BOOKS

Neither wave nor saffron?

A. G. NOORANI

BJP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism: From Periphery to Centre by Partha S. Ghosh; Manohar; pages 460, Rs. 800.

AFTER the French scholar Christopher Jaffrelot's classic The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India (1996) and the Danish scholar Thomas Blom Hansen's erudite and incisive work The Saffron Wave (1999), we have an Indian academic addressing him self in equal earnest to the two questions on which they had laboured. How did the Bharatiya Janata Party manage to travel from the periphery to the centre of Indian politics - from two seats and 7.68 per cent votes in the 1984 Lok Sabha elections to 86 seats and 11.5 per cent votes in the 1989 Lok Sabha elections? The answer is obvious and was provided repeatedly by one of its leaders L. K. Advani; namely, its Ayodhya movement, launched on the basis of the Palampur resolution of 1989 on the eve of the general elections. That, however, is a formal answer. The considerable transfer of votes would not have been possible but for an ideological affinity between the BJP and some leaders and workers in other parties, chiefly the Congress(I).

The second question is whether the so-called "saffron wave" is receding and, relatedly, whether the BJP is shedding its ideological baggage. The answer to the first part will be provided in the election results. Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh chief Rajendra Singh's revival of the triple mosque issue recently - Ayodhya, Mathura and Varanasi - shows that the RSS has not changed one bit. Nor has the BJP. Advani said emphatically in Bhubaneswar on September 19 that "there is no question of giving them (triple demands) up. Only deference is being shown to the sensitivities of the coalition partners.

Partha Ghosh has worked hard to collect data and ranges wide in his work to make it a useful source of reference on the last decade of India's politics generally, besides the communal situation. The book is marked by excessive reliance, generally, on sec ondary sources and a lack of rigour in analysis in many places. Ghosh rightly points out that "distortion of history in school texts is not a phenomenon peculiar to the BJP. In the 1950s and 1960s, when the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) was nowhere in sight of power even in strongholds such as M.P. and Rajasthan, let alone the Centre, there were complaints of distortions of history. Textbooks in circulation in the Hindi-speaking States as well as Gujarat and Maharashtra were heavily loaded in favour of Ind ia's Hindu past and against Muslim rule. When this question was raised in Parliament in 1966, a committee consisting of K. G. Saiyidain, J. P. Naik, Gopinath Aman and others was appointed to look into the matter. The committee reported that there was sub stantive evidence in the allegations that there was a Hindu bias in the textbooks of certain States and that historical events were "presented in such a manner as to arouse and perpetuate prejudice against certain religious groups. Besides, 'the books we re overweighed with Hindu mythology,' the literary texts were full of 'prayers to Hindu deities' and 'Hindu beliefs are presented in a manner as if they are universally held by all Indians.'" The footnote at the end of the paragraph (page 240) does not c ite the committee's report but a book which mentioned its findings. Opinions are quoted at length, and they are not always from ones known for expertise in the matter under discussion.

"Was Partition avoidable?" the author asks and cites the opinions of four writers of varying equipment without leaving the reader any the wiser as to his own views. Elsewhere, he expresses his views plainly enough.

These blemishes detract from the quality of the work but do not affect its essential worth. It is one of the most objective and impartial works by an Indian scholar of integrity and dedication who has brought together a mass of useful material enlivened by candid appraisals. At places they are wide off the mark. "Unlike majority (sic) Hindus, who wanted to wrest their rights through a political struggle with the British, the minority Muslims chose to do the same by aligning with the British. Even Sir Sy ed Ahmed Khan, the father of Muslim modernisation in India, subscribed to this line of argument." Apart from the inappropriate characterisation ("line of argument"), Sir Syed was the foremost advocate of this policy. It was opposed with compelling logic by Badruddin Tyabji, then Congress president, and also by a substantial body of the ulema. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad belonged to this school. The Sir Syed-Tyabji correspondence is very relevant to the situation of Indian Muslims today (For the text, see the writer's Badruddin Tyabji; Publications Division, 1969).

