COVER STORY

A turning point in Kashmir

The Kargil conflict has long-term security implications for India and Pakistan.

V.R. RAGHAVAN

IN the Lahore Declaration signed in February 1999 by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, one of the paragraphs in the preamble reads, "the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidanc e of conflict between the two countries..." It goes on to emphasise that "an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides." The Memorandum of Understanding signed at the time went a long way in identifying specific measures that India and Pakistan would take to implement the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) that already exist and even review them for improvement.

Within three months of the Lahore high point, relations between the two countries have reached a nadir. Kargil, a small district headquarter town situated between the remote Zanskar and the Ladakh ranges, has become the cause celebre in the tragic and avoidable crashing down of hopes generated at Lahore.

During my years in the Kargil area, I was once asked to inaugurate a local festival. A favourite sport of the Kargilis is archery. The young and old were enthusiastically engaged in shooting at small wooden pegs stuck on mounds of earth a long distance a way. A venerable elder asked the D.C. sahib sitting next to me to shoot a few arrows at the targets. The gentle bespoke bureaucrat went up to the mike and announced in inimitable Urdu, "I do not shoot. In Kargil we often get shot at and that is enough fo r me." That remark was received with great applause and appreciation for the understanding he showed of the situation in Kargil. It has remained a perennial target for the Pakistan Army to practise its gunnery. In an indescribably beautiful area of orcha rds, green meadows and water mills, there are villages which have to be vacated year after year when the Pakistani guns rain down death.

The Pakistani military's obsession with Kargil is a favourite subject of speculation over fragrant tea in the town and somewhat stronger beverages in Army messes. Since 1947, the Indian Army has fought some of its toughest combat actions in this area. A few months after Independence, Pakistani troops and irregulars entered Kargil and branched out south to the Zoji-La Pass and east to Leh. They were stopped at the pass by some very brave fighters and prevented from entering into the Srinagar bowl. As for Leh, skirmishes took place within an hour's drive from it. It required the vision of Gen. K.S. Thimayya to plan the recapture of Kargil. He worked a column of troops into Leh through what is today Himachal Pradesh. This march over high passes and diffic ult mountains took months. Thimayya simultaneously put into effect a master stroke by getting an airstrip ready at Leh and forcing the unprecedented entry of tanks on the Zoji-La. In modern Indian military history, the link-up at Kargil by the two column s from Leh and Zoji-La is a memorable event. It needed one year to complete as the troops had to wait out the winter of 1947.

Kargil's relief was short-lived. While the Pakistanis were pushed out of the town, they held the heights overlooking it. From 1948 to 1965 the Kargilis lived under the direct sight of Pakistanis, who rained artillery fire without any pretext every other day. During winter Kargil and Leh are cut off by snow from the rest of the country. They need to be stocked up for winter since the road remains snow-bound for seven months. Unlike Leh and Srinagar, Kargil did not have an air link. The small air strip at Kargil was in view of the Pakistani posts on the hills. Aircraft would land there by running the gauntlet of fire. The Pakistani artillery fire made the road that brought supplies to Kargil and Leh unusable for long periods.

In 1965, on the night the war started, Indian infantry charged up to clear the Pakistanis from the hilltops around Kargil. One of the battalion commanders was advised to wait for a day for preparations to be made for the attack. He attacked the same nigh t saying, "I do not want to gain time and lose the blood of my men." These gains, made with a loss of lives, were undone when, as part of the Tashkent Accord, the captured hills were returned to Pakistan - with disastrous results for the people of Kargil .

In 1971, the hills were recaptured and the Pakistanis were pushed back farther than in 1965. Notwithstanding this, there are some stretches of the Srinagar-Leh road that are still visible to Pakistani posts from a considerable distance. These posts attem pt to fire at the road, but with little effect.

During the period of Pakistan-inspired militancy in the Valley, Kargil has remained adamantly uncooperative with the militant outfits. The people of Kargil have not sided with militancy. They have showed no interest in Pakistan's designs on Kashmir. Karg il is also an overwhelmingly Shia Muslim area. Other than isolated instances of aberrations, Kargil has not supported the militants and their activities. Pakistan's attempts to push in infiltrators through this sector have always failed with heavy losses in men and equipment to them. As a consequence and perhaps because of its unwillingness to support militancy, Pakistan has intensified its attacks on Kargil town and the villages around it in the last few years, with considerable damage to property and life in the area.

