COVER STORY

Treading slowly

India's cautious approach to the developments across the border and the rush of initiatives from the military rulers does not make for much movement on the bilateral front in the immediate context.

JOHN CHERIAN
in New Delhi

IN the past three years, successive Indian governments had found a degree of comfort in doing business with the civilian government in Pakistan led by Nawaz Sharif. The thaw set in when I.K. Gujral was in charge of Indian foreign policy from 1996 to 1998. Both governments indicated at that time that they were willing to discuss substantive issues, including Kashmir. When the Bharatiya Janata Party-led coalition came to power in 1998, relations between the two governments were initially frosty. Then the political heat generated by the nuclear explosions in May 1998 took time to dissipate. When Prime Ministers Atal Behari Vajpayee and Sharif met during the summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Colombo, the bad vibes were manifested in the their body language. But matters improved in a few months.

Indian policymakers may not have anticipated a military takeover in Pakistan at this juncture: military coups have become unusual worldwide, and Sharif's party had an overwhelming majority in Parliament. India initially responded to the coup by taking the high moral ground. External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh said that the events in Pakistan "by themselves are a deadly comment on the situation in that country". He added that India's commitment to democracy had been vividly put across to the international community. "It is ironic that on the eve of the swearing-in of the Vajpayee government, coup leaders took control of Pakistan and the country went under martial law," Jaswant Singh said.

The Indian government then decided to send National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra to Washington to discuss, among other things, the latest developments in Pakistan with U.S. State Department officials. This was not surprising considering the fact that Indian government leaders, from the Prime Minister downwards, had characterised the U.S. as a "natural ally" of India. However, there were surprises in store for them.

Although the world's most powerful democracy was quick to criticise the coup, it made it clear that it would continue to do business with Islamabad. Washington also wanted New Delhi to do likewise. In a telephonic conversation with Vajpayee, President Bill Clinton suggested that India and Pakistan resume talks at the earliest. It is known to discerning observers that successive U.S. administrations have practised double standards in respect of their dealings with military regimes. In the case of countries with which it has had historically close ties - such as Pakistan, Turkey and Indonesia - the U.S. connives at overt or covert military interventions. The Clinton administration, as in the case of previous U.S. administrations, reckons that in certain circumstances the military could prove more sensitive to Washington's concerns.

The armed forces in Pakistan, Turkey and Iran were partners in many important Western enterprises during the Cold War. It is therefore no surprise that Washington has concluded that General Pervez Musharraf is "a man you can do business with". Musharraf, for his part, has advertised to the world his admiration for Turkey's "military democracy" and indicated that he would prefer a similar model for Pakistan. In much the same way as the Turkish military, Musharraf has taken a tough stance in respect of Islamic parties. So far only Islamic parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami have dared to protest openly against military rule.

SHANKER CHAKRAVARTY
Prime Ministers A.B. Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif at the Wagah border on February 20.

Senior U.S. officials have now begun to exert pressure on the Indian government to restart the stalled dialogue process. Indian officials have, however, dismissed Musharraf's announcement regarding the withdrawal of Pakistani troops along the international border as a gimmick. India said that for the withdrawal to be meaningful, Pakistan should simultaneously withdraw troops from the Line of Control. Pakistan insists that the situation along the LoC is qualitatively different as it has been volatile with heavy concentration of troops and firepower on both sides of the border.

However, the U.S. claims that Musharraf's gesture is an important confidence-building measure (CBM) and that reciprocal action from New Delhi would help ease tensions. The Indian side, however, insists that no progress is possible in the dialogue process unless Islamabad gives a "commitment" that it will stop cross-border terrorism. The new military regime in Pakistan has regretted India's "negative response" to its offer of unconditional resumption of dialogue.