There is one formulation that raises an important issue: "Religion played an important role in the growth of Indian/Hindu nationalism and Muslim separatism." The amazing stroke (Indian/Hindu) apart, Hindu nationalism is surely no less "separatist" and a lapse from Indian nationalism than Muslim communalism is. One is reminded of Jawaharlal Nehru's remark on January 5, 1961 that "the communalism of a majority community is apt to be taken for nationalism." How right he was. Serbian "communalism" proved "s eparatist" and wrecked the Yugoslav federation constructed by Tito, a Croat. Not every Congressman shared Nehru's outlook. Morarji Desai had no hesitation in declaring at the National Democratic Convention in New Delhi on November 29, 1964: "The Hindu ma jority is clean-hearted and fair minded. I cannot say the same about the majority of Indian Muslims" (The Hindustan Times; November 30, 1964).

The two-nation theory was first propounded by V. D. Savarkar in his essay 'Hindutva' in 1923. In his presidential address to the Hindu Mahasabha in 1937 he amplified the theory: "There are two nations in the main, the Hindus and the Muslims in India." He rejected "the conception of Territorial Nationality not cemented by any Cultural, Racial or Historical affinities and consequently having no common will to incorporate themselves into a Nation". This doctrine of "cultural nationalism" was echoed by RSS chief M. S. Golwalkar in his Bunch of Thoughts (1966) and was ardently reiterated by the BJP in its election manifesto of 1998. A whole chapter is devoted to "Our National Identity: Cultural Nationalism". It asserts that "the cultural nationalism of India... is the core of Hindutva". The BJP astutely decided not to issue a separate manifesto in 1999 for fear of upsetting its gullible allies. Its 1998 manifesto is tacitly affirmed. It has not been abandoned, as Advani's speech on September 19, 199 9 makes clear.

The origin of Mohammed Ali Jinnah's two-nation theory bears recalling. In an article published in Time and Tide (London) on January 19, 1940, he said: "A Constitution must be evolved that recognises that there are in India two nations, who both mu st share the governance of their common motherland." This implied power-sharing in a united India, not its partition. The point was also made earlier in the article which rejected "unqualified Western democracy" and insisted that "all Gover nments, Central or Provincial, must be Governments that represent all actions of the people". On his part, "in evolving such a constitution" Jinnah was prepared to cooperate with the Congress "so that the present enmities may cease and India may take its place amongst the great countries of the world."

If only two months later, on March 23, 1940, he got the Muslim League to adopt the Pakistan resolution, it was, as is widely realised, as a bargaining chip. On December 20, 1986, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam spokesman in Chennai told The Sunda y Observer that it would accept a "viable alternative" to Eelam if it was made possible for "two nations to co-exist in our country".

Jinnah's intellectual equipment on this subject, like that of most lawyers, was limited. The concept of "consociational democracy" was articulated by Arend Lijphart in his book Democracy in Plural Societies (1982). In 1996 he noted that while "int er-group hostility and violence have increased" in India, it has adopted some elements of his concept. ("The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation"; American Political Science Review, June 1996).

But power-sharing was precisely what most in the Congress and all in the Hindu Mahasabha were opposed to. Hence, the ungenerous Motilal Nehru Report (1928). One of the finest political minds in the country and also a man of sterling integrity, Prem Bhasi n, formerly general secretary of the Praja Socialist Party (PSP), alluded to the latent reality in Janata, a journal founded by Jayaprakash Narayan (Annual Number 1998). He wrote: "The ease with which a large number of Congressmen and women - smal l, big and bigger still - have walked into the RSS-BJP boat and sailed with it is not a matter of surprise. For, there has always been a certain affinity between the two. A large and influential section in the Congress sincerely believed even during t he freedom struggle that the interests of Hindu Indians could not be sacrificed at the altar of a united Independent India." He named two stalwarts, Madan Mohan Malaviya and Lala Lajpat Rai, explicitly; Vallabhbhai Patel, haltingly. This group pre ferred partition to power-sharing in a united India. Lala Lajpat Rai had in the famous article in Tribune (December 14, 1924) proposed a partition of Punjab on communal lines (emphasis added, throughout).

