India's National Magazine
From the publishers of THE HINDU

Vol. 15 :: No. 15 :: July 18 - July 31, 1998

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OPINION

India-Pakistan relations in the new era

ASHRAF JEHANGIR QAZI

WE have entered a new era since the 11 nuclear tests of May. Some of the reasons advanced for doing so were disingenuous and/or based on obsolete concepts of balance of power, realpolitik, deterrence and status. These reasons should be challenged. But our real challenge is to deal with the consequences of the new situation.

For Pakistan the question of the motives behind the Indian tests was to a great extent irrelevant. It saw itself presented with a strategic development that impacted on its national security and the credibility of its policies. In the 17 days between Pokhran-II and Chagai there was a lively and informed debate in Pakistan, especially in the English language media, on whether to emulate India or not. Many cogent reasons for not doing so were advanced. But ultimately, the consequences of India emerging as the sole nuclear power in South Asia, the downside of any external security package or assurance, and the linkage Indian leaders themselves made between India's nuclear weapons status and its dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir determined the outcome.

So where do we go from here? What has essentially changed? How does the change impact on the conduct of India-Pakistan relations? What specific steps should we consider? These are some of the questions we need to address ourselves to with a new urgency and, if possible, with a new mindset.

BY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT
Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, Pakistan's High Commissioner in India.

One often comes across the superficial argument that the nuclear context has actually rendered the South Asia region more stable because now no dispute can ever be pushed to the extent of war. The balance of terror is said to impose peace in a way no pre-nuclear state or situation of nuclear ambiguity could. But in fact the opposite would appear to be closer to the truth.

Non-weaponised deterrence or nuclear ambiguity, which provided the parameters for India-Pakistan relations for the past decade and a half, allowed deterrence to function at a lower level of weapons capability, at a lower level of readiness and at a lower cost. By coming out of the closet and effectively declaring ourselves nuclear weapon states with sovereign rights to develop, test and deploy missiles and nuclear weapons as our security perceptions dictate, we have set up a dynamic that will inevitably lead to a race to develop the infrastructure of a second strike capability, anti-missile defence systems, a range of delivery options to counter such systems, the development of conventional capabilities in order to raise the nuclear threshold, and so on. All this will happen within an environment of increased diplomatic isolation, sustained economic sanctions, reduced investment and growth rates and a possible bonanza for right-wing hawks on the domestic scene in both countries.

WILL all this contribute to our respective national security? Will it reduce the chances of a deterrence systems breakdown with all its uncontrolled and potentially calamitous consequences? Will India and Pakistan command greater respect among the international community in such a torrid and traumatic scenario? Will they be able to deliver on their responsibilities to provide a better and safer existence for the next generation of their masses?

The short answer to these questions is quite obviously 'no'! Unless, of course, India and Pakistan can bring themselves to address - for the first time - the reality of their bilateral relationship, and the reality of the new context in which their bilateral relationship has to work itself out.

The international community, particularly the major powers, have responded to our nuclear tests not with reference to our respective concerns about global disarmament, a deteriorating strategic environment, national security and core issues, but with their own agenda, priorities and interests in mind. Moreover, what was always known to their elite decision-makers - that the peace of the subcontinent was at best fragile - has now become known to their general populace. Accordingly, via the media, this knowledge has entered their own public policy debates and has reinforced the perception that a nuclearised South Asia has become the most potentially hazardous flashpoint in the world. In a nuclear context the smallness of probabilities is outweighed by the largeness of consequences.

This is why we are listening to a new catechism from the U.N. Security Council, the P-5, the G-8, the European Union, and so on. The catechism reads: Thou shalt never be admitted to the club of recognised nuclear weapons states. Thou shalt sign and ratify the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) without condition. Thou shalt join discussions for a FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty). Thou shalt even join the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) as it is and as thou wert. Thou shalt not test, be it missile or nuclear device. Thou shalt not nuclear-tip thine warheads nor deploy missiles or nuclear weapons. Thou shalt not export or transfer technologies, weapons or components that could make other miscreants in thine own image, etc. etc.

THESE are the concerns of the world. We may wriggle and writhe and wring our hands as much as we like. We may strike moral, legal or chauvinist postures as much as we may. But these shall remain the concerns of the international community in general and of the major powers in particular and they will provide the context for the strategies we must adopt in the post-Pokhran/Chagai era. There is no escaping them, not just because these concerns are backed by power but also because they constitute the basis for our mutual security as neighbouring nuclear weapon states.

