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WORLD AFFAIRS
A complex verdict
The fractured verdict in the Provincial Council elections in Sri Lanka
appears to have upset the calculations of the ruling People's Alliance.
D.B.S. JEYARAJ
THE April 6 elections to the five Provincial Councils - Western, Central,
North-Central, Uva and Sabaragamuwa - in Sri Lanka have produced a result
that is complex in many ways. Overall it indicates a clean sweep by the ruling
People's Alliance (P.A.), which polled the largest number of votes. The
prevailing system of proportionate representation has, however, made the
P.A's majority in four of the Councils rather narrow. The Sri Lanka Freedom
Party (SLFP)-led P.A. enjoys an absolute majority only in the North Central
Province, where it won 19 of the 33 seats. It may be able to cobble together
an alliance with some Tamil parties and secure a slender lead in three Councils
in the highlands; in the Western Province, which includes Colombo, it is
not in a position to secure a majority even with the help of minority parties
in a hung Council. Although it won only 26 of the 58 seats in the Central
Province, the P.A. can put together a legislature group of 34 members with
the support of eight representatives of Tamils of Indian origin. Likewise,
in Uva and Sabaragamuwa, where it has won only 17 of the 34 and 22 of the
44 seats, it can manage to have razor-thin majorities with the help of a
Tamil representative in each Province.
In the Western Province, in the country's largest Council, the P.A. faces
bleak prospects as it has won only 46 of the 104 seats, and cannot hope to
achieve a working majority with the help of just two members belonging to
the Tamil and Muslim communities. It is to be seen whether the Opposition
will allow the administration to function smoothly. Frantic negotiations
are on between the P.A. and other parties in order to ensure the smooth
functioning of the Council. Talks are also on between P.A. leaders and upcountry
Tamil leaders on the modalities of power-sharing in the highland Councils.
THIS complex state of affairs has thoroughly undermined the impact of the
P.A's five-nil victory. But for the narrow victory margins, the P.A's performance
could have been deemed impressive for two reasons: first, it was the United
National Party (UNP) that was in power in all but the Western Province, and
second, the P.A. Government in Colombo, elected in August 1994, is now in
its last lap, with elections expected to be announced any time after August
this year. In view of the anti-incumbency factor in the national context,
many analysts had predicted a massive swing of votes against the P.A. Several
pollsters had predicted that the UNP would win three Councils in tight contests.
Instead, it appears that the anti-incumbency factor was at work at the Council
level against the UNP.
There was, however, near-unanimity of opinion that if the polls were free
and fair, the margins of victory for either side would be extremely narrow.
This part of the forecast has proved true. The P.A. won 53.39 per cent of
the votes in the North-Central Province, while the UNP won 39.46 per cent.
In the Western Province, it was an even contest, with the P.A. securing 43.68
per cent and the UNP 43.23 per cent. In the Central, Uva and Sabaragamuwa
Provinces, the P.A. won 43.17 per cent, 44.88 per cent and 47.82 per cent
respectively, while the UNP won 40.10 per cent, 43.98 per cent and 44.85
per cent.
The narrow difference in vote-shares was reflected in the tally of seats.
Under the system followed in the provincial polls, the party that garners
the highest number of votes in a Province gets two additional or bonus seats.
In the April 6 elections, the P.A. won 10 bonus seats. Before the allocation
of these seats it had 120 seats and the UNP 112. Including the bonus seats,
the P.A's tally rose to 130 in a grand total of 273. The break-up of seats
prior to the allocation of bonus seat was: North-Central - P.A. 17 and UNP
12; Western - P.A. 44 and UNP 44; Central - P.A. 24 and UNP 23; Uva - P.A.
15 and UNP 14; and Sabaragamuwa - P.A. 20 and UNP 19.
SRIYANTHA WALPOLA
Roadside
posters of President Chandrika Kumaratunga during the campaign for the April
6 Provincial Council elections.
CRITICS of Ranil Wickremasinghe, UNP leader and Leader of the Opposition
in Parliament, argue that he lacks the charisma of his chief adversary President
Chandrika Kumaratunga, and that he is incapable of leading the party to victory.
