WORLD AFFAIRS

Strategic changes in Wanni

The nature of the conflict between the Sri Lankan Army and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam is undergoing drastic changes as a result of strategic shifts by both the combatants.

D.B.S. JEYARAJ

THE ongoing war between the Sri Lankan armed forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the northern Wanni region of Sri Lanka has undergone a qualitative change in recent times. The theatre of conflict is shifting to the northwestern sector of the Northern Province while the protagonists themselves are revising their objectives and redefining their strategies accordingly. There has been a rapid transformation in both the nature of the war and the military equation on the ground. In three bloodless operations, government troops have acquired 995 sq km of "real estate".

Ever since the Government launched "Operation Jayasikurui" (Certain Victory) on May 13, 1997 to recapture the 76-km stretch of road between Vavuniya and Kilinochchi along the Jaffna-Kandy A-9 highway, the LTTE has resisted it effectively through a counter-offensive named "Operation Sei Allathu Sethu Madi" (Do or Die). The significance of the resistance has been that the LTTE adopted for this the positional method of combat instead of guerilla tactics. The Tigers have entrenched themsleves and attempted to defend territory.

The LTTE's change of strategy has been successful to the extent of preventing the Army from reaching its destination of Kilinochchi despite the protracted war. The armed forces had reached only the northern town of Mankulam, about 32 km south of Kilinochchi, when Jayasikurui was suspended last December. The 18-month battle, however, marked the bloodiest phase in the entire war. Casualties on either side, in terms of both the dead and the injured, have crossed 10,000. It is reported that the LTTE has raised three infantry units and one artillery unit to confront the Army whose 53rd, 54th, 55th and 56th divisions were engaged in the Wanni conflict.

It was after the armed forces gained control of Mankulam that the Government suspended Jayasikurui saying that it had achieved its objectives for the moment. The reality, however, was that the emphasis on a northbound thrust towards Kilinochchi had been put on hold. Instead the Army conducted another limited operation named "Rivibala" (Sunpower), reminiscent of Operation "Riviresa" (Sunray), which dislodged the LTTE from Jaffna.

The Jaffna-Kandy road or the A-9 highway, which runs through the middle of the Wanni mainland, has three major roads leading eastwards to the Tiger citadel of Mullaitheevu on the northeastern coast. These roads start at Paranthan, Mankulam and Puliyankulam. When Jayasikurui was suspended, the Army occupied Nedunkerny on the Puliyankulam-Mullaitheevu road and Olumadu on the Mullaitheevu-Mankulam road apart from its positions along the A-9 highway. In December 1998, as part of Operation Rivibala, the Army broke out from the Olumadu-Karippattamurippu camp and proceeded eastwards until it reached Oddusuddan on the Mullaitheevu road. This manoeuvre was supplemented by another column from Nedunkerny which advanced towards Oddusuddan in a northeastward thrust.

Both lines of advance took the LTTE by surprise. The LTTE had structured its defences in anticipation of an upward, northbound move. Apparently it did not expect the Army to progress sideways. The end result was the linking up of Mankulam via Olumadu to Oddusuddan along with Nedunkerny. This near-triangular area saw the Army easily gain 135 sq km of territory.

There was no direct fighting but the Army's advance was preceded by intense bombing and long-range artillery barrages. Around 14,000 civilians fled the area but another 850 civilians opted to take their chances with the Army. They sought refuge in the premises of the Than Thondreeswarar Sivan Kovil at Oddusuddan. This was remarkable as the practice among Tamil civilians is to run away from areas seized by the Army. Later, Deputy Minister of Defence Anuruddha Ratwatte escaped death when LTTE shells landed dangerously close to him as he was visiting the temple. A senior commander, Maj. Gen. Neil Dias, was injured.

The suspension of Jayasikurui saw a reversal of roles in the military scenario, which went largely unnoticed by the island's media. It was no longer a case of the Army trying to advance on predictable routes, with the Tigers waiting in anticipation. As illustrated by the Oddusuddan annexation, the Army now had the advantage of surprise. The LTTE had to guess where the Army would strike next. In the Wanni arena the Army had the options of moving northeast by east to Mullaitheevu from Oddusuddan; proceeding towards south by southeast to Mullaitheevu from Paranthan; resuming Jayasikurui and making either a northward thrust or a southward thrust or both, and reopening the northwestern front.

