COVER STORY

Pakistan's strategy

Pakistan's move in Kargil is part of a calculated design to revive the flagging militancy in Kashmir and place the dispute squarely in the focus of the international community.

AMIT BARUAH
in Islamabad

THE peace process has been shattered and the "spirit" of Lahore has vanished. Barely three months after the euphoric "bus diplomacy" between India and Pakistan, infiltrators from Pakistan into India have triggered the worst crisis between the two countri es since the 1971 war.

Pakistan's Army and intelligence agencies, aware that the militancy in Kashmir was flagging, have raised the stakes by sending in hundreds of armed and trained intruders across the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kargil and Drass sectors. The infiltrators are backed to the hilt by the Nawaz Sharif Government. The air strikes by India appear to be a belated attempt to dislodge the militants from the strategic heights they have occupied.

The first signs of trouble came soon after the Lahore summit meeting between Sharif and Atal Behari Vajpayee. The appointment of Javed Nasir, a former chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as the head of a Pakistani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committe e, and Sharif's action in granting an audience to Ganga Singh Dhillon, a symbol of the discredited Khalistan movement, were pointers that trust between the two countries remained at a premium.

One can say without fear of contradiction that the Pakistani exercise across the LoC had been planned for months. The experience of Afghanistan and Pakistan's role there will be instructive for those who are keen to know what is happening in Kargil. The Pakistani "role" in Afghanistan was known for long - the Taliban received moral and material support from Pakistan. Likewise, a large number of the "jehadi groups" that operate in Jammu and Kashmir have their bases and training camps in Pakistan-Occup ied Kashmir or in Afghanistan. Groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen have a substantial base among fundamentalist organisations in Pakistan. The former draws recruits from the Markaz dawa wal Irshad and the latter from the Jamaat- e-Islami.

These groups have offices in Muzaffarabad, and even in Islamabad. They were angered by the show of neighbourhood diplomacy in Lahore in February, and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen even threatened Nawaz Sharif with dire consequences. Evidently, since then much h as happened that has served to appease these outfits.

Strictly speaking, the Government of Pakistan does not need to send in any of its regular troops across the LoC. The madrasas in Pakistan, many of which are backed by militant outfits, churn out enough recruits for the Kashmir "jehad". Along with religio us instruction, many madrasas, in collaboration with the militant groups, offer military training. The Pakistani intelligence oversees the entire process and backs the groups that toe its line and further its interests. The recruits, unlike in the initia l years of militancy in Kashmir, are Pakistanis, Afghans and "jehadis" from many other countries, who believe that their religion calls upon them to fight the "Hindu oppressor" in Kashmir. In the light of the Afghanistan experience, it can be assumed t hat Pakistan has sent in mercenaries whose link with its intelligence establishment cannot be easily traced.

The Pakistan Government is aware that the militancy in Kashmir does not draw as much support as it did in the early 1990s. It may be better organised and may produce better results, but it is not popular. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), w hich began the militancy in the late 1980s, has no role to play today. Its founder, the Rawalpindi-based Amanullah Khan, lives under virtual house arrest, his movements under constant watch by the Pakistani intelligence. The reason for this is that Amanu llah Khan remains committed to the cause of "Kashmiri" independence, not to the "right of self-determination" as mentioned in the United Nations resolutions relating to the Kashmir dispute, which give Kashmiris the only option of joining Pakistan.

Any Kashmiri leader who has demonstrated independence of mind has been discarded by the Pakistan Government. Only those who are servile, who unquestioningly toe the line laid down by the ISI, are favoured with funds, arms, communications equipment and m ilitary training.

Pakistan has come to realise that it has to do something "different" to keep the pot boiling in Kashmir. And what better way than to send in well trained mercenaries to take over strategic heights in the Kargil and Drass sectors, which overlook the Kargi l-Leh road, so vital for India's communication links.

Pakistan had earlier alleged that India launched an attack in the Shyok sector on May 6. (New Delhi denied the charge.). The Nation reported (on May 7) that a "large number of Indian intruders" were killed and injured. On May 15, The Nation reported that Pakistan had "captured" five strategic posts in the Kargil sector. The newspaper reported on May 18 that Pakistan continued to occupy the 20 posts it had "wrested" from the Indian Army. No immediate denial of this came from the official mo uthpiece of the Pakistan Army, the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Directorate. Several days later, the ISPR stated that the Pakistan Army had not captured any Indian posts.

The Kargil operation was meticulously planned. The despatch of heavily armed militants to Kargil was intended to raise the stakes on the LoC and also to secure a response from India. The "hotting up" of the situation along the LoC, Pakistan believes, wil l help focus international attention on Kashmir, which has become a "nuclear flashpoint" since May 1998.

The attempt, clearly, was to secure the involvement of the international community in Kashmir. A Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman said on May 26 that the U.N. Secretary-General should send a special envoy to the region and the U.N. Military Observer Gro up in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) should be reinforced and activated. "Kashmir is a nuclear flashpoint," he stated.