Wickremasinghe's attempts to reform and modernise the party has angered the
old guard. Subtle moves have been afoot to replace him with either former
party secretary Sirisena Cooray or Karu Jayasuriya, the newly elected Opposition
leader in the Western Province. Normally, a defeat in all the five Provincial
Councils would have considerably weakened the position of the UNP leader.
The fractured verdict in which the UNP appears to have lost only by a short
head has, however, prevented this from happening. In fact, it has even kept
alive the hopes of a UNP renaissance under Wickremasinghe.
The provincial polls attracted a great deal of attention because they were
expected to provide a clue to the pattern of voting in the future. Had the
UNP won a handsome majority, the writing on the wall would have been clear
for the P.A.. The SLFP's political allies in Parliament would have started
deserting the Government and the UNP would have gained in confidence. Besides,
being in control of the provincial administrative apparatus would have helped
the UNP in the parliamentary or presidential elections.
On the other hand, a victory for the P.A. would have bolstered its image
and President Kumaratunga would have called for an early presidential election,
which she could win in such a context. Thereafter, it would have been possible
for the P.A. to conduct parliamentary elections and gain a significant majority.
However, now with the recent polls throwing up neither victors nor losers,
the situation is not conducive to decision-making on these issues.
With the two main political formations more or less evenly placed, it is
doubtful whether the P.A. will call for early elections. It may be content
to complete its term in office, in the meantime attempting a breakthrough
on both the political and military fronts vis-a-vis the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Also, it is likely to introduce a series of
populist measures with an eye on the elections. In any case, the P.A. Government
is likely to take decisive measures on this issue only after the elections
to the predominantly Sinhala Southern Provincial Council take place. Filing
of nominations for this crucial round of elections will begin on April 22.
Sections of the state-controlled press have been publishing glowing accounts
of the P.A's victory in the Council elections and predicting that on the
basis of this, Chandrika Kumaratunga would emerge winner in the presidential
election. The truth, however, is somewhat different. In spite of winning
the largest number of votes, the P.A's performance leaves much to be desired.
This assessment is based on two factors.
PRIOR to the introduction of proportionate representation, Sri Lanka followed,
like India, the "first past the post" system. Instead of a radical overhaul
of the system, the system of proportionate representation was merely superimposed
on the existing structure. Although elections were district-wise, each electoral
district in turn was a conglomerate of electoral divisions that corresponded
to the earlier single electorates. This was for administrative convenience.
Political parties played along and began appointing organisers on the basis
of electoral divisions. In the 1994 general elections, the P.A. won all but
one of the southern "Sinhala" electoral divisions. In the April elections,
of the 95 electoral divisions in the five Provinces, the P.A. won 61 while
the UNP won 33 and the National Union of Workers (NUW) one. The significance
of the result is that 10 Cabinet Ministers and three Deputy Ministers "lost"
the electoral divisions they were assigned to as organisers. They included
"war" Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte (Senkadagala) and "devolution" Minister
G.L. Peiris. The fact that Cabinet Ministers are slipping on their home turf
does not augur well for the P.A.
Secondly, the prospects of a P.A. sweep in an envisaged presidential election
are not bright. In 1994, Chandrika Kumaratunga scored a grand 63 per cent
vote on a national basis. This comprised 50 per cent of the Sinhala votes
and 13 per cent of the minority votes. If the Tamils of the Northern Province
were able to vote in large numbers, she would have got 70 per cent of the
vote. The recent polls indicate that the P.A's share in the south is only
around 45 per cent as against the UNP's 43 per cent. It is rather unlikely
that the minority communities will vote for Chandrika Kumaratunga, in view
of the ongoing war and the consequent hardships. Thus, she may not garner
50 per cent of the votes on the first count as required in a presidential
poll.
