Militia members under fire

PRAVEEN SWAMI

FARID AHMAD MIR had returned from his operations picket in Bandipore for his son's circumcision ceremony last month. A terrorist who had laid down arms, he worked with a local Army unit, gathering information and guiding security personnel through the rough forest terrain. His hope of reward was a job in the police or the paramilitary forces and a secure family life.

But it was not to be. Just as the ceremonial feast was laid out, a group of 18 terrorists arrived at his unguarded home. Having helped themselves to food, they asked for a guide to go to the next village. Believing that he had not been recognised, Mir volunteered. The next morning his body was found on the main road, riddled with bullets.

In the past one year, members of the counter-terrorist militias set up by surrendered insurgents have been the target of renewed violence in the Kashmir Valley. The most gruesome of the killings came on June 21, when top militia leader and member of the Legislative Assembly Yusuf 'Kuka' Parrey's nephew was killed in a landmine explosion along with four of his comrades-in-arms. The killing of Manzoor Parrey alias 'Wafadar Khan', the second-in-command of Yusuf Parrey's militia, showed that members of the militias were key targets of terrorist groups. These militias had helped decimate major terrorist groups, notably the Hizbul Mujahideen, between 1994 and 1996. Now, the battle for revenge has begun in right earnest.

NISSAR AHMAD
Arms and ammunition recovered by the Special Operations Group in Srinagar on July 7.

It is not clear if the militias are capable of, or are willing to, fight back. The reasons are not hard to find. In the run-up to the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, members of the militias had been promised comprehensive rehabilitation packages, including the option of recruitment in Central paramilitary organisations. Only a few have actually been rewarded for their bold efforts. Some 350 recruits have been inducted into the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and a small number into the Border Security Force (BSF). These figures are negligible, given the fact that there are thousands of surrendered insurgents working with the militias. Militia leaders also insist that their cadres have been bypassed in the recruitment, with the bulk of the benefit going to recruits with political connections or the ability to buy their way into jobs.

Jobs are not the principal problem for the militias. "A surrendered insurgent gets Rs.1,800 as State government grant, and if he works as a Special Police Officer, he gets another Rs.1,500," says Anantnag-based militia leader Liaqat Khan, better known by his nom de guerre, Hilal Hyder. "So money is not the only issue. The real problem is that instead of being treated as people who worked to bring about a solution, we are being treated as the problem. Our boys are harassed with police cases for no fault of theirs, because politicians find them convenient targets. There is no one to defend them from the onslaught they are facing." Khan ought to know. Five members of his group died in a recent assault by the Hizbul Mujahideen, provoking four others to defect to terrorists' ranks. "If this problem isn't addressed, many more will leave," he asserts.

Other militia leaders agree. "If there are no terrorists in Pampore, it is because of us," argues Papa Kishtwari, a one-time CRPF constable who became a terrorist only to lead eventually one of south Kashmir's most formidable militias. "Recently, the police took back more than 20 assault rifles from our picket, leaving us open to attack. Is this the reward for our sacrifices?" Reports of seizure of weapons and harassment by government authorities are common. "I was on my way to Bandipore recently," says a senior commander of Javed Shah's Srinagar group, "and needed to spend the night in a police station. Instead of helping us, the local police called us thieves and traitors, and abused us. It was only after an officer intervened that they let us stay."

Militia leaders admit that their popularity ratings are not high in Kashmir. Allegations of extortion and intimidation became alarmingly common after 1995, as militia members at least at the lower levels showed a gross lack of discipline. "It also happened," says a senior intelligence official, "because at that stage, there simply was not enough money to run the groups properly, and people were left to fend for themselves." The 1996 decision of the militias to contest the Lok Sabha and subsequently the Assembly elections, a decision attributed to their intelligence apparatus handlers, served only to alienate mainstream politicians. By the winter of 1996, the militia leadership was divided vertically. Some made their way to the National Conference, others to the BJP, neither grouping scoring worthwhile gains.

Leaders of militia groups are possibly exaggerating when they warn of large-scale defections or a mass rebellion. "The truth is," admits Javed Shah, "we took a one-way road, and there is no turning back... But we have the right to dignity and respect, and we will struggle until we get both."

"Perhaps people have done a lot of wrong things," adds Parrey's confidant Shiben Krishen Tickoo, "but they are the same people who helped bring peace to Kashmir...There is an unfinished task before them, but the broken promises do not inspire them to work."

Keeping the promises made to more than 3,000 insurgents who laid down their arms remains a key issue before both the State and Central governments.

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