India's National Magazine
From the publishers of THE HINDU

Vol. 16 :: No. 02 :: Jan. 16 - 29, 1999

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COVER STORY

A systemic failure

The circumstances surrounding the dismissal seem to point to a breakdown in the normal functioning of the relationship between the Service Headquarters and the Defence Ministry.

B.G. DESHMUKH

IN September 1991, while putting down my views on the institution of Cabinet Secretary, I wrote:

"It is pertinent to mention here the tenure system in force for the Chiefs of the three armed services. They are given a fixed tenure and fortunately so far no Chief has been shifted before he had completed his tenure (General R.N. Thapar voluntarily retired and was not removed). One of the contributory reasons for this may be the fact that under the Constitution, the President is the Supreme Commander of the armed forces and his concurrence is mandatory for appointment of a new Chief. I know only one case where a new Prime Minister (Chandra Shekhar) was considering a change in the name of a Chief approved by his predecessor, but the then President, being a statesman and a seasoned administrator, put his foot down firmly. This system of a Chief holding a tenure post and not getting shifted before the tenure is over has given certain stability to the armed forces, and the morale of the services has remained high, as compared to the morale of the civil services, especially in the States (where the Chief Secretaries are routinely and merrily shifted by the Chief Ministers). Attempts were made to interfere with the official hierarchy in the armed forces but this happened only once in the early Sixties (when Krishna Menon was the Defence Minister) and fortunately we have learnt the lesson."

The armed forces have traditionally received special attention and consideration. Article 52(2) of the Constitution makes a special mention: "Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision the supreme command of the Defence Forces of the Union shall be vested in the President and the exercise thereof shall be regulated by law."

The approach behind this national consensus was the recognition that the nascent Indian democracy needed a dependable, and an apolitical, instrument to protect it during the turbulent times when India became independent in 1947 and immediately thereafter. Given the geo-political situation and India's security and threat perception, the need for such an instrument was paramount. It was especially so in the case of a developing economy like India's where social tensions and political upheavals are normal and natural. Thanks to this national approach and consensus, the armed forces have so far faithfully and loyally discharged their obligations and fulfilled the people's expectations. This must be viewed also against what has happened in many countries in Asia and Africa which became independent more or less at the same time that India became independent.

THE HINDU PHOTO LIBRARY
In October 1986, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi with the chiefs of the three Services, (from left) Gen. K. Sundarji, Air Chief Marshal Dennis La Fontaine and Admiral R.H. Tahiliani. Rajiv Gandhi, who also held the Defence portfolio, treated the Service Chiefs with full courtesy and consideration and insisted on their showing him the necessary courtesy, loyalty and obedience.

But at the same time, it must be categorically and unambiguously stated that the armed forces in India are under the full and effective control of the elected Union government. It means that they shall carry out all the legal and constitutional orders passed by such a government. There are definite procedures and conventions laid down or implicitly accepted when the Service Chiefs want to represent against such orders and decisions. These forces, commonly known as "uniform forces", have to observe a certain discipline and loyalty and obey orders. It is not expected of them to make or to start a public controversy on any issue.

The Service Chiefs have always tended to behave as prima donnas, especially when dealing with the civilian bureaucracy in the government in general and in the Defence Ministry in particular. Till the Pay Commission revised the pay of the Cabinet Secretary in the early 1980s and brought it on a par with that of the Service Chiefs, the latter did not even acknowledge the status of the Cabinet Secretary in the government. But the situation changed afterwards slowly and steadily. As the Cabinet Secretary, I had no difficulty in dealing with the Service Chiefs but this, of course, depended on giving them my fair treatment, consideration and attention. But then I extended such courtesy to all my senior colleagues in the government. These Service Chiefs always used to argue that senior appointments in the armed forces should not be treated as routine matters to be approved by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) and should be routed through the Cabinet Secretary, but I took a firm stand and the Prime Minister agreed with me.

But the Service Chiefs had a running battle with the Defence Secretary so far as protocol and control were concerned. As for the former aspect, it sometimes reached a stage when a certain Service Chief refused to attend a meeting in the Defence Secretary's room saying that he was senior to him (this was based on the Service Chief's higher pay and position in the order of precedence). But it should be added that one Defence Secretary went to another extreme and treated the Service Chief unfairly and rudely, taking advantage of his proximity to the Prime Minister. I had insisted that if the Defence Secretary did not agree with any proposal made by a Service Chief, he should discuss it first with the Service Chief concerned and record full justification, if necessary, for the disagreement, or, better still, brief the Defence Minister first and then take a decision after a full discussion in the Minister's room with the Service Chief concerned. Of course, in spite of all this, some Service Chiefs did behave rather condescendingly with the Defence Secretary.

When Rajiv Gandhi was Prime Minister, he also held the Defence portfolio; Arun Singh served as his Minister of State for Defence. Unfortunately, Arun Singh, mainly on account of his inexperience in government, was completely bowled over by the Service Chiefs. Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister could not naturally look after the day-to-day working of the Defence Ministry and, therefore, the Service Chiefs during this period came to overshadow the bureaucratic civil structure of the Ministry. When they then tried to overshadow the Cabinet Secretary, I put them in their place, after mentioning this to the Prime Minister. Conditions did change when K.C. Pant became Defence Minister.

