Frontline Volume 16 - Issue 13, June 19 - July 02, 1999
India's National Magazine
from the publishers of THE HINDU


Table of Contents

COVER STORY

The other wars

Even as the Army takes on Pakistani intruders on the heights of Kargil, the war against terrorism goes on elsewhere in Jammu and Kashmir.

PRAVEEN SWAMI

THE grey mountain dawn broke over Malpora village a little after 4:30 a.m. With it, crack police commandos entered the remote forest village, moving down the main path in pace with the protective shield of an armoured car. The night before, field intelli gence had reported that the Ganderbal area's top Hizbul Mujahideen commander, Bambar Khan, was in Malpora with five of his men. Now each of the village's 300 homes had to be searched. Any of them could be booby-trapped or each could be an ambush. Two hou rs later it became clear that terrorists had indeed been in the village, but had left the previous evening. "He is just three hours ahead of us," said Srinagar's Superintendent of Police (Operations). "Soon, we will get there first."

As Indian troops fight to regain the Kargil heights, another war against Pakistan-backed terrorists continues through Jammu and Kashmir. Each day of this war, as the one in Kargil, sees the death of both Pakistan-backed irregulars and Indian combatants. Three thousand soldiers, police personnel, paramilitary troopers and pro-India militia members have been killed in combat over the last 10 years. But unlike the battle in Kargil, there is little glory in this war, and even less respect for its soldiers. Their stories are not reported on prime-time television and on newspaper pages. In 1995, two soldiers from the Rajputana Rifles were beheaded in Kupwara, and the mutilated body of a third soldier was recovered shortly afterwards. No government official s aw it fit even to express outrage.

The cordon-and-search operation at Malpora was just one of the many such carried out through Jammu and Kashmir each night. Personnel from the Jammu and Kashmir Police's Special Operations Group (SOG), the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Central Reser ve Police Force (CRPF) had to wade through slushy paddyfields and scramble over the steep slopes around Malpora to cordon off the village. Although they were weighed down by bullet-proof gear and weapons, the task had to be accomplished, in total silenc e and darkness. A torch, or even a lit cigarette, could invite fire from a lookout's sniper rifle. And then began the wait to dawn, with fingers on the trigger, ready to engage any attempt to escape the cordon.

SHANKER CHAKRAVARTY
An Army patrol in Narsangar village in southern Kashmir. With growing numbers of Army personnel being enlisted for duty in Kargil and elsewhere, anti-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir have slowed down perceptibly.

With growing numbers of Army personnel on internal security duties being pulled out to the Line of Control (LoC) in Kargil and elsewhere, anti-terrorist operations have slowed down perceptibly. The thinning of troops on the ground comes at a time when tr aditionally terrorist activity escalates through Jammu and Kashmir. At least 400 terrorists are believed to have moved into the State from their bases in Pakistan since the snow melted on the high passes in late March. Their presence compensates for thos e killed in the previous year's operations. "We are very nervous," said one senior police official. "Massacres in Jammu or strikes against high-profile targets in Kashmir would be difficult to cope with, given the forces we have."

That something of the kind has not already happened is a tribute to the police, paramilitary and Army personnel who are still engaged in counter-terrorist duties. However, signs of trouble are growing. Pakistan's unconcealed involvement in Kargil has giv en renewed hope to terrorist groups who, until the Pokhran-II nuclear tests opened up the prospect of international intervention in Jammu and Kashmir, appeared to be heading towards an inglorious defeat. The June 7 arrests of 10 terrorists from the Diski t area of Turtok led to the recovery of massive quantities of weapons, the first of its kind in the Kargil region. Movements of new and large groups of terrorists - one with up to 70 combatants - have been reported from the communally-sensitive Doda area . On June 9, five powerful improvised explosive devices, meant to be fitted in cars, were recovered from south Kashmir. The chances of the relative quiet in Jammu and Kashmir lasting until autumn, appear to be slim.

Morale among the leadership of the Pakistan-based secessionist movement appears to be higher than it was at any point in the recent past. On June 1, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen chief Maulana Fazlur Rahman Khalil claimed that his men were responsible for the Kar gil offensive and rejected Defence Minister George Fernandes' ill-advised offer of "safe passage". "We will give the Indian Army safe passage out of Kargil," he said. "I promise we will not attack them if they choose to withdraw." "If the Indian Army has the power," he said, "it should throw us out of Kashmir." The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, the new avatar of the Harkat-ul-Ansar after it was declared a terrorist organisation by the United States' State Department, is among the largest insurgent groups in Jam mu and Kashmir.

