COVER STORY

BACK IN BUSINESS

Pakistan is back in the military mould, although 'Chief Executive' Pervez Musharraf talks of the path to democracy. Where does the country go from here?

AMIT BARUAH
in Islamabad

What is the Constitution? It is a booklet with 10 or 12 pages. I can tear them up and say that from tomorrow we shall live under a different system. Is there anybody to stop me? Today, the people follow wherever I lead. All the politicians, including the once-mighty Mr. (Zulfiqar Ali) Bhutto, will follow me with their tails wagging. But is that good for the country? No, I have no political ambition personally.

- Pakistani dictator Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, quoted in Working with Zia by General (retd) K.M. Arif.

ON October 12, General Pervez Musharraf's troops went about their business in a cool, clinical manner. Not a single shot was fired as the khaki-clad men moved into Islamabad, took over strategic locations, and confined Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his key associates to their houses. As the Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) aircraft in which Musharraf was returning from Colombo neared Karachi, troops under the command of the X Corps Commander based in Rawalpindi, Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmad, announced by their presence on the streets the "ouster" of the Nawaz Sharif Government. They met with no resistance. The coup was indeed a bloodless one.

However, a mid-air drama unfolded in the skies above Karachi. According to Musharraf, who had gone to Colombo to attend the 50th anniversary celebrations of the Sri Lankan Army, instructions had been given to the Karachi airport authorities to deny permission for the plane carrying him to land in Pakistan and to divert it elsewhere. The aircraft was low on fuel, and the order imperilled the lives of the passengers, he said. According to reports, Musharraf immediately took charge of the situation. Using the in-flight radio transmission facility, he ordered the Karachi control tower to allow the plane to land since it was running short of fuel. Permission was accorded, and the plane eventually touched down at 6.50 p.m. with hardly any fuel left. Musharraf's troops were by then in command of the airport building.

It is apparent from the sequence of events that the X Corps Commander did not await instructions from Musharraf, who had only hours earlier been "retired" by Sharif, before taking over key installations in Islamabad. His motive was to prevent a re-broadcast of the news of Musharraf's dismissal, which had been put out by Pakistan Television at 5 p.m.

In the 6 p.m. English bulletin, only Chechnya and Kashmir were in focus. Suddenly, the programme went off the PTV World channel, but continued on PTV's main terrestrial channel. Shaista Zaid, the newscaster made famous by the fact that it was she who "broke" the news of the coup, read on. This time, the information put out at 5 p.m. - that Gen. Pervez Musharraf had been "retired" with immediate effect and Lt. Gen. Khwaja Ziauddin, chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence, appointed the new Army Chief - was not repeated. After the weather report, however, the dramatic announcement was repeated: Gen. Musharraf had been dismissed by Sharif.

All this gave sufficient indication that something was up. As this reporter rushed to the PTV station, scores of people had gathered outside it. Khaki-clad Army personnel were at work inside the station.

AP
Gen. Pervez Musharraf takes the salute at the Pakistan Military Academy in Kabul
on October 18.

Inside the newsroom, another drama had been played out. PTV Chairman Pervez Rashid reached the station to ensure that the news of Musharraf's dismissal was duly announced. A few Army personnel, led by a Major, entered the newsroom just as Shaista Zaid was reading the bulletin. However, the Prime Minister's Military Secretary, Brig. Javed Malik, disarmed the Major.

Only then, the weather report over, did Shaista Zaid repeat the announcement that a new Army chief had been appointed. Only PTV's main channel carried the news; PTV World had by then passed into the control of troops loyal to Musharraf.

From the PTV station it is only a two-minute drive to the Prime Minister's residence , but access to it had been blocked with trucks. A young Army officer and a few soldiers stood at the end of the access road.

GHULAM HASNAIN/GAMMA
Security forces outside the National Assembly building in Islamabad after Musharraf took over on October 12.

