Of scientists and nukes

There are disturbing questions about the role played by India's nuclear and defence research scientists.

T. JAYARAMAN

EVEN as the political drama triggered by the 'Shakti 98' series of Indian nuclear tests deepens, with Pakistan conducting its own series of tests in response, the political stock of Indian science and technology remains at an all-time high. Despite the sharp political divide that has emerged on the nuclear issue, with the Opposition parties questioning the BJP-led Government on the motivations behind and the timing of the tests, the atomic energy and defence research establishments have continued to receive kid-glove treatment. In fact, it has been an integral part of the BJP-led Government's strategy to use the 'scientific' argument, and the general public appreciation of Indian science and its successes, to justify its reactionary departure from India's established nuclear policy. Initiating the parliamentary debate on the nuclear issue, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee claimed that India's newly acquired 'nuclear weapon state' status was "an endowment given to her by scientists and engineers." In another instance, Parliamentary Affairs Minister Madan Lal Khurana claimed that the tests were a scientific necessity.

But disturbing questions have emerged about the actual scientific performance as well as the background political role of the atomic energy and defence research sectors in relation to this series of nuclear tests. These questions cannot be brushed aside by citing the excuse of the inviolability or 'neutrality' of expert scientific opinion, nor can questions of scientific credibility be taken care of by mere statements of patriotic faith in Indian scientists.

The major scientific issue pertaining to the tests that is not satisfactorily resolved is whether the explosions of May 11 included the explosion of a true thermonuclear device. The questions have been raised primarily on two counts. One is that there is a discrepancy between the seismographic data of the Indian sensors and foreign sites, with the seismographic evidence of the foreign sites suggesting that the explosions were less powerful than claimed by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). The second is that according to some expert opinion, even the claimed power of the explosions seem not to fall in the class of true thermonuclear devices.

Dr. B.K. Subba Rao, in his criticism of the DAE on this score (see separate article), has clearly made out a case that there is something untenable about the discrepancy between the data recorded by the Indian sensors and the foreign ones. How could the interference effect, which the DAE claims caused the data discrepancy in the foreign sensors, not affect the Indian sensors?

ANU PUSHKARNA
Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee with Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Dr. R. Chidambaram (left) and the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, in New Delhi on May 14, a day after the second round of the Pokhran-II nuclear tests.

It is not unknown in science that under political pressure experiments can produce results that reflect what is desired rather than what actually happened, or data are produced that do not correspond to what was measured. This may well have happened in the case of the Indian seismic data.

Apart from this, there was a discrepancy between yield estimates from foreign seismic data and the official Indian figures. Although the DAE's original explanation of an interference effect is rather weak and has rightly been challenged, some foreign experts have now changed their original estimates to those that are consistent with official Indian ones. One must add here that it is a well-known practice in nuclear weapons technology to set off multiple explosions in order to confuse foreign sensors. From the seismic data, it is also quite difficult to estimate yields exactly and several factors like site preparation, the nature of the soil in the region of the explosions and subsurface formations could affect the final calculation, leading to considerable uncertainties in the final yield figures.

The major suspicions expressed in the foreign media about whether India really has a thermonuclear weapon essentially centres on the low explosive power of the devices. In general, the data appear consistent, according to foreign experts (cited in a New York Times article by William J. Broad) with a "boosted" fission device. However, the DAE has chosen to counter the doubts aggressively with an explicit claim that it was indeed a genuine hydrogen bomb, with two explosive stages.

It is true that advanced design thermonuclear devices of explosive power ranging from a few tens of kilotons upwards are known to be present in various nuclear arsenals and have been tested. In general, however, they have been the result of several years of testing and research, involving both a boosted fission stage and a megaton thermonuclear stage. In the absence of such stages in the Indian development of a thermonuclear device, the DAE claims appear exaggerated to some observers. There are, however, other experts who have stated that such a low-yield thermonuclear device is in fact the correct technological route.