Significantly, the spokesman stated that the air attacks by Indian aircraft were conducted on the Indian side of the LoC, but that some "bombs" had fallen on the Pakistan side. The import of the statement was to become clear the next day. On May 27, Majo r-General Anis Bajwa, Vice-Chief of the General Staff of the Pakistan Army, claimed - contrary to the previous day's remarks by the Foreign Office spokesman - that Indian aircraft had rocketed and strafed Pakistani positions in the Indus sub-sector on Ma y 26 and flown back. He further claimed that when the Indian aircraft came again on May 27 to the same area, they were shot down.

Gen. Bajwa said that Flight Lieutenant Nachiketa (No. 1135, 9 Squadron, Srinagar) piloting a MiG-27 was in Pakistani custody while Squadron Leader (Ajay) Ahuja was "unfortunately killed". Ahuja's body was handed over to the Indian side on May 28, and the Indian Army stated that the body bore bullet wounds. The reports also suggest that Ahuja had ejected safely and had used his parachute. Foreign journalists, who were taken by Pakistani authorities to see both the crashed aircraft, saw Ahuja's personal effects, including his personal weapon, which had his name engraved on it.

B.K. BANGASH / AP
In Nellum Valley in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. Pakistani officials allege that the house was destroyed in IAF bombing.

On May 28, Brigadier Rashid Qureshi stated that an Indian helicopter was brought down by "Indian fire" during air strikes on the positions held by mercenary militants. Soon after, the United Jehadi Council claimed responsibility for the downing of the MI -17 helicopter. "The downing of the Indian helicopter gunship is the result of the collective operation of all the Mujahideen in the Council," said Syed Salahuddin, Council "chief" and supreme commander of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. The Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (formerly the Harkat-ul-Ansar) and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen are the main groups in this Pakistan-backed Council.

Initially, the Tehrik-e-Jihad, a similar front, had stated that its armed mercenaries had taken position on the heights in the Kargil and Drass sectors. Soon, the other major militant outfits announced that they were sending "reinforcements" to the area. Clearly, all the pro-Pakistan militant outfits, which receive their sustenance from Pakistan, are operating in the Kargil and Drass sectors.

However, the Pakistani strategy has not succeeded in getting the international community to put pressure on India. The West has limited itself to counselling both India and Pakistan to exercise restraint. Of late, relations between the United States and Pakistan seem to have become strained.

Addressing a public meeting in Karachi on May 28, Yaum-i-Takbeer ('The Great Day') - the first anniversary of the Chagai nuclear tests - Prime Minister Sharif stated that he had spoken on the telephone to his Indian counterpart. The Information Minister stated on May 29 that Sharif was merely returning Vajpayee's call of May 24.

State-run television reported that Sharif had offered to send Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz to Delhi for talks and that he had said that issues between India and Pakistan could be resolved across the table, not by sending in aircraft.

The Sharif Government has made it clear that the objective of the Aziz visit was not merely to defuse the tension but to find a permanent solution to the Kashmir issue. That, in itself, is a giveaway. The dialogue process between India and Pakistan is on ; it is Pakistan which has chosen not to respond to India's offer to hold Foreign Secretary-level talks, which cover the all-important issues of peace and security and Kashmir.

Why did Pakistan shy away from Foreign Secretary-level talks? Why is Pakistan now willing to send its Foreign Minister for talks? Given the fact that Pakistan does not recognise the mercenary Mujahideen as anything but a "Kashmiri" force, what is there t o talk about? Will Aziz agree that the Mujahideen who are operating from camps in POK should withdraw to their earlier locations? That seems a highly unlikely proposition.

The Pakistani move in Kargil is part of a cold, calculated strategy. Apart from flogging the militancy in Kashmir, the attempt is to put Kashmir on the front-burner. Since February 1997, Pakistani spokesmen have tom-tommed their success in making the Kas hmir issue visible internationally and in placing it on the top of the agenda for the dialogue with India.

There are no divisions in the Pakistani establishment. The Army is under the control of Nawaz Sharif and it is he who calls the shots in Pakistan. The ISI continues its operations against India and in Kashmir; there is no contradiction here. Civilian Min isters and Army officials continue to echo each other in their daily diatribes against India. When it comes to taking an anti-India stand, the Pakistani establishment is solid as a rock. Kargil reflects that reality.

The hawks in India have clearly been taken for a ride by the hawks in Pakistan. When Vajpayee arrived at Wagah on that clear afternoon of February 20, Sharif offered him "half a hug", nothing more. That is the ground reality of India-Pakistan relations. Nothing, apart from the atmospherics, had changed since February.

In the 10 years of Kashmiri militancy, Pakistan had never tried such an adventure. A self-proclaimed nationalist government was in power in New Delhi when the infiltration took place. Kargil demands a re-examination of the Indian approach towards Pakista n. Lack of coherence must yield ground to a cogent policy.