At this point, it was unclear as to whom the troops were loyal to. Soon enough came the information that the Prime Minister was at home and that no one was allowed to enter or leave the premises. In a few minutes, another piece of reliable information trickled in: the troops had moved in on the orders of the chiefs of the three wings of Pakistan's armed forces.

SHARIF'S plan to divert the plane carrying Musharraf, arrest him using the Sindh police and instal Gen. Ziauddin as the Army chief was doomed to failure. For of the nine corps commanders, Sharif could muster the support of only two: Lt. Gen. Salim Haidar (Mangla) and Lt. Gen. Tariq Pervez (Quetta). Haidar had been shifted to General Head Quarters, Rawalpindi, by Musharraf, and Tariq Pervez retired on October 9 for having had an unauthorised meeting with Sharif.

Sharif was evidently misled by advice from his cronies into thinking that he could carry out the plan to dismiss Musharraf. Sharif perhaps thought that he could repeat what he did in December 1997 to Supreme Court Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah: with the support of other judges, he forced Shah to withdraw from the scene. The Army did nothing when Shah sought its protection. The then Army chief, Gen. Jehangir Karamat, merely marked to the Defence Secretary his letter seeking security.

American scholar Stephen Cohen made a prescient observation in an epilogue to the 1998 edition of his book, The Pakistan Army: "It (Sharif's attack on the judiciary in 1997) may, however, have brought the next civilian-military crisis closer if Nawaz Sharif ever attempts to pack the upper reaches of the Army with his followers as he attempted to pack the Supreme Court with sympathetic judges."

However, Sharif's plan came unstuck this time because seven of the nine Corps Commanders stood solidly behind Musharraf.

B.K. BANGASH/AP
Nawaz Sharif, who was dismissed as Prime Minister.

Musharraf had made it clear on September 23 that he would complete his term as Army chief. For the Sharif Government, that obviously set the alarm bells ringing. Sharif, who had extended Musharraf's term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) on September 29, "retired" him on October 12.

Informed sources told Frontline that another reason for Sharif's worries was that Musharraf had replaced the commander of the 111 Brigade some time ago with his "own man", Brigadier Salahuddin. Considering that Sharif sees conspiracies where none exists, this appointment served to heighten his sense of insecurity.

It was, however, Kargil which brought to the fore the differences between Musharraf and Sharif. There are reports that the Kargil operation was planned in October-November 1998 and that the first infiltrators moved in at the time; if so, the operation was planned by Musharraf soon after he took over as Army chief on October 7, 1998. Approval from the Prime Minister was, possibly, obtained in due course.

However, Musharraf was not prepared to take the rap for Kargil. If anything, both he and Sharif are responsible for the misadventure which led to the death of some 1,000 Pakistani and Indian soldiers.

Political analyst Ayaz Amir wrote in the newspaper Dawn on September 17: "Kargil has dealt a blow to the unity of the governing class, driving a wedge between the heavy mandate (of Sharif) and Rawalpindi. While both have had their fingers burnt, both are trying to put the blame for this fiasco on the shoulders of the other... This is the real cat-and-mouse game being played." Amir warned that the mood in Rawalpindi was "dark, even dangerous".

It is clear, therefore, that the strains in the relations between the Army chief and the Prime Minister were no secret.

ON October 12, public uncertainty continued to mount as the PTV channel remained off the air. Finally, transmission resumed at about 11 p.m., with an announcement that the Nawaz Sharif Government had been dismissed and that the JCSC Chairman would address the nation.

Musharraf began the brief addressat 2.50 a.m. on October 13. He said: "... I wish to inform you that the armed forces have moved in as a last resort, to prevent any further destabilisation." He accused the Sharif Government of trying to "politicise the Army, destabilise it" and create "dissension" within its ranks.

AP
Musharraf with President Rafiq Tarar in Islamabad a day after the coup.