Since the Pakistani military cannot reach Kargil by ground, it has attempted since 1971 and particularly in the last few years to do so with its guns. It has targeted the homes, cattle and fields of the Kargilis. When that did not work and its other aven ues of entry into the Valley were effectively curtailed, it has now attempted a new method. In the process, it has raised the threshold of its military involvement in Kashmir to new and dangerous levels. The intrusion in May 1999 in the Kargil sector, wi th militants armed to hitherto unattainable levels, portrays an altogether different approach. This time the intention is apparently to take and hold territory in Jammu and Kashmir and invite an Indian response. The selection of the area, the timing of t he intrusion, the extent of area taken and the preparedness of the intruding groups are unique. They are also indicative of the planning, preparation and combat support made available to the intruders. These are not irregulars of the kind so far seen in the Valley. The Indian suspicion that they are Pakistani military personnel with an irregular patina is therefore not misplaced.

THE choice of the Kargil sector for the major intrusion requires some explaining. This is the only sector on the Line of Control (LoC) where Pakistani posts have an advantage of higher positions. Elsewhere on the LoC, they are at a disadvantage since the dominating heights are held by the Indian military. Pakistan's military has a long history of attempting a direct and frontal approach to military operations. It has abiding faith in its ability to make deep inroads and cut off road arteries. It tried i t in Chhamb and Akhnoor in 1965 and 1971 but, despite initial successes, failed in its objective. In Kargil the same operational philosophy leads it to believe that it can cut the Srinagar-Leh road. This it believes will land into its hands a large chunk of territory, which can be used to force an unfavourable bargain on India.

The Kargil sector extends to about 150 km, with Drass at one end and Batalik at the other. The Pakistani intrusions cover over 100 km of the Kargil sector. The intruders have occupied areas that were not held by Indian troops. Moving such large numbers i n such a large area - even though the extent of intrusion is not large - requires preparation and planning. Irregulars cannot manage such operations without general staff and logistics support. That can only come from an Army - that of Pakistan.

PANKAJ RISHI KUMAR
From an Indian Army post, a view of the mountain ranges that extend into Pakistan. Since 1947, the Indian Army has carried out some of its toughest combat actions in the Kargil area.

The intruders are being supported by artillery fire from inside Pakistani territory. They have helicopter support for supplies. The radio frequencies the intruders are using are not of the citizen band but those normally reserved for military purposes. T he Indian Director-General of Military Operation (DGMO) raised this with his Pakistani counterpart on the hotline. He was informed that these might be freedom fighters and Pakistan did not have anything to do with them! Recently, documents found from the areas cleared of the intruders indicated the presence of Pakistani military personnel with the intruders. In the face of this evidence, the inability of major countries to accept Pakistan's claims of innocence was inevitable.

EXPERT ANALYSIS

PAKISTAN'S Kargil venture is indicative of two principal influences in Pakistan. First, the long-prevalent doubts about the military in Pakistan running its own foreign policy stand confirmed. This happened in Afghanistan and now there are clear indicato rs of it in the Kargil adventure. It is difficult to believe that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who won his parliamentary majority with a mandate for peace on the subcontinent, could do Lahore as a subterfuge. If it was so, it would be an impossible recor d for him to live down. The second influence is a constructive one: a momentum for peace and stability has been built in Pakistan. The military is finding it difficult to countenance this; this has led to a situation in which it is doing what it does bes t, that is, create a war-like condition to ruin the Lahore dream.

Pakistan's military has presented the political establishment with complex dilemmas. On the one hand, Sharif cannot allow this large group of intruders to be eliminated by Indian military action. On the other, he cannot also accept the consequences of ba cking their presence in Indian territory indefinitely. The intruders would, before long, face the brunt of ground operations by the Indian Army in addition to the air attacks. They are going to be isolated in small groups and eliminated piecemeal, one by one. Under the circumstances, the Pakistan Prime Minister's offer to send his Foreign Minister may be more a pointer to his limited options than to any ability to impose terms. As for the Pakistan military, another defeat in its well-laid plans will be a daunting prospect. The military in Pakistan, even if it tilts at the windmills of peace, will remain an important constituency. It will serve many interests to allow it an exit route out of the impasse. That will strengthen Nawaz Sharif and the peace c onstituency.

As for India, there were only two options to deal with the situation. It has rightly discarded the option of inaction by going for the air attacks. It has sent a clear message on where it will draw the line, on transgression of its sovereignty and territ orial integrity. It has also introduced an element of the unexpected into the Pakistan military's calculations and will thus set it thinking. The loss of aircraft, however unfortunate, cannot be allowed to defer the operational plans to evict the intrusi ons. The threat of elimination in combat will have to remain the principal threat to the intruders and will need to be put into effect. That process is already under way.

Pakistan will make every attempt to seek parleys on equal terms in order to delay the inevitable on the ground and the unpredictable political and international fall-out. It would like the Indian military response to be stopped while talks get started. T he usual arguments about creating the right ambience, allowing tempers to cool, will be trotted out. Not unexpectedly, Pakistan will seek to introduce the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) into the pullout process and thereby bring U.N. observers back into play. After the 1971 war, India had argued that the U.N. observers have no role to play in the bilateral arrangements envisaged under the Shimla Accord.

