India's National Magazine
From the publishers of THE HINDU

Vol. 16 :: No. 02 :: Jan. 16 - 29, 1999

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COVER STORY

Navy, nation and national security

The dismissal of Admiral Bhagwat has brought into focus fundamental questions of unequal power relations, weak structures and unprofessional leadership obtaining within the civil-military complex and the democratic set-up.

L. RAMDAS

During the past few days, I have read a wide range of views and opinions as expressed in some of the leading newspapers and journals in the country; listened to a few of the discussions and interviews in the electronic media; and above all spoken and listened to a cross-section of people from various walks of life, including sailors from that wonderful service, the Indian Navy, in which I have had the privilege of serving from the age of 15 until I retired as head of the Service in 1993. With near unanimity barring a few dissident views, there is a loud and clear message of shock, disapproval, dismay and even anger at the turn of events that has led this coalition Government to resort to such a unilateral and harsh action against a Service man - that too the head of a Service.

THE decision by the Government of India to dismiss Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat as the Chief of the Naval Staff was sudden and extraordinary. A lifetime of dedicated, disciplined and loyal service to the Navy and the country was brought to an abrupt end with a stroke and a flourish of the pen, in the following words: "The President is pleased to withdraw his pleasure for continuance of Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat... on account of loss of confidence in his fitness..."(from the Ministry of Defence letter dated December 30, 1998).

Some reports in the electronic media even mentioned that the approval for the termination of Admiral Bhagwat's services and the appointment of his successor was not obtained from the President and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. If this is true, it represents a complete violation of all existing norms.

This is a sad time for many of us - for Vishnu Bhagwat as much as for Sushil Kumar, the newly appointed Navy Chief, both of whom have served with me and both of whom have had different but impressive career profiles. It is a time for introspection for every single man and woman in service in the armed forces; for those of us who are today retired but who spent many decades in uniform; and for this country and its people as we are on the threshold of a new millennium.

SHANKER CHAKRAVARTY
Admiral Bhagwat with President K.R. Narayanan, the Supreme Commander of the armed forces.

Journals and journalists have had a field day - and almost every journal has had the story of the 'sacking' as its cover story. Depending on their sympathies, the headlines scream "The Sinking of Bhagwat" or "The Bitter Half", to "Arms Merchants Got the Navy Chief Out", "Admiral Overboard" and "Spat of the Year". As for the news reports from various sources, we have been treated to a veritable no-holds-barred display - with allegations of "disturbing tendencies", "defiant conduct", "indifference to authority", "security reasons", "threat to national security", "Government had no choice", "the Opposition was not consulted", "Bhagwat had threatened Kumar", "the fight for turf", and so on.

The media may have done their bit, created some sensational headlines, made or broken people's lives and reputation, with a few brilliant words. But what of those affected? I speak not only for those individuals whose lives are affected in countless ways but, above all, for the traditions and the institutions which go to build the nation and the fighting forces - the structures which sustain our democracy - and the assault on those values and norms which form the core of the Constitution of India.

It is these values which are under threat today as never before. Today it is the sacking of a chief of a Service for reasons known, unknown, real or imaginary, shrouded under the cloak of "national security". Tomorrow it may be some other sets of decisions which could seriously undermine the rule of law and the fundamentals of a democratic polity.

It is for all these reasons that I say it is time for many of us who have chosen to remain silent, to demand answers to several questions which are central to this particular issue - to voice our concerns in a manner which is germane to the concerns of a healthy and functioning democracy. If we fail to do so now, this may well mark one more milestone on the slippery slope towards anarchy.

My attempt here is to cut through much of the hype and try to highlight what in my perception are some of the critical issues affecting our country and the Services at this juncture - to outline the linkages between the two and to try to point to certain directions which could help us find a way ahead. We are in a time where there is need, above all, for courage and honesty, objectivity and vision - all of which are to be found in abundant measure in this land and in our people. But we need to be able to cut away much that is crass and irrelevant from those that are central to the situation facing us. Looking at the body of publicly stated opinion to date, it would appear that many concerns have surfaced in one form or the other.