Others rapidly joined in where Khalil left off. On June 7, Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the supreme leader of the Lashkar-e-Taiba's parent religious body, the Markaz Dawa wal'Irshad, claimed that his organisation spearheaded the war against Indian troops in Ka rgil. "Our Mujahideen will not withdraw from Kargil and Drass," Sayeed said, "we will not stop until we liberate all of Kashmir." He expressed concern at ongoing moves to bring about a dialogue between India and Pakistan, and criticised Prime Minister Na waz Sharif's Government for releasing Indian Air Force pilot Flt. Lt. K. Nachiketa. Nachiketa, he said, should have been handed over to the United Jihad Council, an apex body of the 14 terrorist organisations operating in Jammu and Kashmir.

Lashkar-e-Taiba officials said that specially trained reinforcements had been sent to Kargil, led by Afghan war veteran Salamatullah Janbaz. Janbaz, they claimed, had been in Jammu and Kashmir since 1994 and had received specialised training in high-alti tude warfare. Indian intelligence officials who are familiar with the Lashkar-e-Taiba's activities within Jammu and Kashmir said that the name was not familiar; however, they agreed that the Lashkar-e-Taiba's cadre contains a significant number of recrui ts who have fought in Afghanistan. Interestingly, reports in the British press suggest that at least six United Kingdom-based recruits have left for Kargil after receiving specialised training in high-altitude combat. It appears that the training was car ried out by a British instructor, who is believed to have received £30 a day per student as payment.

B.K. BANGASH/ AP
Hizbul Mujahideeen commander Mohammad Yusuf Shah alias Syed Salahuddin: "The struggle for freedom has entered a final phase."

Mohammad Yusuf Shah, the Jihad Council's head and commander of the Hizbul Mujahideen, offered a broader theoretical framework for the events in Kargil. Speaking at Muzaffarabad on June 11, Shah, better known by his theatrical pseudonym Syed Salahuddin, s aid that "the struggle for the freedom of Kashmir has entered a final phase. Internally, economically and diplomatically the issue of Kashmir has entered a decisive stage and within a couple of years it is going to be decided according to the wishes of t he people." "At this time," Shah continued, "the activities of the Mujahideen are spread all over." "The ultimate thing that will decide the issue is the fighting power of the Kashmiri Mujahideen and the tolerance, the Himalayan patience, of the Kashmiri people."

Shah's casting of the events in Kargil was more than a little significant. Only recently did All-Parties Hurriyat Conference chairman and Jamaat-e-Islami political chief Syed Ali Shah Geelani say that the struggle for Jammu and Kashmir could continue, "f orever, if need be". The Islamic right saw an opportunity where real pressure could be brought to bear for international intervention in Jammu and Kashmir. Secondly, Shah's assertion that his cadres were "spread all over" mirrored a second key Pakistan o bjective. Pakistan could now claim that terrorist activity had spread to all the Muslim-majority areas in Jammu and Kashmir, strengthening moves for a final partition of the state along communal lines. These moves have come from U.S.-based thinktanks suc h as the Kashmir Study Group, and from a curious spectrum of Muslim and Hindu chauvinist politicians within the State.

Hurriyat Conference leaders, for their part, are delighted that events are moving their way. On June 10, the organisation's Working Committee condemned the talks between Pakistan Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz and his Indian counterpart Jaswant Singh. Such talks, he said, were unacceptable because "the Kashmir issue is not confined to the Kargil flare-up alone." Significantly, senior Hurriyat leader Abdul Ghani Lone, who was speaking on behalf of its Working Committee, said that the organisation "does not hold the Line of Control sacrosanct and rejects it, considering it to be a sanguinary partition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir." "The Working Committee of the Hurriyat wants to make it clear to the international community in general and to the United Nations Security Council and major powers in particular that just as the ceasefire line (of 1948) was not made binding upon the people of the State, they do not accept the Line of Control either."

It is evident that events will probably move in two ways. Should Indian forces succeed in evicting Pakistan troops and irregulars within a reasonable period of time, terrorist groups within Jammu and Kashmir would receive a severe setback. The prospect o f Pakistan's support resulting in a meaningful resolution of the status of Jammu and Kashmir to their benefit would unravel as fantasy. However, pessimistic outcomes are also possible. Should the violence in Kargil escalate and terrorist activity within the State grow, India will have to fight a war on two fronts, not just one. A third front would soon open up, that of Western diplomatic pressure. Given the incompetent way in which the Bharatiya Janata Party-led caretaker government has managed the cris is so far, it is unlikely that it will be able to contain these multiple pressures.


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