Needless to say, we have no intention of meekly accepting the testament of the P-5 or G-8 and reversing the clock. Virginity - whether nuclear or conventional - once lost is irretrievable. So too must nuclear innocence. We no longer have the luxury of playing the nuclear innocent, that is, determining policies on the basis of nuclear illiteracy. Our decision-makers, our intelligentsia and our masses must progressively acquire an essential knowledge of the implications of neighbourly nuclear animosity and the need for codes of conduct and survival.

Hence all the talk about unilateral moratoria, no first use, CBMs (Confidence Building Measures), no-war pacts, early warning systems, risk reduction and crisis management procedures, hot lines, permissive action links, command and control systems, time buffers, computer simulated scenario surfing and, of course, seminars, workshops, interfacings, and so on. Pakistan and India have both made exploratory proposals which can be discussed within the framework of their dialogue and under the rubric of peace and security including CBMs, which is the first item on the agreed agenda of the bilateral dialogue.

But all CBMs - nuclear or otherwise - require a context of understanding and a climate of mutual good faith. Otherwise, they will comprise just another set of zero sum stratagems, and will be seen as designed only to steal a diplomatic march. In the absence of a minimum of understanding and mutual good faith, even those CBMs that are agreed upon will not be implemented as intended. So, merely to refer to the catastrophic consequences which CBMs are designed to avert without at the same time seeking to build up the necessary climate of mutual understanding and trust will in practice doom the whole CBM exercise, however urgent, to futility.

WHAT do we mean by developing a climate of understanding and mutual good faith in the context of India-Pakistan relations? It means taking an honest look at our relations over the last 50 years and asking ourselves, why have we armed ourselves so fiercely - and may be uncontrollably - against each other? Oh, ho! I can hear my Indian friends exclaim, here comes the K-word! The supposed root of all evil between us and the magic mantra for the solution to all our problems!

Yes, my dear Indian friends, here indeed does come the inevitable K-word when we talk India-Pakistan relations. That is the Kashmir dispute. We need not here discuss its substance, its details, its origin, its history, its essence, its current state, its solution or settlement, and so on. These are all aspects on which, unfortunately, we have no hope of agreeing any time soon. But we can and should agree on one thing: the K-word, that is, the Kashmir dispute, is the one issue that has come, does come and may well continue to come between us and our shared desire and need to reach out to each other and build a new relationship based on the myriad indissoluble links between us.

We have a choice. Either we continue to make Kashmir the symbol of an insurmountable political, philosophical and civilisational divide that practically negates the binding links between us and shackles us in intimate and intractable animosity. Or we recognise it as an imperative to chart a mutually acceptable course towards its settlement which would enable us both to come to terms with the pain of our separation and begin to build a neighbourly relationship that answers to our obvious needs and deepest desires.

This choice is now imposed upon us with greater than ever clarity and insistence by our nuclear circumstance. Do we have the vision, the wisdom, the courage, the common sense, the decency and the practical genius to make the correct choice? Will we negotiate our suddenly nuclear context with inappropriate attitudes and failed approaches? Or will we summon the collective capacity to do things differently?

WHAT then is to be done? Essentially two things. One, to address the consequences, concerns, implications, risks and so on that stem from our having acquired and proclaimed our nuclear weapons capability. Two, to address the Kashmir dispute which has played a significant role - directly or indirectly, and to a greater or lesser extent - in our respective decisions to go nuclear and which, if not meaningfully addressed, will impede our ability to negotiate the nuclear context in which we now find ourselves. If we are unable to make progress on these matters in discussions among ourselves, how can we credibly tell the rest of the world that it has no business to concern itself with the futility and sterility of our dialogue, nuclear nightmares notwithstanding?

We really have no right to be stuck on modalities indefinitely. We have no right to play zero sum games forever. We have no right to think that we can set aside, freeze or forget the one issue that has set us apart all these years - and which can (however improbably) yet again threaten the peace between us in a new, alien, incomprehensible and infinitely more dangerous nuclear context. Despite our mutually exclusive positions on Kashmir and the fact that it may well elude a final settlement for a long time yet, we simply have to find a mutually acceptable modality for dealing with it and a mutually acceptable strategy to register movement towards an eventual settlement. Otherwise, we will neither begin to create the climate in which we can negotiate our nuclear context nor create the political space for much desired movement between us on other fronts.

History suggests we may need the help of mutual friends in this regard. To refuse such help while knowing the dismal prospects for any movement in exclusively bilateral talks is to insist on policy paralysis. Over the past 50 years we have both paid a high price for such policy paralysis even if at times we have suggested to ourselves that it was worth it. Over the next 50 years the luxury of such self-delusion will simply not be available to us.