Civil-military relations and higher defence management

It is ironic that within days of the dismissal of Admiral Bhagwat (and possibly as a move to pre-empt further criticism), Defence Minister George Fernandes and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) announced on January 6 their intention of "initiating a process of restructuring which would include integrating the three Service headquarters with the Ministry." It would almost appear that Bhagwat has been made a kind of scapegoat and sacrificed at the altar of the power play that has gone unchecked for too long. George Fernandes has also said that this task will be completed within 30 days. If this is indeed the intention, surely this could have been implemented much earlier, instead of allowing Admiral Bhagwat's case to end the way it has ended. My own experience tells me that the time-frame in which it is intended to implement this change is unrealistic, to say the least. One hopes that this will not end up as a mere cosmetic exercise to placate public reaction to this tragic episode. Time alone will tell whether this is one more of the unfulfilled promises that are so easily made.

Having said this, it is important to understand some of the reasons for our having arrived at this stage of almost complete breakdown in civil-military relations after fifty-plus years as an independent nation. This has not happened overnight. Several commissions and committees on restructuring, including the ones headed by Sharda Mukherjee (1969) and Arun Singh (1990), have argued for a total redesigning of the MoD and for the setting up of a Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. They all met with the same fate - their recommendations were consigned to the dustbin. Possibly the motivations were similar to the one ascribed to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by M.D. Nalapat in a recent article (The Times of India) - namely, a deep wariness and suspicion of men in uniform, especially with the experience of Pakistan next door.

It is well known that the position and status of the military vis-a-vis its civil service counterparts has been steadily chiselled away by a series of actions since 1952 - regardless of which government or political party was in power. The chief architects of these actions have often been the principal civil servants in the MoD, the Cabinet Secretariat and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO); details of these have been excellently chronicled by Nalapat in his article, "Bhagwat felled by bureaucratic axe" (January 6).

Nalapat traces this trend to 1952 where the entire Office Manual of the Ministry was rewritten to make "the three wings of the armed forces report, not directly to the political authority but to the civilian bureaucracy."

The article further says: "Over the post-Independence period, the powers of the civilian officials have grown to such an extent that today even low-level postings in the three Services have to be vetted by Joint or Additional Secretaries in the Defence Ministry. As a result, the respect of the men below for their Chiefs has diminished, and the command and control system within the Services has got weakened."

Recommendations for such postings are normally made by the Chief of Personnel in the Navy - a Vice-Admiral, who usually has about 30 to 35 years' service, as opposed to a Joint Secretary, who usually will not have more than 18 to 20 years' service. The disparity in service and experience is self-evident. This has also encouraged Service officers to bypass their usual 'Service channels' and approach bureaucrats and politicians directly. This has led to a systematic erosion of Service discipline and the authority of those in the Service, including the Chief.

Another aspect that is worthy of attention is the present cumbersome process of decision-making within the MoD and the Service headquarters. Despite the fact that budgets are allocated to each Service in the annual defence estimates passed by Parliament, the Chiefs of Staff are not permitted to authorise spending as they deem fit. The capital budget, which usually sets aside funds for procurement, acquisitions and modernisation, is also primarily negotiated and handled by civil servants; the military has only a limited role.

In addition, the position of the Service Chiefs and other Service officers in the Warrant of Precedence has been lowered over the years; this has also contributed towards a lowering of Service morale. This has been brought to the notice of the Government on every single occasion but the so-called "civil authority" has not found it fit to rectify this.

The track record of 'exemplary' behaviour by the Indian armed forces since Independence in our democratic framework is there for all to see. The bogey of military takeover and therefore the need to clip the military's wings even further make no sense at all. Every one of us in the Services understands and respects 'civil control' over the military. Implicit in this is the principle that the civil authority (that is, political power vested in the people's representatives and the Cabinet) treats the armed forces with respect. The customary compliments paid to the Services during the annual defence debate appear to be just lip-service when seen against the backdrop of recent events - in the context of the unprecedented insult to the office of the Chief of the Naval Staff. After all, Admiral Bhagwat was also an appointee of the Government of India. And the selection of the post of head of a Service is usually done from a panel of two or three of the seniormost officers, after extensive scrutiny of their confidential records and dossiers, and investigations by the Intelligence Bureau, lasting some months.

