An ambiguous process

The outcome of Jaswant Singh's fourth round of discussions with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott remains opaque.

SUKUMAR MURALIDHARAN

INFERENCES about the intent and progress of the ongoing "strategic dialogue" between India and the United States can only be derived from events on the peripheries. Jaswant Singh, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, whose formal jurisdiction does not reach beyond the territorial boundaries of India, concluded a fourth round of discussions with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott on August 24. Routine expressions of goodwill apart, neither protagonist had much to say on the substance of their talks.

Jaswant Singh's long-awaited induction into the Union Cabinet, with responsibility for the External Affairs Ministry, could conceivably have given him a greater underpinning of gravity in his engagement with overseas interlocutors. Yet this ministerial appointment, which is considered almost axiomatic in its merits, is yet to materialise, since the rickety coalition at the Centre has not been able to take its mind off a basic agenda of survival. Questions could justifiably be raised about the extent to which a Government so unsure of its mandate could go in negotiating changes to the country's foreign policy doctrine.

Jaswant Singh's most recent meeting with Talbott was conducted in the wake of the U.S. missile strikes against locations in Afghanistan and Sudan, which are alleged breeding grounds of international terrorism. Already suffused with resentment, the global climate was further vitiated by a conspicuous display of contempt for world opinion by the U.S., when it blocked a debate in the United Nations Security Council over the attack on Sudan. With all the nonchalance of power, the U.S. Representative in the U.N. claimed that a non-partisan mission to ascertain the character of the factory destroyed on the outskirts of Khartoum would be superfluous since all the requisite evidence was in possession of American intelligence.

India's initial response was that the U.S. strikes were regrettable in their "selective and unilateral" nature. But the undertone of self-vindication was distinct. India had long been suffering the scourge of cross-border terrorism, said Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee as the Bharatiya Janata Party's national executive meeting concluded in Jaipur in the last week of August. A coordinated international effort to deal with the problem was necessary, in which India would remain a constructive participant.

CURIOUSLY, the Indian Government is yet to formulate a position on the methods adopted by the U.S. in its modern-day crusade. Varieties of ethical standards have been witnessed in the age of imperialism, and yet it is unclear that one country can really set itself up as the final arbiter of virtue, unobliged to share information with any other country or government. Where once India would not have hesitated to denounce the U.S.' invocation of the right of retribution against any country deemed culpable for a random act of terror, the BJP-led Ministry today shows a curious reticence.

This meshes in with the advocacy of the right of "hot pursuit" that certain senior BJP leaders - notably Home Minister L.K. Advani - have in recent times been engaged in. Being seen in tacit approval of the U.S.' global enforcement role may be one way of bidding for a like role in a regional or neighbourhood context. But the effort to partake of common rules of combat and obtain the same right of arbitrary action in the neighbourhood came a cropper. The final rites for this ambition were administered by Thomas Pickering, the veteran diplomat and hatchet man for American global designs, who was briefly Ambassador in India and currently holds one of the top four jobs in the State Department as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

Pickering's advice, conveyed through a special briefing for foreign correspondents based in Washington, was unambiguous in its implications. The U.S. could undertake military strikes anywhere in the world where it suspected that its vital interests were threatened by terrorism. American lives were not dispensable, said Pickering, with all the brutal candour that his country has rediscovered after the Gulf war.

The presence of certain Pakistan nationals at the Afghan locations targeted by the U.S. cruise missiles did not change American perceptions about the sponsorship of terrorism by Pakistan. This, said Pickering, remained a question that the American foreign policy establishment was continuing to deliberate over. One militant Islamic grouping, the Harkat-ul-Ansar, had been deemed to be involved in terrorist activity, and the official curbs enforced by the U.S. Government would put a "serious limitation" on the proscribed group's "funds collection in the U.S.". But direct action from India against terrorist organisations in Pakistan would be inadvisable and imprudent, since that would only spark a larger conflict.

By the standards of proof adopted in Sudan, the profound sense of indecision in relation to Pakistan must seem rather incongruous. The Taliban, which has been hosting Osama bin Laden - the newly discovered scourge of U.S. interests - is not identified directly as a terrorist organisation. In fact, the assessment of the Taliban that is available from the U.S. State Department from 1996 is that it is an "indigenous grouping" with certain claims to legitimacy that cannot be denied - its version of Islamic law being not particularly objectionable. There have since been a few deprecatory references to the Taliban from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, but the fact that the group enjoys solid U.S. patronage cannot be denied.

V. SUDERSHAN
Strobe Talbott with Jaswant Singh during the third round of talks in New Delhi on July 21.

Advani was unamused by Pickering's formulations and denounced him for his espousal of "double standards" and his audacity in suggesting that U.S. citizens were in some manner more privileged than others.

IF these are the ambiguities of tone that have set the context for the Jaswant-Talbott talks, the fact that their content has remained shrouded in secrecy should be no surprise. Shortly after the conclusion of the latest round of discussions, two conflicting versions were put out - both on the strength of unattributed high-level briefings of an unofficial kind. One version held that the talks had ended in stalemate, while the other held that there was a solid basis constituted for further negotiations.

The Jaswant-Talbott parleys, in other words, are the ideal territory for spin doctors of all hues to have their say without any sense of accountability. For the public record, the talks have dealt with certain core issues such as nuclear proliferation, security, technology transfer and economic policy. The linkages that have been struck between these disparate concerns and the perceptions of these on either side remain opaque to the public.

It has been the stated position of the BJP-led Government that accession to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) today will do no serious harm to India's national security interests, and that participation in talks towards a fissile material cut-off will in fact benefit the nation. These projections lose sight of the larger picture. They omit to mention that the CTBT and the fissile material cut-off are part of the larger architecture of global power administered today by the U.S.

The BJP-led Government has in various ways shown its eagerness to gain a position within this hierarchical power relationship. But the compromises involved and their political costs in the domestic context have restrained them.

For the U.S., talking terms with India is still not a matter of vital self-interest. Its interests in tacitly backing the Pakistani sponsorship of the Taliban in Afghanistan are strong, all the repugnance attached to that variety of religious fundamentalism being easily submerged in commerce. Its interests in engaging with a sub-continental polity such as India are not yet that strong. The BJP-led Government evidently embarked upon a policy of nuclear adventurism with the sole motive of striking a new bargain of convenience with the U.S. and forcing it to sunder its ties of intimacy with Pakistan. Events that have followed since should disabuse it of these facile notions. Yet, given the BJP's commitment to this vision, even the fifth round of talks between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott, scheduled for October, may, all its vacuousness apart, only prove the precursor for an equally futile sixth round.

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