COVER STORY

Sensitive cargo

SUDHA MAHALINGAM

FIVE days before the North Korean vessel mv Ku Vol San was due to dock at Kandla, Russian intelligence authorities had alerted Indian officials about the sensitive nature of the cargo it carried. The ship was bound for Malta via Singapore, Kandla and Karachi.

The Government instructed the Department of Revenue Intelligence and the Research and Analysis Wing to mount a surveillance operation in the Arabian Sea. As soon as the ship docked at Kandla on June 18, ostensibly to offload 13,000 tonnes of sugar meant for a private Indian trader, the Customs authorities searched it. They faced resistance from the 44-member crew, and the initial search yielded nothing incriminating. The authorities had almost decided to let the ship and its crew off as the search had threatened to explode into a diplomatic disaster. It was then that Russian intelligence came up with specific information about the location of the suspected cargo; it was hidden in the ship's belly.

The cargo consisted of 148 boxes described as machinery and water-refining equipment. A team of senior Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) scientists, missile experts and military intelligence officers reached Kandla to examine the boxes. It turned out that the consignments were materials required for the production of tactical surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 300 km. They included fuel propulsion systems and hardware for the fabrication and launching of the missiles. According to a statement from the Ministry of External Affairs, the cargo included "special material and equipment, components for guidance system, blueprints, drawings and instruction manuals for the production of such missiles." On interrogation, the crew admitted that the cargo was meant for a Pakistani public sector company engaged in a missile development programme for the Army. It was also ascertained that the address in Malta, to which the boxes were purportedly destined, was fictitious.

It appears strange that a ship with sensitive cargo bound for Pakistan should dock at an Indian port, especially when the two countries were engaged in a conflict. Informed sources told Frontline that apparently neither the owner of the ship nor the key members of the crew were aware of the real nature of the cargo. The commercial vessel was on a routine run from Pyongyang to Malta, with stops at Kandla and Karachi, and was chosen to carry the cargo in the belief that it would not arouse any suspicion. The plan was to offload the cargo on the high seas off Karachi, for which arrangements had been made, these sources said.

INTELLIGENCE sources believe that North Korea has been bartering metals, missile components and technology in return for nuclear technology and materials from Pakistan. Sources say that initially North Korea supplied these components and technology in return for rice and sugar, which Pakistan exported to that country in March 1998. North Korea is learnt to have accepted the rice but refused the consignment of sugar. It was soon after this that Pakistan successfully test-fired the Ghauri missile. Subsequently, North Korea is learnt to have demanded hard currency payments for the supply of sensitive missile equipment and technology. Pakistan, which faced a resource crunch, was unable to pay up.

Pakistan pursues two parallel missile programmes - Ghauri, with liquid fuel technology, and Shaheen, with part-liquid and part-solid fuel technology. Ukraine and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States have supplied dual-use metals and technology to Pakistan. However, after German Police and Federal investigators intercepted and seized sensitive cargo and fissile materials bound for Pakistan through Bonn in 1997-98, this route was not available and Pakistan had to look elsewhere for its requirements.

AP
Ghauri-II, capable of carrying different warheads, was launched on April 14 at Jhelum, 120 km from Islamabad.

While Ghauri has already been successfully test-fired, Shaheen is still under development. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who heads the A.Q. Khan Laboratories, and who has taken the credit for Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, has been reportedly under considerable pressure to complete Shaheen. Speculation is rife that he may have traded nuclear materials/technology with North Korea in return for materials to complete Shaheen.

Ghauri is said to be a replica of North Korea's Nodong-I missile, which uses liquid fuel. Shaheen is to be based on the solid fuel technology of the Taepodong missile system of North Korea. North Korea was persuaded by the U.S. to abandon its nuclear programme in return for the supply of two research nuclear reactors meant for peaceful purposes. However, it is understood that North Korea has been clandestinely pursuing its nuclear weapons programme and scouting for technology and materials while Pakistan has been on the lookout for metals for critical technological areas of military application.

Sources said that Pakistani and North Korean officials had held a few meetings to clinch the deal. Indian intelligence authorities are aware of at least two such meetings, one held in Shen Zen in China in 1998 and another in New Delhi in January. It is also surmised that two or three consignments have already reached Pakistan.

The Indian authorities have taken the captain and crew of the ship into custody. A first information report has been registered by the Gujarat Police.