While the military operations continue - and they should not be terminated until the intrusions are undone - there is a need to be clear about what is the end result expected of the parleys. The pressure for parleys is bound to grow and India will find i t difficult to refuse to join them. It is difficult to see how the talks can be handled at the Foreign Secretary level while intense military and diplomatic action is on. It may be better to constitute two special teams comprising Foreign, Defence, and H ome Ministry officials of appropriate seniority to hammer out the issues. Later, when the talks are concluded, the resulting arrangements can be signed at the appropriate levels.

What is it that needs to be negotiated - other than a pullback by the intruders across the LoC? There is much that can be re-asserted during these talks. The first thing which Pakistan must accept, re-assert and comply with in future is the status of the LoC. It is not a line that can be unilaterally shifted, trespassed upon or violated. The reported statement by a spokesman for the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) that Pakistan does not accept the LoC as sacrosanct will have to be repudiated. It is po ssible to evolve CBMs to ensure that neither side need be anxious about encroachments across the LoC during winter when some posts are vacated. It is also possible to put into place CBMs which allow better joint verification of alleged LoC violations tha n has been possible thus far. There is no harm in intimating each other of a list of posts which are vacated or retained during winter. These measures would obviate the need to maintain military presence in ever-increasing areas and numbers. This would r educe costs and budgets on both sides. It is time that India insisted on political directions to the military in Pakistan to work the CBMs that have been agreed upon.

None of the above can come about by an Indian effort alone. The international response to Indian statements that it is merely clearing its own territory of intruders has been favourable. This can quickly change if Indian military operations continue for very long or if they lead to unpredictable reactions from Pakistan. These will be seen as destabilising by the international community. It will be prudent to control the military operations carefully to keep them at a threshold which does not engender an xieties of a wider conflict. The synergy between the military, diplomatic and political responses will remain an important requirement. The Indian political leadership at the high levels will need to maintain contact internationally to assuage fears and obtain the support necessary for the plans in hand.

SHANKER CHAKRAVARTY
Prime Ministers A.B. Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif in Lahore in February 1999. Within three months of that high point, relations between India and Pakistan have reached a nadir.

The role of political parties in evolving a response to the Kargil developments will be crucial. In the democratic tradition, they must remain vigilant on the course the Kargil situation takes and be critical of policies when they are inappropriate or in adequate. This is particularly so since the present Government's record in matters of defence management has been the cause of much dissatisfaction. The Government will also do well to remember its caretaker status and keep the political leadership acros s the board informed. A consultative rather than unilateral approach to India's response to Kargil will serve the nation's interests best. Political concern for casualties suffered by the Indian defence and paramilitary forces has been traditionally inad equate. This is viewed by the forces as neglect and political opportunism. A major military operation that takes casualties and does not show concern for the feelings of the troops is a sure recipe for disillusionment among them.

The September of 1999 can be a cruel one in many ways. The Kosovo situation will have to find some outcome before the onset of winter. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is another milestone that is yet to be crossed. This Government, which spent a year claiming credit for the nuclear tests, has done little to evolve a national consensus on the issue. There can be pressures on the caretaker government through all these influences. The elections due in September-October will also be a factor. Thro ugh whom and how will political directions be made available to the Chiefs of Staff Committee during the close combat of the electoral battlefield, which will start soon? This Government, fighting for its life in Parliament, could not find the time for t he needs of the Chiefs of the Services. How will it do so when its political warhorses are out at the hustings? These and other questions on the Government's ability to deliver are already being asked. There is no better time for this Government to demon strate its abilities than in the coming weeks and months.

Kargil has raised many issues and more will become apparent as the situation unfolds. The military option is for the time being the appropriate one; without this, there can be no resolution of the situation created by the Pakistan military. It cannot, ho wever, be the sole option. There is a change in the global tolerance levels of armed conflicts, particularly those which have an impact on other countries. An unrestricted freedom to carry on with the military option indefinitely is no longer a total sov ereign right. Conducting military operations has always required as much political skill as high military competence. The military instrument needs to be used with an understanding of the larger context of regional and international security.

Kargil has brought India and Pakistan to a turning point. It is time to look beyond Kargil to the long-term security implications of the Kashmir issue for the well-being of the two countries. The road map in the long term has to be one of going ahead of the Lahore initiative. It is to be hoped that the map to Lahore and beyond has not been torn and thrown away, in the heat of combat actions in progress.

Lt. Gen. V.R. Raghavan, a former Director-General of Military Operations,is Director of the Delhi Policy Group.