Acquisition and procurement of arms and equipment

The Indian armed forces, like armed forces elsewhere in the world, require the provision of weapons, equipment and other forms of military hardware. This also includes acquisitions, replacements and modernisation. Acquisition of military hardware often involves heavy outlays, commissions and kickbacks. This in turn has encouraged an undesirable trend whereby the 'arms lobby' has developed strong vested interests and has influenced decision-making at the political, bureaucratic and military levels. Many of those who belong to this 'arms lobby' are former Service officers. Similarly, there is a growing number of retired senior civil servants who are retained by transnational corporations to protect and further their business interests. All this cannot but lead to the creation of a nexus between several sectors, adding to the already high levels of corruption in the system.

To quote from Nalapat's article, "As for the lucrative sphere of defence procurement, all price-negotiating committees are presided over by civilian officials, even though these are generalists unaware of technical specifications and battlefield needs."

Among the various deals that hit the headlines in recent years were those that related to the purchase of Bofors guns, HDW submarines and Sukhoi aircraft. More recently there have been reports relating to the acquisition of T-90 tanks for the Army, and the Russian aircraft carrier Gorshkov for the Navy. The indigenously designed Air Defence Ship (ADS), which was to be built in India, was put up for government approval during my time as Navy Chief in 1991. It is still awaiting sanction. From newspaper reports I see that the Navy is on the verge of acquiring Gorshkov, which was offered to us in 1991. Had the Government approved the construction of the ADS in India in 1991 there would have been a replacement for Vikrant now. In 1991, the MoD tried to influence the Navy to buy Gorshkov, but it was the Navy's considered view that for a number of technical and operational reasons, Gorshkov was unsuitable. My advice on this was accepted by Defence Minister Sharad Pawar.

The systematic delay in sanctioning the construction of an indigenous ADS has placed the Navy in the awkward position of being faced with a Hobson's choice with regard to Gorshkov. It would be interesting to know how this initiative to acquire Gorshkov got reactivated. Should the ADS be sanctioned today, it could cost nearly Rs.3,000 crores, as against Rs.1,000 crores in 1991. The public has a right to know who is accountable for such avoidable cost overruns in defence procurement. Such is the price the nation pays for the callous manner in which vital proposals for operational replacements made by the Chiefs of Staff are treated. The price we may pay may be far higher than what meets the eye today. This is merely to illustrate and re-emphasise the urgency for a structure that will facilitate joint decision-making and, therefore, joint accountability.

Defence, development and democracy

Expenditure on defence and the armed forces has always come under attack and been seen to be inimical to development. Unfortunately, ever since Independence, the security environment in our neighbourhood has forced us to incur heavy expenditures on defence. This has been largely due to our inability to come to a political settlement and resolve our differences and disputes with Pakistan and China. This has resulted in our fighting three wars with the former and one with the latter. In real terms India has only managed to escalate its defence expenditure without demonstrating serious political will and statesmanship in finding amicable and workable solutions.

The absence of a strategic vision and a national strategy has played a major role in leading to this situation, and this needs to be set right. Many governments in the past have set up National Security Councils with the intention of addressing this question, but these never really functioned. The most recent National Security Council, established by the present Government, has yet to get off the ground and one wonders what role, if any, this body and the National Security Advisor played in the recent drama in the MoD and the decision to dismiss the Chief of the Naval Staff. The composition of such a Council should truly be 'national' in character and transcend the narrow boundaries of political parties and their ideologies. This dimension appears to be lacking in Tier One as it is structured at present. For instance, the Leader of the Opposition should have found a place at this level - after all, he or she is the 'shadow Prime Minister' in the Westminster form of government which India follows. While hearing a lot about "civil control over the military", political parties themselves seem to be heavily dependent on their 'civil servants' in government for advice.

In other democracies, it is customary for politicians to specialise in a particular field and keep in touch with developments in their sphere of expertise. This practice is conspicuous by its absence in the Indian political scene. We have yet to hear of a 'shadow Defence Minister' in any political party in this country. All this highlights the need for a greater and more consistent level of professionalism within our democratic system, which will reduce over-dependence on the bureaucracy and thus enable objective decision-making.

