'Clarifying the facts about 1962 is a precondition'

Sixty-seven-year-old Professor YE ZHENGJIA is Senior Research Fellow at the China Institute of International Studies, Beijing, which was set up in 1993 under the Foreign Ministry. Earlier he served as head of South Asian Studies in the Institute, and before that as the head of the domestic affairs and economic affairs section of the Institute of Indian Studies. In specialised knowledge and practical experience, he represents a unique link between the Nehru years of India-China friendship and the present. He served on the research staff of the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi between 1954 and 1962 specialising, among other things, on the boundary question. He joined the first Asia Division of the Chinese Foreign Ministry and, in 1963, was sent to work on two sections of the Sino-Pakistan boundary demarcation. He returned to New Delhi to work as First Secretary in the Chinese Embassy between 1985 and 1990. After retiring in 1996 as Director of South Asian Studies, he continues to work as Senior Research Fellow.

Professor Ye has a clear and distinctive view of what needs to be done - including what needs to be done differently - to develop the bilateral relationship and he sets it out without inhibition. He spoke to me at his office in English:

N. RAM

"WHEN Prime Minister Vajpayee ordered the nuclear tests, he did not increase India's security; rather it became worse. China is not a threat to India; our nuclear weapons were acquired and developed against the monopoly of the former Soviet Union and the United States.

"We never saw India as a target. India faced no security threat from us. Before the tests, India had a recognised nuclear weapon capability. There was no actual need to test. But since you do it, you have to prepare for further complications.

"Pakistan sees itself under threat. The Indian Government has made an offer of No First Use. I don't think Pakistan will accept it. Because in that case there will be no use Pakistan having nuclear weapons; there will be no meaning to its 'deterrent'.

"It was very bad judgment on the part of Mr. Vajpayee and the BJP-led Government. India has no use for nuclear weapons. You can't use them. I don't think any of the five nuclear weapon states are planning to use them. I don't think India is planning to use them. But if you press Pakistan too much, as a means of survival there is some kind of danger. The chances of this happening are very small. I don't think India will press Pakistan too much.

"Our bilateral relations have certainly suffered a serious setback because of the Indian Government targeting China. Prime Minister Vajpayee's letter (of May 11) to President Clinton was very bad. Somebody said he had signed it without reading it. But the letter is short and Mr. Vajpayee is clever. It showed very bad judgment.

"There is one thing about the 1962 war. There is a very big mistaken perception in India which sees China as an 'aggressor'. I know this to be a very widespread perception. I was working at that time in the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi. China was very tolerant; it was, in fact, on the defensive. We were forced by Indian foreign policy to defend our rights. We actually wanted the border situation stabilised.

"Indians have written a great deal accusing China as the 'aggressor'. This is unjustified, a wrong notion. If Indian politicians insist on this kind of view, I don't think there is any possibility of settling the boundary question, which must be settled on the basis of mutual understanding and accommodation, mutual adjustment.

N. RAM
The campus of the China Institute of International Studies in Beijing.

"My personal view is that it is a precondition (for the development of Sino-Indian relations) to see the right situation in 1962. Otherwise how can you come to terms with an 'aggressor'? You can't come to terms with a 'betrayer'.

"In my analysis, Mr. Nehru made a big mistake on this question. Before that, he did a lot of good work for solidarity among Asian and African countries. He supported China's rights. On the Tibetan question and the boundary question, Mr. Nehru made two big mistakes. This lowered India's status in international affairs. Many Asian and African countries wanted India and China to cooperate. This went against all their aspirations.

"Even today, the Indian Government, many Indian politicians want to force their conditions on China. I don't think this is the way to settle the boundary question. The boundary question can wait if we can't come to terms. This is not the best way, the best way is to sign an agreement on the boundary question. But it can wait if we don't have an agreement.

"Many times I suggested to our (Foreign) Ministry to clarify what happened in 1962. But I think our Government had some kind of apprehension that this would harm the atmosphere. My personal opinion is that we must make this clear, otherwise there is no basis for agreement.

"Now we have a very heavy burden. I think, however, that the burden is heavier on Indian backs than on our backs. India is very anxious to settle this boundary question on Indian terms. What happened in 1962, from 1959 to 1962? The facts must be clarified by the Chinese side.

"What Indian friends must do is this. If the Chinese side can put forward the facts, friendly Indian people should say, 'We must consider what China says'. We can't go forward smoothly without clarifying all the facts. At the beginning, people may feel surprised. But this is the way forward.