The LTTE ruled out the northwestern sector of the Wanni which lies to the west of the A-9 highway, and focussed on other areas. It strengthened its 64-km-long pathukappu veli (security fence) of entrenched positions extending from Vavunikulam in the west to Katsilaimadu in the east. It also set up positions near the Paranthan-Elephant Pass axis. The LTTE may have felt that the Army would target Mullaitheevu because it was in every sense the Tiger heartland now. The Alambil-Salai coastline was the LTTE's lifeline in terms of procuring military supplies from abroad. Also, the fledgling "Vaan Puligal" (Air Tigers) unit, comprising a few microlite aircraft and two-seater helicopters, was also stationed there. Subsequent events demonstrated that the LTTE made a grave miscalculation in ignoring the northwestern sector.

DILIP GANGULY/AP
After the March 22 operation at Madhu church and its environs, Sri Lankan troops guard areas recently captured from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Mannar district, along with portions of Vavuniya and Kilinochchi districts, constitutes the northwestern sector of the Wanni. The A-30 highway is the main road that links Mannar and Vavuniya. This proceeds westwards from Vavuniya town to Parayanalankulam and then northwestwards to Mannar. Another road, the A-14 highway from Medawachiya to Mannar via Chettykulam, meets it at Parayanalankulam. The Army had established control over the Vavuniya-Mannar roadway through another operation named "Edibala" launched prior to Jayasikurui. The LTTE did not offer any resistance then. As the Mannar-Vavuniya road was considered secure, police personnel were deployed along it instead of Army units. Apart from a rare ambush, the LTTE did not attempt any operation to counter the Sri Lankan armed forces' presence there.

From March 4 to 6 this year, government forces conducted an unusually quiet operation, whose character was in striking contrast to its code name "Ranaghosa" (Battle Cry). It was a two-pronged drive from two directions, towards a single destination - Iranaiiluppaikulam, which literally means "twin mahua tree tank" and is 27 km to the northwest of Vavuniya town. This was followed by a second thrust to Moondrumurippu from two directions and then an upward move to Vannivilankulam towards the north.

The Army moved northwards from Poovarasankulam, 13 km to the west of Vavuniya on the Vavuniya-Mannar road, towards Iranaiiluppaikulam along a small road that passes through Velankulam, Thirumenikulam and Periya Puliyank-ulam villages. The area was virtually a no-man's land, devoid of people. Simultaneously, another column proceeded from Thandikulam, 10 km to the north of Vavuniya, along another road, also leading to Iranaiilluppaikulam. This road passes through Marukkarampalai, Shastrikoolankulam, Kalmadu and Thavasiyakulam. Both lines of advance met with no resistance on the way. Even more notable was the virtual absence of landmines on the way. The people of Iranaiiluppaikulam were surprised to wake up one morning and find the Army amidst them. There had been absolutely no firing of any kind. Their surprise increased when they found that the LTTE office which had issued "passes" remained closed and a woman Tiger camp nearby was deserted. Obviously the LTTE had anticipated the arrival of the Army and faded away.

Upon reaching Iranaiiluppaikulam, the Army moved further northwards, passing through the villages of Vilaathikulam, Valaiankaddu and Periyamadhu and reaching Moondru-murippu. Likewise, another column started out from Omanthai, 16 km north of Vavuniya town, and proceeded northwestwards to Moondrumurippu along a gravel track that passes through jungle areas and also the villages of Rambaikulam, Kondakkaarankulam, Palanmoddai, Navvi, Panichankulam and Koliyankulam. Again, there was no resistance. After reaching Moondru-murippu, the Army moved northwards via Pandiyankulam and reached Van-nivilankulam northwest of Mankulam. Later, the Mankulam axis was extended to Vannivilankulam. Now the Army is poised to move through Vavunikulam and then Thunukkai and Mallavi, the two most important towns in the northeastern sector. Mallavi incidentally is the place where a delegation of religious leaders from Colombo met LTTE representatives recently (Frontline, March 12, 1999).

