COVER STORY

Of forgotten fighters

Interview with Lt.-Gen A.S. Kalkat.

As the fighting in the Kargil sector reached a decisive phase, military analysts were drawing comparisons between this latest round and the battles fought by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka in the period between 1987 and 1990. In that operation, 70,000 young men and women, including soldiers, sailors, airmen and civilian service personnel, fought in adverse conditions and hostile circumstances for over two and a half years. But today, the nation seems to have forget ten them. According to Lieutenant-General (retired) A.S. Kalkat, who commanded the IPKF, they "fought with honour and returned with dignity."

The valiant soldiers fighting in Kargil are given due recognition. In a widespread and spontaneous response, the state, private enterprise and individual citizens have contributed liberally to welfare funds for the families of the dead and the wounded. However, a sort of collective amnesia seems to have set in about the around 1,200 Indian soldiers who were killed in the jungles of Sri Lanka.

Here, Lt.-Gen. Kalkat draws parallels between the IPKF experience and the current one in the Kargil sector. Speaking to John Cherian in New Delhi, Lt.-Gen. Kalkat said that it was still not too late for the nation to recognise the sacrifices made by the IPKF soldiers. Excerpts:

Are there any comparisons to be drawn between the fighting in the Kargil sector and the IPKF experience?

Yes and no. The IPKF operations as well as the operations in the Kargil sector are infantry-predominant operations. What this means is that in normal battles, the Air Force, and if there is a coastline, the Navy, play important roles. The other components of the Army, particularly tanks and heavy artillery, play a predominant role in supporting the infantry. This results in much fewer casualties among infantry soldiers.

However, in jungle terrain and in mountain warfare, the support of tanks is almost absent. The ability of the Air Force to provide close air support gets severely restricted and artillery support is not as effective as in the plains. This is the common condition which we soldiers faced in Sri Lanka and indeed face today in the Kargil sector. This implies a much greater reliance by the infantry soldier on his personal weapons and involves engaging the enemy eyeball to eyeball in close combat, often fighting hand to hand ultimately to destroy him. This kind of fighting in essence is the ultimate test of human endurance, perseverance and courage.

The next common factor is that the engagements are not of large formations, such as brigades and divisions. Most battles are fought at the company and platoon levels, and because of this the performance of the young officer, who is the company or platoon commander, becomes a battle-winning factor. As I can see, the performance of the young officer, which was outstanding in Sri Lanka as was evident from the high proportion of officer casualties, is following a similar pattern in the Kargil sector.

In both cases, our soldiers faced a battle-hardened adversary. In Kargil, in addition to the regular Pakistan Army, there is the Afghan Mujahideen; in Sri Lanka, there was the LTTE. Both the Afghan Mujahideen and the LTTE have been rated among the most dangerous militant-terrorist organisations in the world.

Another common factor is that the militants in both the cases have been armed with the most sophisticated weaponry, often superior to that used by the Indian infantry. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE had AK-47s. We never had them. The LTTE also had better hand-held communication equipment.

Was the political environment different when the IPKF moved into Sri Lanka?

V. SUDERSHAN

When the IPKF first went in, there was great public euphoria for two months. But the moment the fighting broke out in right earnest and the body bags started coming home, the euphoria came down. Over a period there were dissenting voices on the government's decision, and indeed against the IPKF. One major political party placed its opposition to the involvement of the IPKF in its election manifesto. This seriously impaired the morale of the Indian soldiers fighting in the jungles of Sri Lanka.

I am happy to say that today the entire nation is behind the Indian soldier in one voice. This certainly makes the task of the commanders easier in sustaining morale and commitment among their troops.

Can this support be sustained for an extended period of time?

My main concern is that in case this confrontation lingers on for long, media interest will start waning after some time. The time should never come that the people of this country lose interest. That is a dangerous scenario which will create the syndrome of 'a forgotten army' - a feeling which had started to creep into the IPKF towards the later stages.

Was there a similar patriotic fervour when the IPKF was in action?

None whatsoever, except in Tamil Nadu, where there was great awareness of the ongoing conflict in the north and east Sri Lanka. We got symbolic gifts and donations but nothing substantive.

Have the martyrs of that war been forgotten?

V. SUDERSHAN
The last batch of IPKF troops to return to India, at Delhi's Palam airport.

It is still not too late. There should be a memorial to commemorate the memory of the soldiers who left the shores of India to fulfil the country's solemn commitment to a friendly neighbour and for which they gave their lives and never returned to their motherland. I would be failing in my duty to the families of the valiant dead of the IPKF, which I had the privilege to command, if I were not to speak on their behalf. In a country where memorials and monuments are put up for all and sundry, no government has seen it fit to lay even one stone or one brick to commemorate the brave men of the Indian armed forces who laid down their lives. There is no place for public recognition for their sacrifices; there is no place where the families of the dead martyrs can even place a wreath in memory of their loved ones.

Even though Vietnam was this century's most controversial and unpopular involvement, the American nation did not forget its dead: the Vietnam Memorial in Washington is the tribute of a grateful people to the patriotism and sacrifice of its soldiers. A nation that does not honour its dead heroes dishonours itself.

Since the withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka in March 1990, successive governments have wished that it had never happened. Indeed, some hoped that by disregarding it, it would be erased from the memory of the nation. Be that as it may, some facts are incontrovertible and can neither be wished away nor thrown into the dustbin of history. First, it actually happened; second, 1,200 Indian soldiers sacrificed their lives and more than 3,000 were wounded; third, a former Prime Minister of our country was assassinated; fourth, the bloodbath in Sri Lanka continues with even greater ferocity, and finally, neither the government of Sri Lanka nor the LTTE nor all the political negotiators since have come up with a better alternative to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.

Do you visualise a quick conclusion to the conflict in Kargil?

We do not know the details of the initiatives, talks and contacts taking place at the covert level. Therefore, if one were to take the statements in the press at face value, then it would appear that the conflict would end soon. However, I am sceptical of commitments given by Pakistan, particularly in respect to any issue in Kashmir. Basically, Pakistan should stick to its words and ensure that the militants are not allowed to operate. Pakistan should not be allowed to wage a proxy war. In such a situation, we have no option but to fight till the last infiltrator is driven out or killed.

What are the options available for India?

At this stage we have two options. One is to carry on as we are doing now - which is a long-drawn-out and time-consuming affair ... Alternatively, cross the Line of Control (LoC) or the border at a time and place of our choosing ultimately to destroy the invaders.

Obviously, around the area of the current operations, bypassing the positions established by the infiltrators - lower to the LoC - may not be possible since all existing gaps would have been plugged by the regular Pakistan Army. Therefore we may have to seek the ingress routes across the LoC away from the area. There are other alternatives such as solely using air power to strike at their artillery which is supporting the infiltrators from positions in Pakistan- Occupied Kashmir (POK). Since Pakistan claims that it is not supporting the Mujahideen, then it cannot complain that we have hit their guns. Of course such an action raises the conflict to another level. Nevertheless, if there seems a danger of this conflict lingering on, it leaves India with no choice except to seek one of these options than getting involved in a bleeding war.