It is important that the Government and the DAE make known exactly where India is on the thermonuclear question. From the standpoint of scientific credibility as well as informing the nation of what exactly happened, it is important that this issue is clarified. Dr. Raja Ramanna, an acknowledged spokesman for the nuclear establishment, in a lengthy television interview to Doordarshan on May 27, did little to clarify this question and simply dismissed all criticism. Even more strangely, the Prime Minister's statement in Parliament was silent on the subject of a thermonuclear device having been developed.

TO turn from the question of performance to policy, one aspect of the atomic energy establishment has drawn little comment in this period, namely the entirely pro-active role that it has played in the building up of pressure to conduct the tests.

The evidence for this was originally indirect, based mainly on the strong political support that was provided by top scientific spokesmen for the nuclear energy establishment for the Government's decision to conduct the tests in terms that went well beyond any demands of scientific clarification. But more direct evidence is provided by the statements of former Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda, in his May 15, 1998 letter to Vajpayee. Deve Gowda states clearly that the "scientists had approached two previous governments to continue the tests, once in 1995 and then in 1997." He adds that as in the case of P.V. Narasimha Rao before him, "I was requested to make a decision to conduct fresh nuclear tests. I convinced the scientists that the time was not ripe..."

Some DAE scientists, in public comments and in off-the-record statements to journalists, have expressed happiness that the Government gave them the chance to demonstrate their capabilities and their competence. This attitude reflects an unacceptably naive standpoint on the question of the political role of science and scientists, especially in nuclear weapons technology. Undoubtedly, DAE and DRDO scientists have, in their research programmes, sought to fulfil the mandate that was given to them by the overall policy orientation. But they cannot claim a right to extend the scientific part of the mandate to the point where it goes against the basic political tenets on which the policy is based.

It is even more serious when a critical section of the scientific leadership goes over to an active advocacy of testing and weaponisation, furthering the creation of a mood that has helped the present Government overturn a peace-oriented, non-military nuclear policy. Indian science, with all its problems, has no need of Edward Tellers.

It is important to emphasise here that there can be no argument of "scientific necessity" for nuclear weapons testing. The basic rationale for testing, with respect to any technology, is of course that one must be certain that the projected designs will work. But this argument cannot be extended indefinitely to situations where the consequences of testing have an immense political or social fallout. The political and other aspects must have overriding priority here. This argument is by no means new. In the field of genetic engineering, certain classes of cloning experiments involving human DNA have been simply disallowed in several countries, irrespective of any potential scientific value.

Undoubtedly, non-testing may require scientists to take more innovative routes, of a much more theoretical or controlled laboratory nature, to validating their designs. If such a discipline is imposed by political requirements, then science must necessarily accept this. In any case, as the experience of Pokhran-II has made clear, the necessary steps to testing could have been undertaken in short order, if there was indeed a genuine need for it.

This pro-active stance of a small group of scientists, in positions of administrative importance and political influence, on nuclear weapons testing, and their increasingly open advocacy of the weaponisation option, is a significant departure from the public style of the Indian scientific establishment that has prevailed thus far. The boastfulness of scientific spokesmen after the explosion has been noticeable. Prof. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam claimed that the nuclear threat to India had been "vacated" while Dr. Raja Ramanna claimed that the tests had provided security to India. As the nuclear arms race escalates in the subcontinent with Pakistan's retaliatory tests, these claims have been shown up to be completely hollow. The Pakistani tests have put the claims of Indian scientific superiority in better perspective.

It is probably overstating the case to speak of the militarisation of parts of the scientific establishment. But clearly a section of top scientists, in the process of helping to overturn established nuclear policy and subsequently defending the new line, have not merely provided support to the pursuit of the jingoistic agenda of a particular political formation. They have contributed to dangerous illusions of strength and invincibility on the subject of national defence and security. The current euphoria over nuclear science and defence research has obviously made most senior scientists wary of speaking out critically. Several others labour under the illusion that there is a purely "scientific" question of nuclear tests that justifies Pokhran-II, that should be considered independently of the political background which led to the tests. Fortunately, some voices of dissent have emerged from within the scientific community on the nuclear weapons issue. Although still a minority, they might eventually help to turn science in India more firmly in the direction of peace and development.

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