"We had this agreement on the Joint Working Group (JWG). The Indian side has some misperception of this. You can't use the Line of Actual Control (LAC) for demarcating the boundary. They want to use the LAC as the legal boundary. The LAC is the LAC; there are checkposts and so forth. In the agreement, it has been made clear that observing the LAC does not prejudice either side's position.

"The boundary line has to be scientifically discussed, delimited and demarcated. Maintaining peace and tranquillity along the LAC. Legally settling the borders. These are two different things and must not be confused.

"The first step should be preparing a good environment, not making it tense. Otherwise, you can't reach the final goal.

"On the JWG, our people find it very difficult to deal with the Indian side. The LAC is very clear on the ground. Which pass? Your position. My position. You have only limited passes to go through in the Himalayan range. The Indian side insists on 'No progress' etc. This kind of approach and attitude is wrong. I will advise the Indian Government to change this kind of attitude, which is not conducive to friendly relations.

"Targeting China? I don't think China is very worried. It will increase our defence budget. India will also have to spend more. Entirely a waste of resources.

"As for Tibet, I don't think India is doing the right thing on the Dalai Lama. India says, 'The Dalai Lama will function only as a religious leader.' Actually, the Dalai Lama is heading a 'government' on Indian territory. Our Government is not protesting. In my opinion, we should protest. If there is some problem with Tibetans, our Government will have to worry. This kind of apprehension is not good.

"India has its problems -- in the northeastern region, in Kashmir, in Punjab. If we interfere with each other, there can be no friendship, no normal relationship.

"On Tibet, it's the same kind of problem. In Nehru's time, the Indian Government first used the word 'suzerainty'. Nehru was very reluctant to recognise Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. More recently, the Indian Government has used the term 'Autonomous Region' (with reference to Tibet as part of China). This kind of issue, autonomy, should be left to our Government to decide, that is, what rights should be given to the Tibetan people. The Indian Government uses the words, 'integral part of Indian territory', for Kashmir, but has never used the words, 'integral part of Chinese territory', for Tibet.

"There is no other problem. If you have nuclear weapons, I don't mind. It's your sovereign right. As for the consequence, it's your problem. But, then, you use this issue against China.

"You have nuclear weapon capability. But weaponisation -- against whom will you use it? Before the tests, I wrote, 'You can have them but the consequence you must face. Pakistan will test, you will face a more dangerous Pakistan.' Sanctions and the increase in the military budget will be a much bigger burden for Pakistan than for India.

"I expected these nuclear tests two years ago. Because you want them as a currency of power. Two weeks before the (May 1998) explosions, I expected them and spoke about them. I believed your Government would use these weapons as a political weapon, not as military weapons. You can't drop them on Islamabad! They can't be used against each other.

"Some Indian politicians believe China is influential because China has nuclear weapons. This is a mistaken notion. Even the veto (in the U.N. Security Council) can't be easily used. China can't use it easily. The Soviet Union could use it against the United States and vice versa. But a weaker power can't use it. Countries like India and China have to build our economic power. We have to adjust relations with neighbours. I appreciate the 'Gujral doctrine' very much. It was the right way.

"Last October, when I met an Indian delegation, somebody observed that Indian influence (in international relations) has suffered a setback because of differences between India and China. I agree. In the mid-1950s, when we had very good relations, at the Bandung Conference India's international influence was much greater than it is nowadays.

"We read some newspaper reports that your Prime Minister was considering sending Mr. Jaswant Singh to China. What does Mr. Vajpayee want in Sino-Indian relations? When he was External Affairs Minister in Mr. Morarji Desai's Cabinet, his attitude was very good. Now it is bad. There should be a better attitude to China now that Mr. Vajpayee is master. I also remember from my New Delhi experience that he used to lead some black flag marches against our Embassy - on the boundary question and Tibet. Which Vajpayee is the real one?

"Because the Indian side did not see the facts right in 1962, from a wrong notion, India and China came to conflict. The BJP Government wants to force a boundary settlement on China on its terms. As a scholar, I would like to warn that if we do not take this boundary question on the right track, it could turn out to be dangerous. We can wait but the Indian Government will not wait (to resolve it).

"In my personal view, the Tibetan problem is even more important than the boundary question. The British (imperialist Raj) perception, as it has influenced the mind of the Indian ruling classes, is very wrong and dangerous: 'when there is a problem in Tibet, raise it!' You may have a strong or a weak government, but if you always think of interfering in Tibetan affairs, the future could be dangerous. As for Mr. George Fernandes' position, I know that the worse aspect relates to Tibetan affairs, not to the boundary question. As for security perceptions of China as a 'threat', we have seen Indian Defence Ministry reports. But when you link it with nuclear tests, it becomes another matter."

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