The divide in Iran

The Khatami Government's decision on Salman Rushdie has raised to new heights the conflict between moderates and hardliners within the Iranian establishment.

KESAVA MENON

A WAR may or may not break out on Iran's eastern frontier, but there is definitely one being waged in its political and intellectual circles. It has been fought with increasing ferocity in the 13 months since Hojatolesslam Syed Mohammed Khatami took office as President, and it appears to have reached its apogee over the Salman Rushdie affair. In no previous episode during this conflict has the dividing line been drawn as sharply as now.

The divide in Iran is not between people who admire Rushdie and appreciate his book, The Satanic Verses, and those who do not. It would be difficult to find in Iran, or for that matter in the rest of the Muslim world, someone who would boldly assert an opinion in favour of Rushdie. Those who abhor the man and his book are very vocal and aggressively so. Even among those who support Khatami and his liberal programme, there would probably be very few who would not repel any suggestion that The Satanic Verses did derive something from the nuances of the scripture. The divide is not between those who abhor Rushdie and those who do not, but between those who believe that their emotions will justify the killing of the man and those who think that such emotions should be restrained.

Those who want to see Rushdie dead - and are willing to kill him themselves if circumstances allowed, or pay someone to carry out the job for them - have call on a higher authority. Rushdie, they would claim, has committed such a gross and foul assault on Islam that it is holy duty to pay him back to the highest degree possible. And whatever the cost, there can be no compromise on this basic obligation. Viewed from another angle, it could be said that people who feel the urge to fulfil this obligation can claim that they are upholding the purity of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. If the revolution was meant to enshrine as the state's guiding philosophy the doctrine expounded by the Prophet, then the least the state should do is punish anyone who insults the Prophet's memory. The late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had himself declared that Rushdie had committed apostasy and should be given the death penalty.

GAMMA
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

This is a formidable array of ideological props which people who desire Rushdie's death can bring into the conflict and the debate. By comparison, counter-arguments based on the requirements of geo-politics or economic development appear morally deficient, even profane. The problem, as successive Iranian governments have realised with much difficulty, is that there is a very high cost to be paid in taking such a position. Iran desperately needs foreign funds for development, and if the suffering of economically backward people have to be weighed against the desire to punish a wayward writer, then there should clearly be no comparison. But no Iranian statesman, not even Khatami, has been able to develop a counter-argument on the basis that the primary objective of the revolution was to address the plight of the poor and the downtrodden.

What successive governments in Iran have resorted to until now appears to have been basically a policy of dissimulation. After much international pressure, the government headed by Hojatolesslam (now Ayatollah) Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani declared in 1996 that it had dropped the intent to implement Imam Khomeini's fatwa. By this it was apparently meant that no governmental agency or department would be ordered to send their personnel to kill Rushdie or otherwise arrange for his death. It was, however, explained that Islamic jurisprudence did not allow the government to revoke the fatwa. On almost every occasion on which the Government made such a declaration there was an immediate rejoinder from other elements in the clerical establishment that the fatwa was sacrosanct and that independent means were available for its implementation.

Khordad-15, an economic trust or holding organisation (these are usually termed buniyads or foundations in Iran-related scholarship), which was allotted a good portion of the property owned by the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and his acolytes after the revolution, has taken it upon itself to see that the fatwa is implemented. It has offered a $2.5-million reward for Rushdie's head. Given its resources, Khordad-15 should be able to finance the reward, and given its standing in the clerical establishment, there is probably nothing much that the government can do to prevent it. Officials have been unable to do much about the financial misadventures that some of these buniyads have indulged in, and hence they could hardly be expected to act against them when they claim to be upholding an ideological principle.

The situation subsequent to the announcement made by Iran's Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazzi at a press conference in the United Nations, is not any different. After his meeting with British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, Kharazzi affirmed that the Government did not support the death sentence and would not seek to implement it. A few days later, a lower-level official from the Foreign Ministry explained that this did not amount to a withdrawal of the fatwa (which could not be done) even as various sections in the clerical establishment were clamouring for its enforcement and the hardline press was urging the Government to revoke its decision. Until the time of going to press, the Iranian Government had not defended itself against this counter-blast, leave alone mount a campaign to promote its decision to withdraw the threat to Rushdie's life.

So how is the enunciation of policy by the Khatami Government any different from that of its predecessor? The difference, to some extent, would lie in the perception of people outside Iran. In the eyes of Iran-watchers, Rafsanjani was closely associated with the early excesses of the revolutionary regime. Although he was eventually considered a relative moderate, there was a persistent suspicion that Rafsanjani's moderation was a tactical ploy. The fact that his name was dragged into a criminal case in Germany, where it was found that Iran's top leadership was involved in a conspiracy to kill dissident Kurds, perhaps also made it difficult for a European government to satisfy itself with his Government's declarations on the Rushdie issue.

On the other hand, Khatami's name is not associated with the early excesses of the revolution. In fact, he was considered a moderate when he was a Minister in an earlier government and was dismissed for championing liberal causes. Khatami fought the presidential election on a liberal platform. But, more important is the fact that the Khatami Government has been taking the battle into the camp of the conservatives on a number of issues. Among the most important of the arenas where he has not merely distanced himself from the conservative hardliners but has actually joined issue with them is the need for freedom of speech and expression. Khatami is still not on such sure political ground that he can challenge directly the fatwa, but he is sincerely working in a field where the fatwa issue figures on extreme fringes.

A cynical view would be that the United Kingdom has become impatient at the fact that its European competitors, France and Italy, have been making strides towards a reconciliation with Iran while they themselves have tied themselves to an ideological post. Having a 70-million-strong population and huge reserves of natural gas and offering the best route of access to Central Asia and the Caspian, Iran is a market that cannot be ignored. It could be said that the U.K. was ready to grab the first available formula to resolve the Rushdie issue.

However, there is also wisdom in the U.K.'s decision. Over the past year Khatami has shown that he believes in his agenda of trying to bring Iran into closer alignment with international trends. Given Iran's internal circumstances, Khatami can do this by a political campaign only to a limited extent. What he has been trying to do is to allow processes, such as allowing greater freedom of expression, which should prove attractive to the public. When Khatami is waging a campaign of action rather than pronouncement, those who wish him well do provide assistance when they show that certain kinds of actions will produce rewards.

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