The Council elections have also brought into sharp focus the growing rift
between the minorities and the Kumaratunga Government. The Ceylon Workers
Congress (CWC) and the Up Country People's Front (UCPF), which represent
Tamils of Indian origin, are components of the P.A. Government, with their
leaders S. Thondaman and P. Chandrashekaran holding office as Minister and
Deputy Minister respectively. Yet both parties refrained from contesting
under the P.A. banner as Tamil sentiment in the plantation areas did not
favour the ruling party. The UCPF contested alone and won two seats. The
CWC, in association with 19 Tamil organisations, formed an umbrella organisation
called Inthiya Vamsavali Makkal Perani (Indian Origin People's Front). In
view of a legal dispute over its election symbol, the cockerel, the CWC adopted
the peacock symbol of the NUW. The Front won nine seats (the CWC won eight
and the Democratic Workers Congress one) in four Councils. The CWC's strength
has been reduced to eight from 17 mainly owing to its association with the
present Government. Yet, the Tamil representatives are now sought after by
the P.A. to form an administration.
The situation is true of Sri Lankan Tamils too. Unlike Tamils of Indian origin,
they are concentrated in sufficient numbers in Colombo and its suburbs. In
the April polls, the voting pattern of Sri Lankan Tamils fell into four
categories: voting for the UNP, abstaining from voting, rendering their votes
invalid, or voting for the New Leftist Front. Since the CWC contested under
the banner of the Indian Tamil Front, Sri Lankan Tamils did not vote for
the party. But their support for the UNP was evident from the large majority
of preference votes received by chief UNP candidate Karu Jayasuriya. The
New Leftist Front won only one seat, and that too in Colombo. The victory
is attributed to the Tamils' support for Wickremabahu Karunarathne, who has
consistently stood up for their rights. The unusually large number of invalid
votes and the comparatively low voter turnout are also attributed to the
attitude of Sri Lankan Tamil voters.
SRIYANTHA WALPOLA
Ranil
Wickremasinghe, Leader of the Opposition, voting in the elections.
The situation is somewhat similar in the case of Tamil-speaking Muslims.
In the 1994 elections, the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress was with the P.A. In
the recent Wayamba provincial polls, there was considerable pressure from
the rank and file on the party leadership to contest independently. But its
leader, Ashroff, decided that the party would contest on a common list with
the P.A.. None of the Muslim Congress' candidates was returned (the system
of proportionate representation entails voting for a party's list of names
and then indicating individual preferences). The Muslim Congress contested
on its own in Kalutara district of the Western Province, and along with the
P.A. in other areas. The Congress won just one seat in the Province. Also,
the P.A. lost electoral divisions that were under the purview of senior Muslim
Ministers such as Fowzie and Alavi Mowlana.
It is clear from the results that the minority communities are getting alienated
from the Government. The P.A. cannot hope to ignore this development as it
is the minority vote that propelled it to power in 1994. The fact that the
Tamil parties, despite their reduced strength, are still able to play the
kingmaker further underscores the importance of the minority vote.
Another phenomenon was the resurrection of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna
(JVP). This ultra leftist organisation contested in all the Councils and
won 15 seats. By winning eight seats in the Western Province, it proved that
it had made deep inroads into Gampaha district, the stronghold of Chandrika
Kumaratunga. If the JVP is willing to align itself with the P.A. or even
the UNP, then a viable administration is possible. But the JVP has announced
that it will neither support any party nor adopt a case-by-case approach
towards the issue. The crux of the matter is that the JVP has arrived on
the national scene as a third force.
Ironically, the Provincial Council scheme, which was introduced primarily
as a device to realise the aspirations of the Tamil people, is defunct in
the North-Eastern Province while being functional in the south where no demand
was raised for devolution of powers. The scheme is yet to prove its worth
to the Sinhala people. Provincial elections continue to be perceived as an
instrument to ascertain the public mood rather than as a tool of development.
The fact that the P.A. Government, which is committed to greater devolution,
is in control of most Councils may bring about an attitudinal change towards
them. Already some Cabinet Ministers are preparing to take over as Chief
Ministers. It remains to be seen whether the Provincial Councils will use
the powers devolved to them to usher in meaningful development in their
respective spheres of control.
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