None of this can excuse the havoc Jinnah wrought. When discussing the Indian Finance Bill (1925), he stated on the floor of the Legislative Assembly: "... I, Sir, stand here with a clear conscience and I say that I am a nationalist first, a nationalist s econd and a nationalist last... I once more appeal to this House, whether you are a Mussalman or a Hindu, for God's sake do not import the discussion of communal matters into this House, and degrade this Assembly, which we desire should become a real Nat ional Parliament. Set an example to the outside world and our people!" When, in 1940, he endorsed the poisonous two-nation theory and demanded Pakistan, he ought to have known that he was playing with fire.

Partha Ghosh has no hesitation in tracing the lineage of the BJP to the old Hindu communal constituency which came into being in the 19th century. Bitterness in the aftermath of Partition gave it an edge. It existed, however, for years earlier. This scho ol would also have flourished even in a united India, along with its Muslim counterpart. Secularists in both communities would have fought jointly against them. The pass was sold by secularists in both the Congress and the Muslim League. The BJP has prof ited by it in India, as has the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan. (On the lineage vide B. R. Purohit; Hindu Revivalism and Indian Nationalism; Sagar, Sathi Prakashan; 1965). It is the minorities in both countries who bore the brunt of Partition.

Partha Ghosh does a fine job, as only a scholar of strong secular commitment would, exposing thoroughly the bogey of "the pampered Muslim" with a wealth of data. Muslims constitute about 13 per cent of the Indian population but are grossly underrepresent ed in jobs, professions and education even fifty years after Independence.

"The National Sample Survey of 1988 provides the following figures: (1) A total of 52.3 per cent Muslims are below the poverty line (BPL); (2) the monthly income of Muslims is only Rs. 150; (3) 50.5 per cent Muslims are illiterate; (4) Muslims educate d up to high school are 4 per cent; (5) in government services their share is 4.4 per cent; (6) for starting any business enterprise 3.7 per cent Muslims got financial loan; (7) 5 per cent of Muslims got bank loans from the scheduled banks; (8) among Ind ian entrepreneurs who get industrial loans, only 2 per cent are Muslims. Male illiteracy among the Muslims is 42.4 per cent compared to 25.3 per cent among the Hindus. The corresponding figures of female illiteracy are 59.5 and 45.2, respectively. Less t han 1 per cent (0.8) Muslims are graduates while 4.5 per cent Hindus are."

In Central government employment, Muslims account for 4.4 per cent. Only 3 per cent of Indian Administrative Service officers are Muslims. Muslims are underrepresented in the police force. It will be long before anyone will think of reforms on the lines of those suggested in Chris Patten's recent Report on the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). Catholics comprise 43 per cent of the population of Northern Ireland. The RUC is 92 per cent Protestant (International Herald Tribune; September 10, 1999).

Contrary to the BJP's propaganda, there is no monolithic Muslim vote-bank. The Muslim in Tamil Nadu, for instance, might perceive the situation differently from his counterpart in Bihar or West Bengal.

The author has not confined himself to the BJP's political agenda. He has also analysed its foreign policy and economic policy. He provides an interesting quote from Atal Behari Vajpayee's speech in May 1978 as Minister for External Affairs at Jawaharlal Nehru University. "The only way to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons is to bring about complete cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and simultaneously cut off the manufacture of all weapon-grade fissionable material. There can be no do ubt about India's policy. We have set an example by abjuring the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons. We have pledged ourselves to developing nuclear technology exclusively for peaceful purposes."

The chapter containing the conclusions is sparse in analysis. "The moot question is, now that the BJP has come to power, if it would mean the takeover of political power by Hindu zealots with the collapse of the inter-communal social fabric of India. BJP is a Hindu communal party but its communalism has limits. The same Advani who talks about Hindutva with so much aplomb castigates the Shiv Sena for its naked Hindu aggressiveness when the latter defeats his party at the Aurangabad municipal polls. As a political party with national ambitions BJP knows that mobilising religious sentiments from a position of responsibility is quite another."

The author does not deign to reflect on the RSS factor. The limits to the BJP's ventures are set by the RSS and no less by the outlook of its leaders who are the products of its upbringing. Advani has demonstrated that.