Politicisation and communalisation of the armed forces

Two related aspects of the current situation created by the decision to dismiss Admiral Bhagwat need to be addressed: namely giving credence and tacit encouragement to demands for promotions, appointments and transfers made by serving officers on political and/or communal grounds. It is important that we recognise that there is increasing manipulative use of caste, communal and religious sentiments in the body politic of the country as a whole. That this has filtered into every facet of society is not surprising - in recent times communalism has reared its head within the armed forces as well. It appears that this card has been used in the present case in the matter of appointment of the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff (DCNS) by Vice-Admiral Harinder Singh. Instead of allowing the Service Chief to deal with the case at his level, the MoD has virtually 'added insult to injury' by ramming his appointment as DCNS down the Navy's throat. Leaving aside for a moment the legalities, seniority and issues of merit involved in the intervention made by the MoD in the case of the appointment of the DCNS, if it is indeed true that this officer made communal allegations against the Navy Chief and references to the religious background of Bhagwat's wife, that alone should be enough to debar him from being considered for appointment as DCNS. Siddharth Varadarajan in his article in The Times of India (January 1, 1999) writes: "Admiral Bhagwat has been dismissed for refusing to accept as his deputy Vice-Admiral Harinder Singh, a man who in his writ petition has given ample proof of communalist, anti-Muslim bias. No matter what spin is put out, this is the long and short of the entire affair."

Many writers have touched upon the question of politicisation of appointments in the armed forces. This was indeed the reason which prompted General Thimayya in 1959 to tender his resignation when Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon tried to appoint Lt. Gen. B.G. Kaul Corps Commander, against his recommendation.

Prabhu Chawla and Manoj Joshi, in their article entitled "Sunk" in India Today dated January 11 have raised the issue of my own appointment as the Chief of the Naval Staff in the following words: "It is felt that the petition (filed by Bhagwat) enabled Vice-Admiral L. Ramdas to prevail over Vice- Admiral S. Jain as Admiral Nadkarni's successor in December 1990." For documentation of my selection as the Chief of the Naval Staff, I can do no better than refer readers to what the then President of India, R. Venkataraman, has written in his book, My Presidential Years (pages 453 to 456). One needs to say no more about this except to add that Chandra Sekhar, on assuming office as Prime Minister in November 1990, tried to reverse the Government decision regarding my appointment. This incident also finds mention in the former President's memoirs and once again is illustrative of the vagaries of political interventions.

To quote once again from the article by Prabhu Chawla and Manoj Joshi, "With Ramdas at the helm, Bhagwat's appointment was cleared in October 1991. Ramdas is now a prominent anti-nuclear activist campaigning against the Vajpayee Government." It is not clear what the reference to my stand on the nuclear question is driving at. However, it might be relevant in this context to mention that Rear Admiral Bhagwat's appointment as Commander of the Eastern Fleet was approved by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) on my recommendation as the Chief of the Naval Staff. My present views on India's lack of effective command and control systems that are needed to be an effective nuclear weapons state are known. The recent display of hasty decision-making, with next to no consultation on such a major step, only serves to strengthen these apprehensions.

The other day, I met one of my old shipmates - today a Master Chief Petty Officer Cook. He could not control his emotions, shared by other shipmates, when he spoke of the decision to dismiss his Chief, Admiral Bhagwat from service. I would like to share his comments in his own words: "Saab, ek junior sailor ko bhi poora defaulter ke baad, ya tho warrant punishment hotha hai ya 'court martial' ke baad nikaala jatha hai. Ab in logon ne hamare CNS saab ko aise hi nikaal diya. Yeh anyaay kyon ho raha hai?" (Sir, even a junior sailor cannot get punished this way except by a warrant punishment or by court martial. These people have dismissed our CNS just like that. Why this injustice?)

Anyone in uniform accused of a crime is provided counsel free of charge or he/she can hire a lawyer. Not for a moment is one insinuating that the former Navy Chief was free of faults - he too is human and therefore prey to human frailty. But making accusations that relate to 'national security' concerns is a serious matter and justice demands that opportunity be provided to him to defend himself.

If nothing else, this tragic episode of terminating the services of the Chief of the Naval Staff has brought into sharp focus fundamental and troubling questions of unequal power relations, weak structures and immature and unprofessional leadership obtaining within our civil-military complex and democratic set-up. This regrettable decision has inflicted a deep wound on the military's psyche and created scars which could take many years and extraordinary leadership skills to heal, regardless of denials and assurances by the political and civil leadership.

One can only hope that good sense will prevail, that some form of inquiry will be instituted, and that the sacrifice made by Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat will not be in vain.

Admiral L. Ramdas (retd) is a former Chief of the Naval Staff.