COVER STORY

The conflict and beyond

Post-Kargil, India has some difficult policy choices to make, and these will depend on the perceptions that Indian policy planners will bring to bear on the management of the Kashmir issue.

V.R. RAGHAVAN

THERE is much anticipation about the way the Kargil issue will ultimately unfold. The scene has been changing fast, both on the battlefield and on the diplomatic front. The return to Pakistan of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif after his visits to Washington and London will certainly produce some result. There is, however, no certainty on what the results will be.

The joint statement from Washington after the Clinton-Sharif meeting was emphatic. It stated in no uncertain terms what Pakistan needs to do. It had to take three essential steps: it must adhere to the Simla Agreement, respect the Line of Control (LoC) and restore the LoC. A ceasefire will take effect after the three measures have been put in place. India initially responded with delight, but that has since given way to circumspect anticipation. It is apparent that the next few weeks will be very significant. The prospects of Pakistan bringing the conflict to an end depend on many factors.

The reaction in Pakistan to the Clinton-Sharif joint statement has been contradictory and confusing. The Foreign Office spokesman claimed that it was a positive development and would prove advantageous to Pakistan. The former chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Gen. Hamid Gul, however, queered the pitch when he said that the measures required of Pakistan were impractical and not implementable. He believes that the mujahideen may descend on Islamabad if they are forced to withdraw from Kargil. This is an amazing commentary on the Pakistan military's control over the mercenary hordes. He also anticipated a civil war in Pakistan if a withdrawal was undertaken. The leader of the Lashkar-e-Taiba has gone on record that even if the Pakistan Army withdraws, his men will not do so.

Amidst all this noise, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff, made two significant pronouncements. First, he said that the military and the Prime Minister were working together and confirmed that the Washington statement was in keeping with the Army's views. The second statement indicated that while the military would withdraw, it could only try to persuade the mujahideen to do so. In other words, he seemed to have washed his hands of the mujahideen's pullback.

Pakistan can sidestep the Washington statement, notwithstanding the clear commitments listed in it. It can claim that it swears by the Simla Agreement and accuse India of having violated the spirit of the accord by delaying the resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. It can claim that it adheres to the LoC but that India is not cooperating with it on clearing doubts about where the Line runs on the ground. It can and probably will claim that it has restored the LoC by pulling back its military. It will most probably plead helplessness in getting the mujahideen - or Kashmiri freedom fighters, as it terms them - to pull back. It would then say that India should deal with the "freedom fighters".

There is no estimate of how far the United States is prepared to go in order to get the sanctity of the LoC restored. If, as is likely, Pakistan can create confusion by leaving behind a mess comprising the mujahideen and their weapons and supplies, it is unlikely that the U.S. will do anything more than reiterate the joint statement. U.S. options will be limited by its long-term interests in Pakistan, its perspective on Central Asia, which includes Pakistan, and pressure from Islamic lobbies.

The situation is likely to be confused and bloody for the Indian troops. There is no word on who will monitor the withdrawal. Pakistan can make a statement some day that it has withdrawn its forces. Will that suffice for the Indian and U.S. governments? Can Indian troops and civilians thereafter freely move into the area? Who will clear the mines and the booby traps that would certainly have been laid by the mujahideen? Who is to account for the complete pullout of the mujahideen? Will Pakistani artillery firing in support of the mujahideen stop, once its troops have pulled back? How will confirmation come that the status quo ante has been restored on the LoC? There will be many issues that are likely to remain unresolved. These uncertainties and ambiguities suit Pakistan more than India.

In view of the immense imponderables ahead, India has some difficult policy choices to make. It can go in for an increased presence on the LoC. It will need a large force and a major logistic build-up. This will certainly impact on defence expenditure: it could impose a burden equivalent to that needed to increase the size of the Army by at least 15 per cent. That would amount to the national GDP equivalent of one-half to one per cent to start with and a major recurring cost year after year. The other choice is to look for alternatives in the technological, strategic and economic dimensions so as to take the battle to Pakistan. India's choices on force levels and new operational capabilities will require very careful analysis. The choices will depend greatly on the perceptions that Indian policy planners will bring to bear on the management of the Jammu and Kashmir issue in the future.

SHANKER CHAKRAVARTY
An Indian Army convoy carrying supplies to Batalik.

Pakistan is more likely to fulfil only a part of its obligation in respect of the Washington statement in the near future. This will leave behind a multitude of Talibanised groups across the border from Kargil. They are likely to continue to make incursions and stage ambushes, kidnappings and other brutal activities across the LoC.

The Indian Government has committed itself to clearing every Pakistani infiltrator from Indian territory. A situation in which Pakistan declares that it has pulled back all its forces and Indian forces still need to fight to clear the intrusions from the Kargil sector will be fraught with many dangers. The elections in India, the deadline for accession to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the coming winter will add to the pressures on the Indian leadership. The calls for major, decisive action will then gather force.

A long-term solution to the challenge posed in Kargil and the possibility of "future Kargils" requires a great deal of new thinking. Major changes are taking place in the nature of inter-state conflicts. The management of territorial integrity is fast becoming a part of managing the economic and social integrity of a nation. Inter-state conflicts are now inevitably linked with other inter-state issues. On the military side, a revolution is under way in the doctrine of waging war. The use of material assets is fast becoming the basis of future military conflict, rather more than the purely human resource in combat.

It looks as if the disengagement will be neither complete nor smooth. Many loose ends will need to be tied up. The extent to which Pakistan is willing to disengage from Kargil will become clear in the coming weeks. The Jammu and Kashmir issue has so far remained a bilateral dispute between India and Pakistan. The Clinton-Sharif joint statement is also a bilateral effort. If Pakistan drags its feet on disengagement, India cannot go on the military route exclusively. It will need every other means to get Pakistan to adhere to its commitment made in Washington. In the interim, Indian military action will be a sad but continuing reality.

Lt.-Gen. V.R. Raghavan, a former Director-General of Military Operations, is Director of the Delhi Policy Group.