of the ground. In the second draft, the last two elements were removed. The Bill, not the less offensive for the revision, got more than the needed two-thirds of the votes in the Lower House. However, since the Muslim League did not have that kind of majority in the Upper House and the others had joined in opposing it, it was kept pending on the calculation that with threats of divine wrath from the mullahs and the re-election to half the Senate seats due in March 2000 the requisite numbers would become available.

NAWAZ SHARIF and his men were active outside of the Constitution as well. The so-called Accountability Cell had throughout his tenure, concentrated on just the Opposition leader Benazir Bhutto and her imprisoned husband Asif Ali Zardari. That pretty much took care of the principal Opposition. The other party occupying considerable political space that the Muslim League coveted was the MQM, Mottahida (formerly Mohajir) Qaomi Mohaz, which had begun as, and still largely remains, the party of the first- and second-generation migrants from India settled mainly in Karachi. At first, the Muslim League joined up with it to form the government in Sindh and keep out the PPP, the single largest party in the province. However, after it had a national Emergency declared following the nuclear tests, and had that measure endorsed by the supreme court, the Muslim League thought that it no longer needed the MQM - it could impose Governor's rule in the province and rule from Islamabad without giving anyone a share in power. Not believing in half-measures, it did not just ditch its former coalition partner, it also cracked down heavily on it in the name of fighting terrorism.

ZIA MAZHA/AP
Bodies of victims of a sectarian clash between Shias and Sunnis being taken for burial in Karachi
on October 2.

The bid to tame the judiciary also started early. It succeeded so well that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (and the then President) were made to resign, following a raid by party goons on the Supreme Court building while the court was in session. Official criticisms against the judiciary continued after that on the supposed grounds of its dilatoriness and its not awarding sentences that were prompt and stiff enough. This was seen as a bid to warn the judges against assuming too much independence. On the eve of Atal Behari Vajpayee's visit to Lahore, the world media that was on hand to witness the occasion huddled around the available television sets when it was announced that Nawaz Sharif was to address the nation. The expectation was that the speech would be about the event that was on the minds of most people - the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Pakistan in close to 40 years. However, as it happened, there was not a word about that. The address was a tirade against the judiciary and the judicial system.

The list of the ousted government's bids to undermine the democratic and federal principles, institutions and sentiments is long despite the relatively brief spell in power. It includes a series of actions against the media and mediapersons, a campaign of vilification against independent-minded non-governmental organisations (NGOs) by name and drawing up a law to limit the freedom of the NGOs and enhance the official say in their affairs, moves that made the predominance of Punjab increasingly felt in the three smaller provinces, and the extravagant sallies into populist economism at a time of virtual bankruptcy.

THE bill of indictment against the Nawaz Sharif Government can go on and on, but that still does not prove that one wrong can be made good by another. Pakistan has had prolonged experience with military rule. Nearly half of its 50 years has been spent thus, with each bout coming in the midst of similar public euphoria and a sense of good riddance for the ousted order. But each such spell left the country, when it was made to leave it, in an even worse mess than it found it in.

The rule of gen. Ayub Khan, among a number of other things, started the process of alienation in East Pakistan, which Gen. Yahya Khan after him carried to completion. Between them they saw half the country break away, the only occurrence of its kind in current history.

M. ZIA/AP
Jamaat-e-Islami leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed addresses a rally in Karachi on October 4.

Zia-ul-Haq's gifts were similarly manifold and far-reaching. He put the country on the map of drug traffic. Drug addiction spread widely within the country too: from being negligible at the start of the 1980s, the numbers shot to upwards of three million at the close of the decade. The country also became the site of the busiest cross-border arms trail since the Vietnam war, with parts of the weaponry meant for Afghanistan trickling sideways, deep into the country, and creating the phenomenon of arms proliferation in private hands. This in turn led to the birth and spread of terrorism within, with gruesome incidents rocking the country. Zia-ul-Haq also acted as a midwife in the process of introducing religious fundamentalism into the body politic. It has since made deep inroads into the corpus of laws and the administration of justice. The pressure has continued to mount. There is an unrelenting bid to enhance its influence and its embrace.

Perhaps the most baneful of the long-term effects of the earlier spells of military rule was that they robbed constitutionalism of much of its sanctity. The Constitution was either abrogated or suspended, replaced or overhauled at the convenience of the dictator of the time. With all that happening - and happening unfortunately with the endorsement of the country's judiciary - the way was opened for political governments too to press against constitutional constraints. A country that was already a bit difficult to rule was thus made even more ungovernable.

The length and nature of past military rules had yet another effect: they made the military's presence loom large even when it was not in power. The political governments that have come in between have felt obliged to keep looking over their shoulders - or, like Mian Nawaz Sharif, to try and create personal loyalties in that camp.

There is little evidence so far that Gen. Musharraf's tenure in power will be very different from those of his predecessors. The objectives he has spelt out for himself make a full enough agenda. The approach is soft for the present. The term martial law has been strictly avoided this time, as a nod no doubt to world opinion. Fundamental rights are also promised to be generally respected. But on past evidence it is hard to be optimistic even about small mercies. As the regime exhausts its ingenuity and innovativeness and public euphoria begins to dissipate, it may find even a relatively free press, independent judiciary and active elements of civil society a bit of a spoilsport.

The Chief Executive has already given himself the authority to act outside of the suspended Constitution in pursuit of the aims he has set out. He may have to make structural changes in such areas as devolution of powers to the grassroots and strengthening the federal bonds, in case he takes those objectives seriously enough. The proposed National Security Council headed by himself and including the two other service chiefs seems particularly likely to become an organic feature as the supreme governing body. The armed forces had long favoured a constitutional role for themselves in governing the country. Now that they have the opportunity to give it to themselves it is unlikely that they will not make sure it stays for all forseeable future.

When asked about his new responsibilities, Gen. Musharraf remarked that it was "nice to be in charge". This candour was amusing. It can also be ominous.

A former Editor of The Frontier Post and The Pakistan Times, Aziz Siddiqui is currently Joint Director of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.