Late on the night of October 15, Musharraf issued an emergency proclamation in "pursuance of deliberations and decisions of Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces and Corps Commanders of Pakistan Army." It said the Constitution was kept in abeyance, the elected Assemblies and the powers of the presiding officers were suspended, the Prime Minister, Federal Ministers and provincial functionaries ceased to hold office and the "whole of Pakistan" came "under the control of the armed forces of Pakistan". The General proclaimed himself "Chief Executive".

Along with the proclamation, Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 1999 was issued; it allowed civil courts to function but prohibited courts from issuing any writ against the Chief Executive or persons acting on his directions. The order stated: "The fundamental rights conferred by Chapter I of Part II of the Constitution, not in conflict with the Proclamation of Emergency or any Order made thereunder from time to time, shall continue to be in force."

Unlike Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, who dissolved the elected Assemblies, imposed martial law and suspended the fundamental rights, Musharraf appears to have attempted to "soften the blow". Just as significant, unlike Zia-ul-Haq, Musharraf did not designate himself Chief Martial Law Administrator.

In a policy address on October 17, Musharraf said: "This is not martial law, only another path towards democracy." However, going by the dictionary meaning of martial law - "the exercise of military power by a government, etc. in time of emergency (war, riot, etc.) with the temporary suspension of ordinary administration and policing" - Pakistan is under military rule.

Announcing that a six-member National Security Council (NSC) with himself as its chief would head the new structure of governance, Musharraf said that a think-tank would act as an adjunct to the NSC while a Cabinet of Ministers "will work under the guidance" of the NSC. The NSC is to comprise the Air Force and Navy chiefs and a "specialist each' in law, finance, foreign policy and national affairs.

The Chief Executive laid down six objectives for his regime - rebuilding national confidence and morale; strengthening the Federation, removing inter-provincial disharmony and restoring national cohesion; reviving the economy and restoring investor confidence; ensuring law and order and dispensing speedy justice; de-politicising state institutions; devolving power to the grassroots level and ensuring swift and across-the-board accountability.

Musharraf attempted to give an account of the problems facing Pakistan. "There is despondency and hopelessness surrounding us... the slide has been gradual but has rapidly accelerated in the last many years. Today, we have reached a stage where our economy has crumbled, our credibility is lost, state institutions lie demolished; provincial disharmony has caused cracks in the Federation and people who were once brothers are now at each other's throat."

"In sum," Musharraf said, "we have lost our honour, our dignity, our respect in the comity of nations. Is this the democracy our Quaid-e-Azam envisaged? Is this the way to enter the new millennium?... Quite clearly, what Pakistan has experienced has been merely a label of democracy, not the essence of it... I shall not allow the people to be taken back to the era of sham democracy but to a true one. And I promise you I will, Inshallah."

Clearly, the General has set himself a formidable agenda. So far no Pakistani government - civilian or military - has succeeded much in these areas. Whether Musharraf can reverse this trend remains to be seen.

K.M. CHOUDARY/AP
Books and tracts on Islam and on the militancy in Kashmir being sold on a Lahore street after Friday prayers. Proceeds from the sale of the books go to fund the militancy.

IN a sense, Musharraf has to deal with Zia-ul-Haq's legacy. Imtiaz Alam wrote in The News on October 19:

"General Zia-ul-Haq brought us the gifts of communalism, ethnic divisions, religious extremism, institutional decay, corrupt politicians of the local body variety, the Sharif model of governance, Talibanisation, Kalashnikov culture, massive corruption, malaise of narcotics, besides a criminal neglect of physical and social infrastructure and a debt trap...

"One may trust Gen. Musharraf's sincerity and integrity. But that is not a sufficient condition to take the burden of an agenda that requires tremendous effort for decades and essentially by civil society and not the least by the garrison." The shorter the intervention, the greater would be its success, Imitiaz Alam argued.

Alam further said: "If extended, the democratic process and civil society that has never been allowed to flourish in an ideological nation-state will suffer and the citizens will remain without a constitutional status... The central question is: can the armed forces rise above their institutional interests and let the forces of civil society in a fragile Federation respond to overall challenges of political and economic survival? If so, can they play the role of a neutral broker, help evolve a national consensus and leave it to the people to decide a new social contract and their future?"