In terms of territorial gains, Operation Battle Cry was a major success: it resulted in an area of 570 sq km coming under Army control. Thus, in two operations that involved no fighting, the Army brought under its control 670 sq km of territory. What is puzzling about this operation is the marked absence of any resistance from the Tigers. It was a virtual cakewalk for the Army. Over 9,000 civilians have opted to remain in the areas captured by the Army, whereas 15,000 persons fled the same areas. An immediate benefit of the operation was the availability of essential goods at relatively low prices. Iranaiiluppaikulam is a key intersection in the northwestern sector. Several roads cut through the place. It was also the main transit point for people crossing from government-controlled areas to LTTE-controlled areas and vice versa.

The change of strategy by both sides provides much food for thought. The Army, instead of focussing only on the A-9 highway, is now opening several fronts to advance in different directions and has seized some territory in the process. The LTTE, on the other hand, has not resisted these advances; it has allowed the Army to march and conquer. Acquiring territory also means that the Army will spread itself thin in trying to consolidate its position, and thus become vulnerable. This could lead to the Tigers attacking isolated Army detachments in the near future. At the same time, it cannot be denied that the Army has shown enough resilience to maintain its presence in the area despite facing onslaughts by the Tigers.

Before Jayasikurui was launched, there were doubts about the efficacy of the Army's strategy to achieve the target of establishing a ground route. In terms of cost analysis, it seemed prudent for the Army to pursue a roundabout but safer route along the northwestern coast. Already the roadway up to Mannar was under Army control. The next stage would have been to gain control of the Mannar-Pooneryn road, or the A-32 highway, which hugs the northwestern coast. From Mannar-Thalladi this road passes through Pappamottai, Pallamadhu, Iluppaikkadavai, Vellan-kulam, Mulankavil, Nachikuda, Palla-varayankattu and so on towards to Pooneryn or Poonagari. Thereafter the linkage with the Jaffna peninsula could be achieved by either extending the links to Elephant Pass via Kilinochchi-Paranthan or by re-establishing the Pooneryn ferry (or constructing the Mahadeva causeway) between Kerathivu and Sangupiddy. Although long-winded, this route which hugs the coast was easier to establish and safeguard than the A-9 highway, which passed through thick jungle in the centre of the Wanni.

Speculation about this route ceased after Jayasikurui. After the Army abandoned Pooneryn and was later driven away from Kilinochchi it seemed that this route was no longer an option. But with the Army making significant strides in the northwestern sector, the route re-emerged as a distinct possibility. The capture of the strategically located Iranaiiluppai-kulam enabled the Army to mount pressure on the LTTE from different directions.

Soon, the air force began bombing the Pooneryn area. Then the Army broke out from the Thallady camp and reached Pappa-mottai on the Pooneryn road without facing any resistance. Perhaps realising that the Army was bent on taking the entire roadway, the Tigers began striking back. Long-range heavy artillery was swiftly moved to Naayaaruveli on the same road from where a barrage was unleashed on the Army. The LTTE scored a major success when shells fell on the Thallady camp ammunition dump. At least 24 soldiers were killed and 42 injured in the serial explosions that followed. The camp sustained great damage and a major fire broke out. The fuel and food storage facilities and a score of vehicles were gutted. The advance along the Pooneryn road was temporarily halted.

The Army, however, started another operation in a different direction. The most famous Catholic church in Sri Lanka is situated at Maruthamadhu and is popularly known as Madhu in Mannar district. In happier times, it attracted around 3.5 lakh pilgrims for the annual feast. It is a church dedicated to Our Lady of the Rosary but is generally known as Our Lady of Madhu or "Madhu Maatha church". For 15 years Sinhala Catholics had been unable to attend the church because of the security situation. In recent times a colony for nearly 20,000 displaced persons has been set up in the areas surrounding it. The colony is under the supervision of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

The road leading to Madhu from the junction on the Mannar-Vavuniya highway is controlled by the Army. With Thallady coming under artillery fire by the LTTE, the Army launched an operation on this road and proceeded towards Madhu. The LTTE fired some shells and the Army turned back. The Army manoeuvre was considered to be a diversionary tactic.