Indian officials are evidently not as impressed as their U.S. counterparts are by the rush of initiatives from the military rulers. Musharraf reiterated the Pakistani offer of a dialogue on Kashmir and other issues. In recent days, the Indian Foreign Office has toughened its stance on Kashmir, asserting that Kashmir is the key to India's territorial unity and that there can be no compromise on this. In the third week of October, a spokesman for the Indian External Affairs Ministry said on condition of anonymity that it was "imperative" that Islamabad stopped cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and the rest of India. The official said that there were as yet no signs that Pakistani support for cross-border terrorism had abated. Jaswant Singh said in late October that it was "too early" to consider a resumption of the dialogue with Islamabad. He dismissed concerns expressed by some Western nations about the danger of the recent events triggering a nuclear flare-up in the region.

In Washington, Brajesh Mishra expressed India's concerns about the military takeover. India's initial interpretation was that the coup was intended to negate the Pakistan Prime Minister's efforts to clamp down on terrorists in that country. Musharraf was portrayed as an officer who was influenced by the concepts of militant Islam and it was even alleged that he had close links with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In support of this charge, Indian officials pointed to the transcripts of a telephone conversation between Musharraf and a senior Army officer during the early stages of the Kargil war; intelligence agencies had secured tapes which, they said, "proved" Musharraf's early role in the Kargil intrusion. Copies of the tapes had been handed over to Nawaz Sharif through secret envoys.

Both Sharif and Vajpayee seemed to want to convey the opinion that Musharraf was the "architect" of Kargil. U.S. officials were less than convinced and were willing to give Musharraf the benefit of the doubt. They, however, assured Mishra in Washington that the U.S. was as keen as India was to see civilian government restored in Pakistan and that they would use their influence on Pakistan to address Indian concerns over cross-border terrorism. The Clinton administration also announced that for the present it would not waive the Pressler Amendment, as proposed, which would lead to the resumption of arms supply to Pakistan.

KAMAL NARANG
At the height of the Kargil War,
an Indian artillery gun booms in the Batalik sector.

At the same time, U.S. officials in Washington and those who were recently in New Delhi want India to keep the door open for talks with the new regime in Islamabad. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Karl Inderfurth said recently that Washington was optimistic of convincing the generals to end state support for cross-border terrorism. Inderfurth said that he would meet Jaswant Singh in early November, and that at the top of the agenda for discussion would be the recent developments in Pakistan and adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Inderfurth told mediapersons in Washington that both the U.S. and India would "closely" watch Musharraf's actions, rather than his words. He conceded that the prospects of "renewing the Lahore process did not look well".

Inderfurth, however, stressed that the U.S. "cannot walk away because Pakistan is important - because stability or the lack thereof in Pakistan will have an impact on Pakistan's neighbours." Bruce Reidel, Senior Director for South Asia in the National Security Council, who was in New Delhi in the fourth week of October, let it be known that Washington viewed Musharraf as a man with "moderate" political views and admitted that Gen. Anthony Zinni, who is in charge of U.S. forces in the Gulf, had a long discussion with Musharraf on security-related issues. New Delhi is not happy at what it feels is only a muted response from Washington to the events in Pakistan.

The Commonwealth, on the other hand, took a tough stance; it suspended Pakistan from the organisation, barely a month before the scheduled Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHOGM) summit in Durban. Members from the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group took the decision at a meeting in London, stating that the suspension would be effective "forthwith" and would remain "pending the restoration of democracy in the country". In a statement released after the talks, the Ministers unanimously condemned the overthrow of the democratically elected government in Pakistan.

The European Union set a November 15 deadline for a return to civilian rule. Failure in this regard would invite punitive action. The Indian government, especially a BJP-led one, cannot afford to take such an open stand on an issue that involves the question of democracy. Vociferous support for the restoration of democratic rule could be misconstrued as support for the ousted Sharif government.

Vajpayee will however have an occasion to interact with the new military strongman of Pakistan at the SAARC summit to be held in Kathmandu in late November. That occasion could well provide the opportunity for the resumption of the stalled dialogue process between the two countries.