THE HINDU PHOTO LIBRARY

Pakistan came under military rule on three previous occassions, under (from left) Gen. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Gen. Yahya Khan and Gen. Zia-ul-Haq.

Pakistanis await the answer to that question, as they get used to a new military regime, which has so far not placed restrictions on the freedom of the press, a litmus test of tolerence for any regime, military or civilian. So far the overall approach has been correct even though the information flow has been "controlled".

FEW Pakistanis have shed a tear for the Sharif Government, which had undermined every institution, including the press. The arrest and detention of journalists was a frightening pointer to the state of mind of the civilian rulers. Ordinary Pakistanis are doubtless pleased that Sharif and Co., who faced serious charges of corruption, have been deposed. However, having heard and seen enough over the years, they have a disdain for words and promises that do not mean much yet.

ROBERT NICKELSBERG/ GAMMA LIAISON
A sound-up truck bearing merchandise lumbers across the Khyber Pass in North West frontier Province, close to the Afghanistan border. Musharraf has identified the revival of the economy as one of his priority areas.

Conversations with people from various walks of life reflected a popular expectation that the Army would now have to deliver on its promises. The recovery of national wealth, in their view, was crucial to restoring the economic health of the country. The people want the Army to deliver - and deliver quickly. However, optimism is tempered by realism. The people are aware that Zia-ul-Haq gave precious little to the people, nor did he put in place any process of accountability. His sole aim was to hold and accumulate power - a legacy he passed on to his civilian "successor" , Nawaz Sharif.

If Pakistan's history holds any lessons, it is that controlled and directed democracy will not work. The Army is a homogeneous institution, but part of the problem in Pakistan is that the Army's political ambitions (and corrupt practices in the past) have led to acts of blatant intervention in electoral politics.

A variety of leaders, including Imran Khan (former captain of Pakistan's cricket team), have argued that the Army should hold power for a two-year period and then hand over power to a civilian government. But if the people of Pakistan do not today have politicians they can trust, what is the guarantee they can produce them in, say, two years?

Not a single member of the Pakistan Musilm League (Nawaz), the erstwhile ruling party or its government moved the Supreme Court seeking restoration of the civilian regime. That, in a sense, said it all: that section's faith in democracy is only skin-deep and fear of the military is deep-seated. After a full week, some members of the former ruling party made a meek demand for the immediate release of the ousted Prime Minister. There was no condemnation of the military for overthrowing a civilian government.

It is not as if the people of Pakistan do not like democracy. The fact is that they have been deprived of democracy and democratic practices by a state that is all-powerful and which controls and watches closely individuals who matter. Note the fact that no Pakistani politician with a military background has ever been given an electoral mandate.

In her book, The State of Martial Rule, Ayesha Jalal, one of Pakistan's finest scholars, wrote about the challenges that lay before Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 1988: "The greatest challenge to the largest political party, however, stemmed from the lingering imbalance between elected and non-elected institutions in Pakistan's history..."

Jalal further wrote: "To survive and succeed, an elected Prime Minister in the Pakistani context has almost to play the role of the leader of the Opposition upholding the case of the political process against the pre-existing state structure..."

Benazir Bhutto twice failed to make the grade democratically and rein in super-powerful institutions; her successor, Nawaz Sharif, more than matched her. For its part, the Army intelligence network resisted any extension of true democracy.

KAREN DAVIES / GAMMA
Musharraf with his parents, wife Saiba and granddaughter Mariam.

Nawaz Sharif, who was once the Army's blue-eyed boy, thought he could consolidate his own personal power by bringing the military to heel. In a country where the Army has either ruled directly or never been far from the levers of power, that proved to be a disastrous miscalculation.

To return to Ayesha Jalal's thesis, can Gen. Musharraf do what four successive civilian governments failed to do since 1988? Can he play the role of the "leader of the Opposition" from within? Or is that too much to expect from a man in uniform?