On March 22, the Army conducted the second phase of Operation Ranaghosa. Four columns marched towards Madhu from four directions. One of them, from Uyilankulam, reached Parappakkadanathan; another, from Manthai, reached Aandankulam. The third, from the newly captured Iranai-iluppaikulam, proceeded along Periya Thambarai and Pandivirichen and reached Palampitty. The fourth moved along Madhu road, seized Sinnapan-divirichen and bypassed Madhu to reach Thatchanamaruthamadhu. In one sweeping move, the Madhu church and its environs were brought under Army control. Since then the Army has set up camp within the church precincts. It captured 325 sq km of new territory. Now the next move seems to be a thrust along the Mannar-Pooneryn road.

A result of the Mannar-Pooneryn road coming under Army control would be a curtailment of the clandestine marine contacts made between the coasts of Tamil Nadu and Mannar. It is no secret that the Tigers have in recent times been procuring medicine, fuel, newsprint, non-perishable foodstuffs, and spare parts for machinery and electronic devices from Tamil Nadu through smugglers and fishermen. Some arrests have been made in this regard. The contraband is stored in the "Sea Tiger" base at Nachikudah and then distributed to Tiger centres in the hinterland. If the coastal road is taken by the Army, then the clandestine traffic between the coasts of Tamil Nadu and Mannar would be interdicted effectively. Arms and ammunition for the LTTE, however, come to the eastern coast of Mullaitheevu from places in the southeast.

The LTTE also revived its bombing campaign in Colombo. On March 9, at 9-05 p.m. a feeder pillar of the electricity board at Gasworks Street, in the business hub of the metropolis, was attacked with an explosive, and the area was plunged in darkness. Two bombs exploded two hours later. One was at the Pettah Central bus station, where the bomb was placed behind the driver's seat on a Galle-bound bus. One person was killed and 18 persons were injured. The second explosion was on a Colombo-bound train from Vavuniya. After the last passenger had disembarked, the train went to the railway yard at Dematagoda where the bomb exploded. Analysts feel that the relatively low loss of lives in the incidents indicated a shift in strategy by the Tigers.

There was another bomb attack, on March 16, at Mount Lavinia, a Colombo suburb. Chief Inspector Mohammed Nilabdeen, head of the anti-terrorism unit in the area, left the Mt. Lavinia police station at 5-35 p.m. after he received a call informing him that his wife was ill. As Nilabdeen's vehicle came out of the premises of this office, a woman suicide bomber, who was waiting in a parked rickshaw, threw herself down and exploded. Nilabdeen was injured seriously. Four persons were killed and 10 injured in the explosion. The dead included the human bomb, who was identified as 22-year-old Mary Quincy of Vankalai in Mannar. Another youth on the scene swallowed a cyanide capsule before he was captured.

The seizure of Madhu is considered to be advantageous for the Chandrika Kumaratunga Government in the sense that it would fetch her party the Sinhala Catholic vote in the elections. However, the presence of the Army within the church has angered Tamil Catholics. The Bishop of the area, Joseph Rayappu, has threatened a non-violent protest campaign if the Army is not withdrawn within two weeks. The fear is that by militarising church premises the armed forces would make the church vulnerable to attacks by the LTTE. The church and also the people who have taken refuge there may suffer as a result.

There is speculation among analysts on the LTTE's next move. By gaining new territory the Army is constrained to re-deploy personnel from other fronts in the northeastern sector. This will relieve pressure on the LTTE. Also, the Army may become a potential target when it spreads itself thin in the future. Also, the Tigers are expected to lodge stiff resistance to any forward movement by the Army along the Pooneryn road. But the anxiety in government circles is that the LTTE may launch its own version of a "Tet Offensive" in the future. It is also feared that its air wing will play a big role in future conflicts. Supporters of the Tigers are disappointed that the LTTE has not resisted forward thrusts by the military. So there is pressure on LTTE chief Velupillai Prabakaran to prove in the coming weeks that he sacrificed 995 sq km of land because he had a greater goal in sight.

Thus it is quite transparent that the conflict is undergoing drastic changes as a result of strategic shifts by both combatants. The situation is fluid right now. The coming days would indicate which side would get the upper hand in South Asia's most protracted conflict.