For a domestic consensus

Recent events in the subcontinent potentially represent a serious setback to the gradual improvement in neighbourhood relations that I.K. Gujral had presided over, first as Minister for External Affairs and then as Prime Minister. Since India's nuclear tests, Gujral has been active in strategy debates and policy discussions, seeking as he says, to work towards a new "national consensus". In the course of an interview with Sukumar Muralidharan, he shared his perceptions of the prevalent situation and the challenges facing Indian politics and diplomacy. Excerpts:

India's nuclear tests have had repercussions for the Kashmir issue. This was predictable, since Pakistan's response was anticipated, and when there are two nuclear-capable states bordering each other with a history of hostile relations, the global community is going to look at the root causes of the animosity. It seems that the Kashmir issue and neighbourhood relations are entering a new phase.

It is not that they are entering a new phase. The difficulty is that powers who have all the time been keen to intervene now think that their opportunity has come. This is not the first time that we are experiencing this. After the Sino-Indian war, which unfortunately ended at great disadvantage to us, we were hoping that because of the contradictions of the Cold War, the West would come to our aid. But when their two missions came, they started talking about Kashmir and not about China. The same is the case now.

But let us make an effort to understand this. The Kashmir issue is now basically confined to the Shimla Agreement. This is a treaty between the two of us which neither has abrogated. And so long as the treaty exists, it remains a bilateral issue. So whoever tells us to settle it bilaterally is not making us any concessions.

Were the tests by themselves damage enough, or did the problem arise from subsequent actions like the threatening noises from certain Ministers?

I do not want to discuss that anymore because it is behind us. Whether it should have been done or not, done now or done later - that is an academic discussion which could go on forever. The main point is to deal with the fallout. We are now confronted with new realities. What was veiled is now exposed - that we both have nuclear weapon capability. This rules out war between us and leaves only one option - that of negotiations.

ANU PUSHKARNA

But do we have the same level of international patronage as Pakistan?

What can patronage do? Sanctions have been imposed - that is obligatory. Only time will tell whether it is pinching them (the West) more or the two of us. But one thing we can possibly think of is that bilateral relations must begin afresh. Nawaz Sharif telephoned me last week and he asked me a straight question: 'What can be done?' I told him the tests have been done; they cannot be undone. So let us proceed from here. And I suggested to him kindly to keep in mind that some of them have this problem of speaking of third-party mediation. Both of us in the subcontinent have had the colonial experience. In today's context, the third party may not come in physically, but hegemonically, and both of us will lose. So it is in our mutual interest to talk to each other.

Was he a receptive listener?

I think so because the Pakistan High Commissioner (in Delhi) came later to discuss these points with me.

There is some talk in the U.S. that China has a role to play in maintaining peace in South Asia.

This new dimension is very interesting. In 1995, I was in the U.S. Mr. (William) Perry, who was Defence Secretary at the time, was visiting China. In Beijing he made the statement that China should take greater interest in South Asia. It so happened that I had to deliver two lectures. At both these I raised the point: Why did Mr. Perry say this? Are you creating new areas of influence? Are you bringing in a new colonial era? It so happened that an official of the State Department was present at one of the lectures. He got up and said that I was overreacting. Even today, U.S. Defence Secretary Mr. (William) Cohen is saying the same thing and President Clinton too. This should make us really think.

We had a process of rapprochement with China under way. Did the Government make an error in identifying China as a strategic threat in the communication to President Clinton?

There are two ways of looking at this. The talks with China were going on; progress was slow, but definitely satisfactory. I think the last time when President Jiang Zemin came here, the progress was sizeable. We have now reached a stage where we can define the Line of Control. Now it is a fact that some statements were made here which could have been avoided. But long-term diplomacy does not depend upon these statements. I think that for China, the rethinking has begun. It is difficult for China to accept the emergence of two new nuclear powers in this region. They have to reorient their diplomacy. Power parities are undergoing a change. President Clinton was thinking, if my assessment is correct, in terms of zones of influence. That has been challenged now and not just in terms of rhetoric. The important thing now is to have a consensus within our country. The existing consensus is strained, if not fractured.

Do you think whatever is under way right now is adequate? Is the internationalisation of Kashmir a setback?

I could deal with this question in partisan language and derive some sort of perverse satisfaction that these gentlemen have done it. But Kashmir is part of India, it is part of you and me. I cannot set fire to my house just so that I could put the blame elsewhere. Indian democracy basically means that we debate, we differ, but we evolve a consensus. This does not mean that the Opposition must agree with the government or the reverse.

Even U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan had called you to talk about the new situation.

He also discussed the same thing. And I told him you could help us by keeping this matter within the bilateral framework. Another thing I told him was that I appreciated his statement in Chicago, where he told the P-5 to look at their own homes and see the dirt that has accumulated.

That again is another aspect. India has always taken a stand that it cannot disarm when they are arming themselves to the teeth, that we want a global and non-discriminatory approach to disarmament. Does this stand suffer now?

Basically, this world would be safe and every country would be safe in the process of disarmament. The difficulties are two - the P-5 having the nuclear weapon and also using it as an instrument of diplomatic superiority.

Do you mean coercion and intimidation?

I am avoiding those words. But what is the new world order you are thinking of? The last time I met President Clinton, I told him that every time I go to the U.N., I see a signboard outside the Security Council. It is invisible, but I can read it. What I see written there is: 'You can come in, but only if you have money or the bomb.' So then I turn around to my people and tell them, money is very difficult to make, but the bomb may not be so difficult. I told him, when you are thinking of a way to reform the U.N., please spell out the criteria to me. So then one of his aides intervened and said: 'No, you see, money is very important for the U.N.' So I told him that they could possibly put the seats on auction, and then maybe Libya could buy it.

This new world order is a new type of parity, in which some countries are superior to others. If I may say so, these nuclear tests by India and Pakistan are a major challenge to that.

But as you yourself have said, this proposal to test has been there since 1987, and India had six Prime Ministers who did not approve of it.

Every Prime Minister has to assess the costs and benefits. Some could be right and some could be wrong. But ever since we decided to acquire the deterrent, every Prime Minister has acted with a great deal of responsibility.

Including the current Prime Minister?

I do not question the sense of responsibility of Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee.

But his reading of costs and benefits was different?

Definitely. When you read the costs and benefits there could be two viewpoints. My conclusion may have been different. Maybe he is right and maybe I was not. But my view has always been that in the new world order, economic development occupies the front seat. Weapons do not make you a big power.

When you talk of bilateral talks with Pakistan, cooling tempers will depend upon progress on the Kashmir question.

Progress means discussion. If somebody in Pakistan thinks that an Indian Prime Minister will go there and say - 'here is Kashmir, it is yours, take it' - can any Indian Prime Minister do it? Can the Indian state survive after that? I have always said that settlement with Pakistan is not an event but a process. Ultimately, you may come to a solution that may be at the back of your mind, but you do not want to say it. But we both have to pass through the process.

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