THE Service Chiefs normally could not and did not behave like this with elected political executives, that is, the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister. But I have seen some exceptions - for instance, General K. Sundarji. He remarked indiscreetly during the Brasstacks Exercise that the "young boy (Rajiv Gandhi) had chickened out." I also remember an instance during another briefing in the Prime Minister's room. The Army Chief became rather rudely critical of a previous Prime Minister. Rajiv Gandhi flushed but kept quiet, but I could not do so and had to tell the Army Chief that "the Army will have to obey orders issued by a democratically elected Prime Minister under any circumstance, and if the Chief does not agree with this, he had better put in his papers." But it must also be stated that Rajiv Gandhi treated the Service Chiefs with full courtesy and consideration while insisting on their showing him the necessary courtesy, loyalty and obedience.

The demand of the Service Chiefs to do away with the Defence Ministry's civilian control or at least to dilute it considerably is a long-standing one. They want their proposals not to be scrutinised in the Defence Ministry, but to go directly to the Ministers and other competent authorities for consideration and approval. They want the Service Headquarters to function as the Ministry. I believe the Arun Singh Committee Report recommended many steps towards this, but the main rationale against such an extreme step has always been that civilian control, that is, the Defence Ministry's control, over the armed forces is necessary. But then I had always argued that at least in their operational activities, the Service Headquarters should be more or less autonomous, and even in other fields, there should be a large delegation of powers and full consultation and coordination between the Service Headquarters and the Ministry. There should be some mechanism to sort out disagreements in a constructive way.

WHAT happened in the case of Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat is not fully known outside the Government. But apart from the arguments about Admiral Bhagwat's alleged action of going public, it seems that there has been a breakdown in the normal functioning in the relationship between the Service Headquarters and the Defence Ministry. In this particular case of the appointment of a Deputy Chief, if the recommendation made by Admiral Bhagwat was not to be put up to the ACC for approval, it was expected of the Defence Secretary that he would discuss the matter with the Admiral first and then advise the Minister to call the Admiral for a discussion. As the Cabinet Secretary, I have seen such discussion notes on the file. There also seems to be some breakdown in the personal relationship between the Service Chiefs and the Defence Secretary; otherwise such unpleasantness would not have arisen. I must also state very clearly that if the Cabinet Secretary and the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister were aware of such developments - and they should have if they were vigilant - they should have stepped in and ensured that such discussions took place and the gist was brought on file. It is also a moot point whether the Navy Chief was allowed to see the Prime Minister or even the President as Supreme Commander if he had felt so strongly.

Irrespective of who is really responsible for this unfortunate mess, it cannot be denied that it will affect the morale of the Services. All the players in this drama, the Navy Chief, the Defence Secretary, the Cabinet Secretary and the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, should have realised and known this and therefore must share responsibility. They were not fair to the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister - and to the President.

AFTER I recorded the above on December 31, 1998, a lot of statements have been made. The Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, B.C. Mishra, said that the Opposition leaders were fully briefed about the seriousness of the situation ten days before the decision to dismiss Admiral Bhagwat was implemented. The Defence Minister refused to make any specific comments but alleged that Admiral Bhagwat persistently disobeyed the civilian authority and some of his actions had grave security implications. The Prime Minister said that in view of security considerations, all facts of the case cannot be revealed. The general impression created by these statements is that the controversy about the appointment of the Deputy Chief was the last straw on the camel's back and that the whole affair had been brewing for months.

The Opposition parties and leaders have soundly criticised the Government. Apparently, they had no inkling of the final decision and were hoping that the Government would sort out matters in a more constructive way. The Defence Minister has opened a Pandora's box. Admiral Bhagwat has decided not to go to the court for relief, but he will be fully justified now in making a formal representation to the President to clear his name regarding the charges made by the Defence Minister. The Prime Minister's statement is the usual fig-leaf worn by any government to avoid embarrassing disclosures.

Unfortunately, the President's name is also likely to be dragged in. As Supreme Commander, he must have watched the developments with growing concern and anxiety, and must have insisted on being briefed personally by the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister. He could have also called Admiral Bhagwat and consulted other Chiefs of Staff. The final order of removal of Admiral Bhagwat must have been personally cleared by the President after he was fully satisfied that there was no other way; otherwise he could have returned the case to the Government for reconsideration.

Finally, I must voice a major worry which I had recorded in September 1991. At that time, I wrote that the Government should not play with the institution of Cabinet Secretary. For the first time, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi removed a serving Cabinet Secretary, starting the trend. Prime Minister V.P. Singh did the same thing, removing T.N. Seshan as Cabinet Secretary. His appointee, Vinod Pande, was removed in turn by Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar. The next Prime Minister did not remove the incumbent Cabinet Secretary but played so much havoc with the institution that the post of Cabinet Secretary has now become a regular bargaining object. This has demoralised the civil services as the Cabinet Secretary is the head of these services. Now that an incumbent Service Chief has been removed, one sincerely hopes that this Government and future governments do not play lightly with the institution of Service Chiefs. Exercising civilian supremacy over the armed forces, as when President Truman removed General MacArthur, is one thing. But misusing and abusing it merely to bend the armed forces to one's wishes or for petty political gains is another thing. Yet this is too tempting an attraction for politicians. I hope they remember what happened to one of the finest armed forces and its morale and efficiency when V. K. Krishna Menon was Defence Minister.

B.G. Deshmukh is a former Cabinet Secretary.